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Abstract
We propose and investigate a semantics for peer data exchange systems where different
peers are related by data exchange constraints and trust relationships. These two elements
plus the data at the peers’ sites and their local integrity constraints are made compatible
via a semantics that characterizes sets of solution instances for the peers. They are the
intended -possibly virtual- instances for a peer that are obtained through a data repair
semantics that we introduce and investigate. The semantically correct answers from a peer
to a query, the so-called peer consistent answers, are defined as those answers that are
invariant under all its different solution instances. We show that solution instances can
be specified as the models of logic programs with a stable model semantics. The repair
semantics is based on null values as used in SQL databases, and is also of independent
interest for repairs of single databases with respect to integrity constraints.
To appear in Theory and Practice of Logic Programming (TPLP).
KEYWORDS: Peer data exchange, answer set programs, disjunctive stable model seman-
tics, metadata management, schema mappings, relational databases, integrity constraints,
database repairs, consistency.
1 Introduction
A peer data exchange system (PDES) (also known as a peer data management
system) can be conceived as a finite set P = {P1, . . . , Pn} of peers, each of them
owning a local relational schema and a database instance. When a peer P receives a
query, in order to answer it, P’s data is completed or modified according to relevant
data that other peers may have. For this to be possible, P has to be directly related
to some neighbor peers Q through sets, Σ(P, Q), of logical mappings or data exchange
∗ Contact author.
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constraints (DECs), from P to Q. They are first-order sentences expressed in terms
of the elements of the database schemas of P and Q. In their turn, P’s neighbors may
have their own neighbors, who through their data may, transitively and eventually,
have an impact on P’s data as well.
DECs between two peers are expected to be satisfied by the combination of the
two local instances. In this sense, DECs act as integrity constraints (ICs) on the
combination of two schemas and their instances. However, they are not forced to be
satisfied, and there is no mechanism in place for maintaining them. Actually, it is
the inconsistency of a DEC that will enable the movement of data between peers,
at query-answering time: When a peer P receives a query, it examines its DECs,
on that basis poses queries to its neighbors, who return consistent data to P. P
also queries its own database. If its DECs are not satisfied by the collected data, P,
after a -possibly virtual- consistency repair process, composes a consistent answer
to the original query. A peer’s answering of a query received from an external user
or another peer triggers an iterative process of interleaved consistency checking of
DECs with respect to the data at hand, and the repair of the latter if necessary.
This movement of data among peers is used for query answering, but not for
updating the local physical instances with the purpose of having the DECs satisfied.
Of course, this could be done by a peer who receives data from other peers, if it
decides to do so. However, it is not the goal of data exchange in such a system
to have all the instances synchronized and globally satisfying the DECs. Peers
are autonomous, their instances are possibly being independently updated, and
other peers are not expected to be aware of that. DECs constrain and trigger data
exchange through their inconsistency, which is detected and resolved locally, by a
single peer, namely the one who owns those DECs. We do not assume any kind
of central or global coordination; nor that any two neighbors interact for DEC
evaluation.
A peer P that is answering a query may, at query-answering time, import data
from its neighbors, to complement its data and/or ignore part of its own data. The
way a peer uses the imported data of course depends on its DECs, but also on the
trust relationships to its neighbors: A peer P may trust its data the same as or less
than a neighbor’s data. As a consequence, in our PDESs, data exchange is driven
by inconsistency and constrained by trust.
Example 1.1
Peers P1 and P2 have relational schemas S(P1) = {R1(·, ·, ·),S 1(·)}, and S(P2) =
{R2(·, ·),S 2(·, ·)}. Here, P1 is connected to peer P2 by P1’s set of DECs:
Σ(P1, P2) = {∀x∀y(R2(x , y) ∧ S 2(y , z )→ R1(x , y , z )), ∀x (S 1(x )→ S 2(5, x ))}·
These DECs belong to P1; and P2 may not even be aware of them. Let’s assume
that P1 trusts P2 more than itself. The existence of DECs from P1 to P2, and the
trust relationship are indicated in Figure 1 by the labeled arrow from one instance
to the other.
We can see that the DECs are not satisfied by the combined instance, which is
perfectly acceptable; we do not have to do anything.
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Fig. 2. A neighborhood solution instance for P1
do not have to do anything.
Now, a query is posed to P1, e.g. Q1(x) : ∃yzR1(x, y, z). In order to answer it,
P1 has to adjust its own data, so that the DECs with P2 are satisfied. In order to
do this, P1 will ask P2 for its data, issuing to P2 queries in P2’s language, namely
Q121 : R2(x, y) and Q122 : S2(x, y). Although P1 does not need the whole extensions
of P2’s tables, using this coarse queries will allow us to better illustrate the solution
instances for each peer, are they are not defined by a particular query at hand.
Notice that, at this stage and from the point of view of P2, the queries Q121 and
Q122 can be considered as queries posed by an external user, as the queryQ1 received
by P1.
Since P2 has no DECs to other peers, it will return to P1 its physical data, without
any modification, as query answers. In this case, P2’s current instance is its only
solution instance. Now P1, confronted with a combined instance, can detect that
the first DEC is not satisfied, because the tuple 〈d, 5, 3〉 is not in R1. Nor the second
DEC, because the tuple 〈5, 7〉 is not in S2.
Since P1 trusts P2’s data more than its own, the inconsistencies are locally solved
by P1 by adding 〈d, 5, 3〉 to R1, and removing tuple 〈7〉 from S1. These changes can
be only virtual and for query answering purposes. In this case, there is only one
neighborhood solution (instance) centered around P1, i.e. for the combined schema
of itself and its neighbors. It is shown in Fig. 2.
The restriction of this neighborhood solution to P1’s schema is the solution instance
for P1, and it is used to answer the initial query posed to P1. Thus, the answers to
Q1 are 〈c〉, 〈f〉, 〈d〉. 2
It is not difficult to realize that in other situations, a peer P might have several
neighborhood solutions, leading to also possibly several (local) solution instances.
The answers returned by P (to an external user or another peer) will be the peer
consistent answers, i.e. those that are shared (or returned) by all the different
solution instances for P. That is, a cautions (a.k.a. skeptical or certain) semantics
is applied to query answering.
We should also emphasize that, in the example above, the semantic conflicts
related to the DECs were solved by performing a minimal set of virtual changes
on the database relations. Without making specific commitments about the notion
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Now, assume that the qu ry Q(x ) : ∃yzR1(x , y , z ) is posed to P1. In order to
answer it, P1 notices through the DECs that P2’s schema is related to its predicate
R1. Accordingly, P1 has to adjust its own data, so that the DECs with P2 are
satisfied. In order to do this, P1 requests P2’s data, by issuing to P2 atomic queries
in P2’s language, namely Q1(x , y) : R2(x , y) and Q2(x , y) : S 2(x , y).1 Notice that,
at this stage and from the point of view of P2, the queries Q1 and Q2 can be
considered as queries posed by an external user, so as query Q was posed to P1.
Since P2 has neither DECs to other peers nor local ICs, it will return to P1 its
physical data, without any modification, as query answers. Now P1, confronted
with a combined instance, can detect that the first DEC is not satisfied, because
the tuple R1(d , 5, 3) is not in R1. Nor the second DEC, because the tuple S 2(5, 7)
is not in S 2.
Since P1 trusts P2’s data more than its own, the inconsistencies are locally solved
by P1 by inserting R1(d , 5, 3) into R1, and deleti g tuple S 1(7) from S 1. These
changes c uld be only virtual, and for the purpose of answering the query at hand.
In this case, P1 has a single neighborhood solution (instance), th t is, an instanc for
the combined schema that satisfies the DECs, an in some sense, minimally departs
from th (inconsistent) instance that had been formed at P1’ neighborhood. This
neighborhood solution for P1 is shown in Figure 2. The restriction of this instance
to P1’s schema is a solution (instance) for P1, and is used to answer the initial query
posed to P1. Thus, the answers to Q are 〈c〉, 〈f 〉, 〈d〉. 2
In the example, for illustration purposes, we used a particular and well-known
repair semantics, i.e. a particular way of restoring consistency on a database that
does n t satisfy a given set of ICs,2 while still staying “as close as possible” to the
given, inconsistent instance. In th s case, repairs minimize, under set inclusio , the
set of tuples that are deleted or inserted (Arenas et al. 1999). Repair semantics
come with their minimality criteria. (Cf. (Bertossi 2011) for a general discussion of
1 Actually, P1 does not need the whole extensions of P2’s tables. However, asking for P2’s whole
tables allow us to better illustrate our general approach.
2 We emphasize that DECs can be seen as ICs on combined schemas and instances.
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repair semantics, and for references to different repair semantics.) In this work we
will introduce, investigate and use a variation of the repair semantics used in the
example.
In some cases, a peer P may have several neighborhood solutions, leading to also
possibly several (local) solution instances. The answers returned by P (to an external
user or another peer) will be the peer consistent answers, i.e. those that are shared
(or returned) by all the different solution instances for P. That is, a cautious (also
known as skeptical or certain) semantics is applied to query answering (Brewka
et al. 2011; Leone et al. 2006). The same do P’s neighbors, who may have solutions
of their own, when they hand over their data to P: They give away their own
peer-consistent data.
The notion of solution instance for a peer is used as an auxiliary notion, to
characterize the semantically correct answers from P’s point of view. When trying
to correctly answer a query, we try to avoid, as much as possible, the generation
of material solutions instances. Ideally, a peer would compute its peer consistent
answers to a user query just by querying the already available local instances, and
dealing with the involved DECs on-the-fly, at query answering time.
In this work we formalize these ideas, by first providing a general semantic frame-
work for PDESs and their solution-semantics. It captures in abstract terms, and in
this order, the notions of: (a) PDES, including a broad and useful syntactic class
of DECs; (b) neighborhood solution for a peer, appealing to an abstract repair-
semantics that involves trust relationships; (c) solution for a peer, a recursive con-
cept due to a possible (always finite) chain of peers building each, one after another,
neighborhood solutions; and (d) peer-consistent answer.
The result is a formal semantics for a system of peers who exchange data for query
answering. It is a model-theoretic possible-world semantics that characterizes the
class of intended instances for a peer, the above mentioned solutions. The expected
answers from a peer are certain with respect to that class, i.e. true in all of them.
Next, as a second main subject, we instantiate the general semantic framework,
and introduce and investigate a specific repair (or solution) semantics for PDESs.
We do so by making some specific commitments and assumptions: (a) Database
instances may have null values as those used in SQL relational databases. (b)
Those null values behave and are handled as in DBMSs that (at least partially)
comply with the SQL Standard, in particular with respect to IC satisfaction and
query answering. (c) The null-based solution semantics that we introduce heavily
depends on the presence of nulls a` la SQL, and on the use of nulls to restore
consistency. (d) This null-based repair semantics comes with its own minimality
criterion. (e) Query answering, and DEC and IC satisfaction follow a a logic in
databases with null a` la SQL that we formalize for conjunctive queries and a broad
class of DECs and ICs.
For the gist, the null-based repair semantics we adopt does not allow, for example,
to introduce a null value to satisfy a join, such as that with the existential z in the
DEC ∀x∀y(R(x , y)→ ∃z (S (x , z ) ∧ T (z , y))). In this case, a tuple deletion from R
will be preferred. However, a null can be used for variable z in a tuple inserted to
satisfy the DEC ∀x∀y(R(x , y)→ ∃zS (x , z )) (a deletion from R is also possible).
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Our decision to consider null values, as used in SQL relational database systems,
for single database repairs and solutions in PDESs is based upon and motivated by
the facts that: (a) In this way our research becomes close to database practice; (b)
it can be made compatible with and applicable in that practice; (c) SQL DBMSs
implicitly implement a sort of null-based repair semantics (when maintaining ICs);
(d) that “repair semantics” deserves a theoretical investigation; and (e) at least
a sizeable part of the SQL standard and practice can be be put on solid logical
grounds. Actually, we are able to bring into this research essentially all the classes
of integrity constraints and logical mappings that are used in both database practice
and research, and to treat them according to the just mentioned null-based SQL
semantics.
We emphasize, however, that our abstract framework is sufficiently modular and
flexible to adopt alternative repair semantics for dealing with inconsistency and
incompleteness of data.
We see our work also as a contribution to the subjects of repairs and consistent
query answering for single relational databases. Repairs based on the use of nulls;
actually a single one with a semantics in the style of SQL -which we also logically for-
malize in this work- had been presented in preliminary form in (Bravo and Bertossi
2006; Bravo 2007). Here, we provide an extended and definitive formulation, and
we apply it to peer data exchange.
We also investigate complexity-theoretic and algorithmic issues related to the
solution semantics. More specifically, we show that deciding if a neighborhood in-
stance is a neighborhood solution for a peer is coNP -complete in data, and deciding
if a tuple is a peer consistent answer to a local query is ΠP2 -complete in data. We in-
vestigate a particular, important and common case of the PDES semantics, where
peers just import data from other peers to complete their own data set, without
giving semantic priority to the latter. This leads to a reduction in data complexity
for the solution checking problem.
Finally, we show that the null-based, model-theoretic semantics for PDESs can
be captured by means of disjunctive logic programs with stable model semantics
(Gelfond and Lifschitz 1991), also known as answer set programs (ASPs) (Brewka
et al. 2011). More specifically, we establish an explicit correspondence between the
solutions for a peer and the stable models of the program, obtaining, in this way, a
declarative semantics for PDESs that can also be made executable.
In relation to most immediately related work, the idea of peer consistent query
answering resembles that of consistent query answering (CQA) in databases (Are-
nas et al. 1999): Consistent answers to a query posed to a database that may be
inconsistent with respect to certain ICs are invariant under all repairs, i.e. the min-
imally repaired and consistent versions of the original instance. Furthermore, there
are mechanisms for computing consistent answers that avoid or minimize the phys-
ical generation of repairs. Logic programs for specifying database repairs as their
stable models have been proposed and investigated in (Arenas et al. 2003; Greco
et al. 2003; Barcelo and Bertossi 2003; Caniupan and Bertossi 2010). Cf. (Bertossi
2011; Bertossi 2006; Chomicki 2007) for recent surveys of CQA.
Our work can be classified among those on semantic and schema-based ap-
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proaches to peer-to-peer data management systems (Halevy et al. 2003; Halevy
et al. 2004; Calvanese et al. 2004; Franconi et al. 2004; Bertossi and Bravo 2004b;
Calvanese et al. 2005; Fuxman et al. 2006). The emphasis is on specifying the in-
tended and legal database instances behind a system of peers who are connected
with each other by means of schema mappings.
Different notions and forms of trust have been considered in P2P information
sharing systems (Demolombe 2011; Sabater and Sierra 2005; Artz and Gil 2007;
Marti and Garcia-Molina 2006) (cf. the special issue (Boutaba and Marshall 2006)),
but not much in the context of semantic PDESs, where the trust relationships be-
tween peers are used to essentially modulate or qualify the use of the data exchange
constraints between peers. Our emphasis is on the integration of trust and data
exchange constraints, with a notion of trust that is closer to the notion of relative
reputation or reliability of a peer as a source of information, in relation to the qual-
ity of its data (Marti and Garcia-Molina 2006). In this work, trust relationships are
given, and not computed or updated (Jøsang et al. 2006; Jøsang et al. 2012).
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides technical preliminaries and
basic elements of PDESs. Section 3 introduces a general semantic framework for
PDESs. Section 4, in preparation for the introduction of what will be the official,
concrete peer-solution semantics, discusses and formalizes database instances with
null values as used in SQL. It also formulates query answering and integrity satis-
faction in those databases. Section 5 instantiates the abstract semantic framework
proposed in Section 3 by introducing a particular consistency restoration seman-
tics based on the use of null values. This section also investigates the complexity
of some computational problems. Section 6 captures the semantics of the previous
section in terms of logic programs with stable model semantics. In Section 7 we
discuss related work. In Section 8 some final conclusions are drawn. The electronic
Appendix A discusses several additional and alternative approaches and issues with
respect to the previously introduced general and specific semantics. The electronic
Appendix B gives proofs of our main results. This work considerably extends and
develops the semantics for PDESs first suggested in (Bertossi and Bravo 2004b),
and further developed in (Bertossi and Bravo 2007).
2 The Basic PDES Scenario
Every peer in a PDES will have a local relational schema with a local relational in-
stance. For this reason, we recall first some basic notions from relational databases.
A relational schema S consists of a set of relational predicates. A relational pred-
icate R ∈ S with arity n and attributes A1, · · ·,An , is commonly denoted with
R(A1, . . . ,An), or sometimes simply R(·, . . . , ·). Each attribute A of (a predicate
in) S has a possibly infinite data domain, Dom(A). In general, we will denote with
U the union of the attribute domains, obtaining a single, possibly infinite data
domain.
In addition to the database predicates in a relational schema S, we have a set
B of built-in predicates (that have a fixed semantics), e.g. comparison predicates,
such as =, 6=, <, etc. We assume that B contains the propositional predicate false
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that is always false. (Later on, we will introduce some additional, specific, built-in
predicates.)
The predicates of the relational schema S plus those in B (that we leave implicit),
and the constants in U determine a language L(S) of first-order predicate logic. The
schema may also contain integrity constraints, that are sentences of L(S).
An instance D for a schema S is a finite set of a ground atoms of the form
R(c¯), where R(A1, . . . ,An) ∈ S has some arity n, and c¯ = 〈c1, . . . , cn〉, with ci ∈
Dom(Ai). For each n-ary predicate R ∈ S, an instance D for S determines an
extension for R that is a finite n-ary relation over the data domain. If t ∈ D we
denote by t [A¯] the sequence of values in t¯ for attributes A ∈ A¯. Given an instance
D , the active domain of D , denoted, Adom(D), is the finite subset of
⋃
ADom(A)
that contains all the constants that appear in relations in D .
If S ′ is a subschema of S, i.e. contains some of the relational predicates in S,
and D is an instance for S, then D  S ′ denotes the restriction of D to S ′, i.e.
DS ′ = {R(t¯) | R ∈ S ′ and R(t¯) ∈ D}.
A database instance D for the schema S serves then as an interpretation for the
language L(S). If D is an instance for S, and Ψ is a set of sentences of L(S), then
D |= Ψ denotes that D satisfies (makes true) all the sentences in Ψ. If Ψ is the set
of integrity constraints that comes with the schema S and D |= Ψ, we say that D
is consistent. Otherwise, D is inconsistent.3
A query Q(x¯ ) is a formula of a language L(S), where x¯ is the list of free variables.
A sequence of constants c¯ is an answer to Q(x¯ ) in instance D for S if D |= Q[c¯],
i.e. the formula becomes true in D when the variables in x¯ are replaced by the
corresponding constants in c¯. When x¯ is empty, the query Q is a Boolean query,
i.e. a sentence. In this case, the answer in D can be yes or no depending on whether
it is true or not in D , denoted D |= Q, resp. D 6|= Q.
Now we introduce some of the elements that will form a peer data exchange system
(PDES). After introducing them we will give the formal definition of a PDES (cf.
Definitions 2.1 and 2.2 below).
A (PDES) contains a finite set P = {P1, . . . , Pn} of peers. Each peer P owns a
relational database schema S(P), and a database instance D(P) for the schema S(P).
We denote withS the set of all schemas of a PDES, that is,S = {S(P1), . . . ,S(Pn)}.
We assume, to simplify the presentation and, without loss of generality, that the
peers’ schemas are mutually disjoint, but share a common, possibly infinite database
domain U . Each D(P) can be seen as a finite set of ground atoms over U , with
predicates in S(P). It holds, Adom(D(P)) ⊆ U .
The peers’ schemas, or unions thereof, determine first-order languages, e.g. L(P),
L(P, Q), which are L(S(P)) and L(S(P) ∪ S(Q)), resp. A data exchange constraint
(DEC) between peers P, Q is an L(P, Q)-sentence. We will consider the following
two syntactic classes of DECs:
3 In this work, whenever we consider sets Σ of integrity constraints, we assume that Σ is logically
consistent.
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(a) A universal data exchange constraint (UDEC) between peers P, Q is an L(P, Q)-
sentence of the form:
∀x¯ (
n∧
i=1
Ri(x¯i) −→
l∧
k=1
(
m∨
j=1
Qkj (y¯kj ))), (1)
where the Ri are predicates in S(P)∪S(Q), the Qkj are atomic formulas with
predicates in S(P) ∪ S(Q) or atoms with predicates in B, x¯ = ⋃ni=1 x¯i , and
y¯kj ⊆ x¯ .
(b) A referential data exchange constraint (RDEC) between peers P, Q is an
L(P, Q)-sentence of the form:
∀x¯ (
n∧
i=1
Ri(x¯i) −→ ∃y¯(
l∧
k=1
Qk (x¯k , y¯k ) ∧ ϕk (x¯ ′k , y¯ ′k )) ∨ϕ(x¯ )), (2)
where the Ri ,Qk are predicates in S(P) ∪ S(Q), ϕk and ϕ are a conjunction,
resp. a disjunction, of atoms with predicates in B, and x¯i , x¯k ⊆ x¯ , x¯ ′k ⊆ x¯k ,
y¯ ′k ⊆ y¯k , and y¯ =
⋃l
k=1 y¯k 6= ∅.
The formulas ϕk (x¯
′
k , y¯
′
k )) are used to impose conditions on the existential
values, and ϕ for conditions on the values for x¯ in the antecedent.
The classes of exchange constraints that we are considering are broad enough to
capture all the relevant integrity constraints and logical mappings found in data
exchange and virtual data integration that are usually considered in the theoretical,
technical and applied literature on data management. In particular, UDECs can be
used to express equality-generating dependencies (egds), and RDECs can express
general tuple-generating dependencies (tgds) (Abiteboul et al. 1995).
Each peer P of P has a possibly empty collection of sets of DECs, Σ(P, Q), between
P and peers Q ∈ P, with at most one Σ(P, Q) for each peer Q. Each Σ(P, Q) is finite
and logically consistent. Due to the local nature of PDESs systems, it is possible
for Σ(P, Q) (which is owned by P) to be different from Σ(Q, P) (which is owned by
Q). The DECs in Σ(P, P) are the integrity constraints for (instances of) peer P. We
denote with Σ the class formed by of all non-empty sets Σ(P, Q) of a PDES.
A PDES also has a relation Trust ⊆ P×{less, same}×P, with exactly one triple
of the form (P, ·, Q) for each Σ(P, Q) ∈ Σ. The intended semantics of (P, less, Q) ∈
Trust is that peer P trusts itself less than Q; while (P, same, Q) ∈ Trust indicates
that P trusts itself the same as Q.4 The trust relation is not necessarily symmetric,
e.g. it could hold (P, less, Q), (Q, same, P) ∈ Trust. For a peer P, when Σ(P, P) 6= ∅,
we assume (P, same, P) ∈ Trust.
Definition 2.1
(a) The schema of a PDES P is a sequence 〈P,S,Σ, T rust〉, where P is a set of
peers, S is a corresponding set of peer database schemas, Σ the set of DECs,
and Trust the set of trust relationships.
(b) An instance D of a PDES schema P = 〈P,S,Σ, T rust〉 is a set containing one
database instance D(P) for the schema S (P) ∈ S, for each peer P ∈ P. 2
4 We do not consider the case when a peer P trusts itself more than another peer, since the
information of the latter should be irrelevant to P.
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Fig. 3. Graphs for Example 2.1
Intuitively, and due to the locality of peers, a peer P will be aware only of the
sets Σ(P, Q) and elements of Trust whose first argument is P. More precisely, a peer
stores its own database schema and instance, its DECs to other peers, and its trust
relationships. Furthermore, for an instance D of schema P, the instances D(P) ∈ D
are not required to (jointly) satisfy the DECs in Σ. Consistency and consistency
restoration is a concern only when queries are posed to peers.
Definition 2.2
Given a PDES schema P = 〈P,S,Σ, T rust〉:
(a) The schema of a peer P ∈ P is P(P) = 〈S(P),Σ(P), T rust(P)〉, where S(P) ∈
S, Σ(P) = {ϕ | ϕ ∈ Σ(P, Q), Σ(P, Q) ∈ Σ, and Q ∈ P}; and Trust(P) =
{(P, t , Q) | (P, t , Q) ∈ Trust, and Q ∈ P}. (We can safely identify a peer P with
its schema P(P).)
(b) The accessibility graph G(P) contains a vertex for each P ∈ P, and a directed
edge from P to Q if P 6= Q and Σ(P, Q) 6= ∅. An edge from P to Q is labeled with
“<” when (P, less, Q) ∈ Trust, and with “=” when (P, same, Q) ∈ Trust.
(c) Peer P’ is accessible from P if there is a path in G(P) from P to P’ or if P’=P.
AC(P) denotes the set of peers accessible from P. G(P) denotes the restriction
of G(P) to the peers in AC(P) (i.e. it contains as vertices only the peers in
AC(P), and the edges between them are those inherited from G(P)).
(d) Peer P’ is a neighbor of P if there is an edge from P to P’ in G(P), or if P’ = P.
We denote with N (P) the set of neighbors of P; and with S(N (P)) the union
of their schemas, i.e.
⋃
Q∈N (P)S(Q). Furthermore, N ◦(P) := N (P)r {P}. 2
Example 2.1
Consider P = 〈P,S,Σ, T rust〉 with P = {P1, P2, P3, P4}, S = {S(P1), S(P2),
S(P3),S(P4)}, S(P1) = {R1(·, ·)}, S(P2) = {R2(·, ·), S 2(·, ·)}, S(P3) = {R3(·, ·)},
S(P4) = {R4(·, ·, ·)}. Furthermore, Trust={(P1, less, P2), (P2, same, P3), (P4, less,
P2), (P4, less, P3)}, and Σ contains:
Σ(P1, P2) = {∀xy(R2(x , y)→ R1(x , y))}, (3)
Σ(P2, P2) = {∀x∀y(R2(x , y) ∧ S 2(x , y)→ false), (4)
∀x∀y∀z (R2(x , y) ∧ R2(x , z )→ y = z )} (5)
Σ(P2, P3) = {∀xy(R2(x , y) ∧ R3(x , y)→ false)}, (6)
Σ(P4, P2) = {∀xyz (R2(x , y) ∧ S 2(y , z )→ R4(x , y , z ))}, (7)
Σ(P4, P3) = {∀xy(R3(x , y)→ ∃zR4(x , y , z ))}· (8)
Fig. 3. Graphs for Example 2.1
Intuitively, and due to the locality of peers, a peer P will be aware only of the
sets Σ(P, Q) and elements of Trust whose first argument is P. More precisely, a peer
stores its own database schema and instance, its DECs to other peers, and its trust
relationships. Furthermore, for an instance D of schema P, the instances D(P) ∈ D
are not required to (jointly) satisfy the DECs in Σ. Consistency and consistency
restoration is a concern only when queries are posed to peers.
Definition 2.2
Given a PDES schema P = 〈P,S,Σ, T rust〉:
(a) The schema of a peer P ∈ P is P(P) = 〈S(P),Σ(P), T rust(P)〉, where S(P) ∈
S, Σ(P) = {ϕ | ϕ ∈ Σ(P, Q), Σ(P, Q) ∈ Σ, and Q ∈ P}; and Trust(P) =
{(P, t , Q) | (P, t , Q) ∈ Trust, and Q ∈ P}. (We can safely identify a peer P with
its schema P(P).)
(b) The accessibility graph G(P) contains a vertex for each P ∈ P, and a directed
edge from P to Q if P 6= Q and Σ(P, Q) 6= ∅. An edge from P to Q is labeled with
“<” when (P, less, Q) ∈ Trust, and with “=” when (P, same, Q) ∈ Trust.
(c) Peer P’ is accessible from P if there is a path in G(P) from P to P’ or if P’=P.
AC(P) denotes the set of peers accessible from P. G(P) denotes the restriction
of G(P) to the peers in AC(P) (i.e. it contains as vertices only the peers in
AC(P), and the edges between them are those inherited from G(P)).
(d) Peer P’ is a neighbor of P if there is an edge from P to P’ in G(P), or if P’ = P.
We denote with N (P) the set of neighbors of P; and with S(N (P)) the union
of their schemas, i.e.
⋃
Q∈N (P)S(Q). Furthermore, N ◦(P) := N (P)r {P}. 2
Example 2.1
Consider P = 〈P,S,Σ, T rust〉 with P = {P1, P2, P3, P4}, S = {S(P1), S(P2),
S(P3),S(P4)}, S(P1) = {R1(·, ·)}, S(P2) = {R2(·, ·), S 2(·, ·)}, S(P3) = {R3(·, ·)},
S(P4) = {R4(·, ·, ·)}. Furthermore, Trust={(P1, less, P2), (P2, same, P3), (P4, less,
P2), (P4, less, P3)}, and Σ contains:
Σ(P1, P2) = {∀xy(R2(x , y)→ R1(x , y))}, (3)
(P2, P2) {∀x∀y(R2(x , y) ∧ S 2(x , y)→ false), (4)
∀x∀y∀z (R2(x , y) ∧ R2(x , z )→ y = z )},
Σ(P2, P3) = {∀xy(R2(x , y) ∧ R3(x , y)→ false)}, (5)
Σ(P4, P2) = {∀xyz (R2(x , y) ∧ S 2(y , z ) R4(x , y , z ))}, (6)
Σ(P4, P3) = {∀xy(R3(x , y)→ ∃zR4(x , y , z ))}· (7)
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The built-in atom false in (4) and (5) is false in every instance. The DECs in
Σ(P2, P2) are the local integrity constraints for P2, in this case a denial constraint
(i.e. a prohibited join of positive atoms) and a functional dependency, requiring
that (the values for) the first attribute functionally determines (determine the val-
ues for) the second one. Here, Σ(P4) = {∀xyz (R2(x , y) ∧ S 2(y , z ) → R4(x , y , z )),
∀xy(R3(x , y)→ ∃zR4(x , y , z ))}.
The DEC in (7) is an RDEC, and all the others are UDECs. Some of the acces-
sibility graphs are shown in Figure 3. Notice that AC(P1) = {P1, P2, P3}, AC(P2)
= {P2, P3}, AC(P3) = {P3}, AC(P4) = {P2, P3, P4}, N (P1) = {P1, P2}, N (P2) =
{P2, P3}, N (P3) = {P3}, N (P4) = {P2, P3, P4}, N ◦(P1) = {P2}, N ◦(P2) = {P3},
N ◦(P3) = ∅, and N ◦(P4) = {P2, P3}.
As an example, peer P4 only knows its schema and database, the DECs from
it to peers P2 and P3, and how much it trusts them. More precisely, P4 knows
its schema P(P4) = 〈S(P4),Σ(P4), T rust(P4)〉, with Σ(P4) = {∀xyz (R2(x , y) ∧
S 2(y , z )→ R4(x , y , z )),∀xy(R3(x , y)→ ∃zR4(x , y , z ))}, and Trust(P4)={(P4, less,
P2), (P4, less, P3)}. This peer also has its database instance D(P4).
The schema of P1 is P(P1) = 〈{R1(·, ·)}, {∀xy(R2(x , y)→ R1(x , y))}, {(P1, less,
P2)}〉. As will be determined by the semantics later on, the combination of P1’s
DEC in (3) and the trust relationship to P2, will make P1 import all the missing
data from the extension of its neighbor’s R2 into the extension of its own R1. 2
Example 2.2
(example 1.1 cont.) The PDES can be formalized through the schemaP = 〈P,S,Σ,
T rust〉, where P = {P1, P2}, S = {S(P1),S(P2)}, Σ = {Σ(P1, P2)}, Σ(P1, P2) =
{∀xy(R2(x , y) ∧ S 2(y , z ) → R1(x , y , z )), ∀x (S 1(x ) → S 2(5, x ))}, and Trust =
{(P1, less, P2)}.
The schema of P1 is P(P1) = 〈S(P1), Σ(P1, P2), {(P1, less, P2)}〉, and that of P2
is P(P2) = 〈S(P2), ∅, ∅〉. The instance for the PDES, D = {D(P1),D(P2)}, contains
the two instances shown in Figure 1. 2
Remark 2.1
From now on we assume that the graph G(P) is acyclic. As a consequence, for each
particular peer P, G(P) is also acyclic. This is a global assumption, not local to any
particular peer, that will be used to define the semantics of a PDES. (A discussion
around this and related assumptions can be found in electronic Appendix A.) 2
Notice that according to its definition, the accessibility graph has no self-loops.
The finiteness of the set of peers and the acyclicity of the accessibility graph imply
that there must be “sink” (or terminal) peers, without any outgoing edges. Also
notice that we are not making the assumption that for a peer P its initial instance
D(P) has to satisfy the local constraints in Σ(P, P). This applies in particular to sink
peers in the accessibility graph. They can have local ICs, which may be violated.
3 A General Semantic Framework for a PDES
Before presenting the formal semantics of PDESs, we describe the intended seman-
tics in intuitive and operational terms.
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A query Q ∈ L(P) is posed to a peer P by a certain user U, who may be an external
user or another peer in P. Now P, depending on the query predicates, inspects the
DECs in Σ(P) to identify data owned by other neighboring peers Q that may be
related to its own data. If predicate RQ ∈ S(Q) appears in Σ(P), then P requests
from Q the (contents of the) relation RQ. Q returns to P a possible modified version
of its relation, because Q may have to take into account data from its own neighbors
(in the same way P did when it received the user query), which could produce local
inconsistencies at Q’s level, and they have to be repaired; and so on.
For the purpose of presenting the semantics of the system, that should be query-
independent, we will assume for the moment that P receives whole relation instances
from its neighbors. We emphasize that, in their turn, P’s neighboring peers Q con-
sider data from their own neighbors, and so on; data that may also be eventually
used by P, by transitivity (cf. details below).
The data P receives from another peer Q is defined in a recursive manner, because
Q may have connections to other peers who may contribute with data of their own.
Eventually, after receiving the requested relation instances from its neighbors, P
has now a database instance D for the expanded database schema S(N (P)), which
extends the initial instance D(P) by adding predicates and data from its neighbors.
D can be used to interpret the DECs in Σ(P). Most likely, D will not satisfy Σ(P).
When this extended instance D is inconsistent with respect to Σ(P), different
alternatives to restore consistency with respect to Σ(P) can be considered, but
the (possibly virtual) updates performed on the extended instance D will have to
both respect the trust relationships and make sure that the consistent alternative
instances stay as close as possible to instance D (for which a form of distance
has to be introduced, as we do later in this section). In this way, a collection of
consistent, and possibly virtual, extended instances for P’s neighborhood emerges,
the neighborhood instances. By restricting those instances to the schema of peer P,
the solution instances for P are obtained.
Now, we give the precise definition of neighborhood solution. In order to do
so, we will assume that it is possible to compare arbitrary instances D1,D2 with
respect to a fixed instance D by means of a preorder relation D (i.e. a reflexive and
transitive binary relation). If D ,D1,D2 are database instances for the same schema,
the intuition behind the relationship D1 D D2 is that D1 is at least as close to D
as D2 (is to D). We can define D1 ≺D D2 iff D1 D D2, but not D2 D D1, with
the intuition that D1 is closer to D than D2.
In our semantics, the participating instances will always be for a neighborhood
schema S(N (P)) of a peer P. Even more, the preorder relation will also depend on
Σ(P) (which has to be satisfied).
As a consequence, we will assume, for D a fixed instance for S(N (P)), the exis-
tence of a preorder relation Σ(P)D on instances for the schema S(N (P)).
Definition 3.1
Given a PDES schema P = 〈P,S,Σ, T rust〉, a peer P ∈ P, and an instance D¯ for
the schema S(N (P)):
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(a) An instance D ′ for the schema S(N (P)) is a neighborhood solution for P and
D¯ if:
(i) D ′ |= Σ(P).
(ii) There is no instance D ′′ satisfying (i), and D ′′ ≺Σ(P)
D¯
D ′.
(iii) D ′{R} = D¯{R} for every predicate R ∈ S(Q) with (P, less, Q) ∈ Trust.
(b) NSP(P, D¯) denotes the set of neighborhood solutions for P and D¯ .
When clear from the context, we will simply use NS(P, D¯). 2
A neighborhood solution for P is a database for its whole neighborhood that satisfies
P’s DECs (including its local constraints), and respects its trust relationships. A
neighborhood solution also stays as close as possible to the original neighborhood
instance, while staying the same for trustable peers. In operational and intuitive
terms, a minimal data set with respect to Definition 3.1 is imported or given up to
satisfy the DECs.
Notice that Definition 3.1 introduces an abstract repair semantics, similar to
those used to handle inconsistency in single databases (Bertossi 2011). For example,
a well-studied repair semantics for single databases was introduced in (Arenas et al.
1999). It is based on insertions or deletions of whole tuples into/from the original in-
consistent instance D , and the “distances” of two instances D1,D2 from D are com-
pared using the symmetric differences: D1 ∆,Σ(P)D D2 :⇔ ∆(D ,D1) ⊆ ∆(D ,D2).5
For a peer P in isolation, i.e. with N ◦(P) = ∅, a neighborhood solution of its
original instance D(P) will simply be an instance D ′ for its schema S(P), such
that: (a) D ′ |= Σ(P, P) (i.e. P’s own integrity constraints); and (b) There is no
instance D ′′ satisfying (a) and D ′′ ≺Σ(P,P)
D(P) D
′. This defines a class of repairs of
instance D(P) with respect toΣ(P, P).6 Thus, this neighborhood-solution semantics
for PDESs naturally extends the notion of repair to neighborhood solutions.
Example 3.1
(examples 1.1 and 2.2 cont.) The elements of the PDES schema are all as before,
in particular,
Σ(P1, P2) = {∀xy(R2(x , y) ∧ S 2(y , z )→ R1(x , y , z )), ∀x (S 1(x )→ S 2(5, x ))}, (8)
but this time consider {(P1, same, P2)} ∈ Trust.
Now assume, in this example, for illustration purposes, that the preorder relations
are defined by D1 ∆,Σ(P)D D2 iff ∆(D ,D1) ⊆ ∆(D ,D2).
If a query is posed to P1, it will have to compute (possibly virtually) its neigh-
borhood solutions. Peer P1’s knowledge of the schema is limited to its own schema
P(P1) = 〈S(P1),Σ(P1), T rust(P1)〉 where S(P1) = {R1(·, ·, ·),S 1(·)}, Σ(P1) =
Σ(P1, P2), and Trust(P1) = {(P1, same, P2)}.
In order to enforce Σ(P1), P1 poses two atomic queries to peer P2: Q1(x , y):
R2(x , y) and Q2(x , y): S 2(x , y). Since P2 is not related to any other peer, and has
no local ICs, it will provide as answers the content of those relations in D(P2). In
5 For sets S1 and S2, ∆(S1,S2) := (S1 r S2) ∪ (S2 r S1).
6 We are using abstract preorder relations to define repair semantics. It should also be possible to
use abstract “distance measures” to define repairs and repair semantics. Cf. (Arieli et al. 2003).
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Fig. 4. A database instance D for schema S(N (P1))
Fig. 5. Several neighborhood solution instances for peer P1
this way, P1 has an extended instance D , shown in Figure 4, that corresponds to
the union of the two instances in Figure 1, that is, D = D(P1) ∪ D(P2). Since D
does not satisfy Σ(P1), D has to be repaired.
Since (P1, same, P2), there are several neighborhood solutions for P1, which are
obtained by virtually modifying both peers’ data. For example, the inconsistencies
with respect to the first UDEC in (8) can be (minimally) solved by either removing
R2(d , 5) from R2, or removing S 2(5, 3) from S 2, or inserting R1(d , 5, 3) into R1.
If S 2(5, 3) were removed from S 2, a new inconsistency is created with respect to
the second UDEC in (8). This one can be solved by removing S 1(3) from S 1. The
inconsistencies with respect to the second DEC can be solved by either removing
S 1(7) from S 1 or inserting S 2(5, 7) into S 2.
Figure 5 shows the six neighborhood solutions in NSP(P1,D). All these neigh-
borhood instances are repairs in the sense of (Arenas et al. 1999) of instance D
with respect to P1’s DECs. If we are locally interested only in P1, we consider their
restrictions to P1’ schema S(P1). 2
As the following example shows, trust relationships in combination with incon-
sistent DECs may cause that neighborhood solutions do not exist.
Example 3.2
Consider a PDES schema P = 〈P,S,Σ, T rust〉 with P = {P, Q, R}, and
1. S = {S(P),S(Q), S(R)}, S(P) = {P}, S(Q) = {Q}, S(R) = {R}.
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2. Σ = {Σ(P, Q),Σ(P, R))}, Σ(P, Q) = {∀xy(Q(x , y) → P(x , y))},
Σ(P, R) = {∀xy(P(x , y)→ R(x , y))}.
3. Trust = {(P, less, Q), (P, less, R)}.
4. D = {D(P),D(Q),D(R)}, with D(P) = D(R) = ∅, and D(Q) = {Q(a, b)}.
For peer P and D = D(P) ∪ D(Q) ∪ D(R) = {Q(a, b)}, there is no neighborhood
solution, i.e. NS(P,D(P) ∪ D(Q) ∪ D(R)) is empty. This is because P’s DEC with
Q forces the insertion of P(a, b), but at the same time the interaction of P with R
requires relation P to be empty. Since peer P trusts both peers more than itself,
there is no neighborhood solution that satisfies the DECs and respect the trust
relations.
Notice that the DEC in Σ(P, R) acts as a restriction on tuples for its owner, P,
rather than as a tuple generator for it. 2
In the previous example, the trust relationships impose unsolvable conditions on
neighborhood solutions. However, if all the trust relationships are of the flexible
form (P, same, Q), a peer always has solutions.
Proposition 3.1
Consider a PDES schema P = 〈P,S,Σ, T rust〉 and a peer P ∈ P whose trust
relationships are all of the form (P, same, Q). Given an instance D¯ for S(N (P)),
peer P always has a neighborhood solution for D¯ . 2
Having defined the notion of neighborhood solution for a peer, now we can define
the notion of solution for a peer, which is a local instance but takes all the ac-
cessible peers into account. The data distributed across different peers has to be
appropriately gathered to build solution instances for the peer. This definition of
solution instance is recursive, and appeals to that of neighborhood solution. The
intuition and idea are as follows: (a) Assume each neighbor Q of peer P has the class
Sol(Q,D) of its solution instances (hence the recursion). Each of these Q passes to
P the intersection
⋂
Sol(Q,D) of its solution set.7 With them and its own initial
instance D(P), P builds an instance D for its neighborhood N (P). The solutions for
P become the restrictions to P’s schema of the neighborhood solutions for P with
respect to D , Σ(P), and P’s trust relationships.
Under this recursive definition, the solutions for the neighbors have to be de-
termined, under the same semantics. Base cases of the recursion are peers with
no DECs or with only local constraints, that is, when either Σ(P) = ∅ or Σ(P) =
{Σ(P, P)} . These peers are sinks in the accessibility graph of P. In this regard, we
recall that we made the assumption that the accessibility graphs are acyclic.
Definition 3.2
Given an instance D for the PDES schema P = 〈P,S,Σ, T rust〉, and a peer P, an
instance D for the schema S(P) is a solution instance (or simply solution) for P,
denoted D ∈ SolP(P,D) (or simply, Sol(P,D)), iff:
7 When C is a class of sets, then we will usually denote with ⋂ C the intersection of its elements,
i.e.
⋂ C := ⋂C∈C C .
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(a) For Σ(P) = ∅: D = D(P) (P’s initial instance, the projection of D on S(P)).
(b) For Σ(P) = {Σ(P,P)}: D ∈ NSP(P,D(P)).
(c) For ∅ 6= Σ(P) 6= {Σ(P,P)}: D = D  S(P), where D ∈ NSP(P,D(P) ∪⋃
Q∈N◦(P) Core(Q,D)).
Here, Core(Q,D) :=
⋂
SolP(Q,D) when SolP(Q,D) 6= ∅; and Core(Q,D) :=
{incQ}, otherwise. The propositional built-in predicate incQ in S(Q) is true of
an instance iff it is contained in the latter as an atom. 2
The base cases of the recursion are (a) and (b), where the solutions of a peer
can be computed without data from other peers. Case (c) corresponds to the prop-
erly recursive case, where, before determining P’s solutions, there is an extended
instance D around P formed by its local instance D(P) plus, for each neighbor Q,
the intersection, Core(Q,D), of all its solutions. The combined database D is for
the schema S(N (P)), and starting from D , neighborhood solutions for P can be
determined; and their restrictions to P’s schema become P’s solutions.
Although, in Definition 3.2, cases (a) and (b) are special cases of (c), we include
them explicitly, for clarity. Notice that case (b) amounts to obtaining the repairs
of a local instance with respect to a set of local integrity constraints.
The following is a immediate consequence of Proposition 3.1.
Corollary 3.1
Consider a PDES schema P = 〈P,S,Σ, T rust〉 with trust relationships all of the
form (R, same, Q), and a peer P ∈ P. Given an instance D for P, peer P always has
a solution, that is, SolP(P,D) 6= ∅. 2
Remark 3.1
As we have seen, even in the absence of cycles in G(P), a peer may have no neigh-
borhood solutions (cf. Example 3.2), and then no solutions, i.e. Sol(P,D) = ∅. That
is why, in this case, we make the convention in Definition 3.2 that Core(P,D) =
{incP}. When Sol(P,D) = ∅, if another peer requests from P the intersection of its
solutions, P returns the instance {incP}.
The idea is that when a peer becomes inconsistent, it makes another peer Q who
requests its data notice its inconsistency by sending this special instance. In this
case, Q is expected to ignore its mappings with P. This can be made precise and
formally accommodated by modifying the DECs through the introduction of an
extra conjunct in the antecedent. For example, the DEC Σ(Q, P) = {∀x (P(x ) →
Q(x ))} would be replaced by {∀x (P(x ) ∧ ¬incP → Q(x ))}, which would become
trivially satisfied. Alternatively, if we want to keep the built-ins in the consequent,
we could replace Σ(Q, P) by {∀x (P(x )→ (Q(x ) ∨ incP))}.
In order not to complicate the notation, we will refrain from explicitly introducing
the incPs in the DECs. 2
According to this convention about the treatment of peers without solutions, a
peer that becomes intrinsically inconsistent, “irreparable”, is ignored by its neigh-
bors when they receive the notification of inconsistency. However, this form of
ignoring is put here on a solid logical foot, that is compatible and uniform with the
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treatment of other peers. As long as a peer declares itself as inconsistent, there is
no much a neighbor can do. However, an inconsistent peer might decide to relax its
own consistency requirements and send to other peers only “partially consistent”
data, which would be transparent to those receiving peers.8
The peer consistent answers from a peer to a query are the semantically correct an-
swers, which means that when answering the query, the peer consistently considers
the data of its neighbors and the trust relationships with them.
Definition 3.3
Consider an instance D for the PDES schema P = 〈P,S,Σ, T rust〉, and a peer
P ∈ P. Let Q(x¯ ) ∈ L(P) be a query, with x¯ a possibly empty list of free variables.
1. If Sol(P,D) 6= ∅:
(a) If x¯ 6= ∅, a finite sequence c¯ of constants in U of the same length as x¯
is a peer consistent answer (PCA) to Q from P iff D |= Q[c¯] for every
D ∈ Sol(P,D).
(b) If Q is Boolean and D |= Q for every D ∈ Sol(P,D), then yes is the only
PCA to Q.
2. If Sol(P,D) = ∅, then incP is the only PCA to Q(x¯ ). 2
For illustration, in Example 3.1, if P1 has to answer a query Q ∈ L(P1), it
returns the answers that are simultaneously true in all its neighborhood solutions.
For example, under this semantics, the answers to query Q(x ) : ∃yzR1(x , y , z ) posed
to P1 will be 〈c〉, 〈f 〉, which are shared by all the six neighborhood solutions for P1
(or better, by their restrictions to P1’s schema). The answers to queries Q1 and Q2
posed by P1 to P2 are answered in the same way, taking into consideration the P2’s
DECs.
We can see that the answers from a peer to a query are certain answers (Imielinski
and Lipski 1984). This condition makes the data moved from one peer to a neighbor
always certain. In particular, this allows us to treat external queries and inter-peer
queries in a uniform manner. In particular, we will be in position to conceive and
implement the passage of data from one peer to a neighbor as a query answering
process.
Example 3.3
Consider the PDES schema P and instance D represented in graph G(P) in Figure
6. Here, Σ = {Σ(P1, P2),Σ(P2, P3),Σ(P4, P3)}, and:
- Σ(P1, P2)= {∀xyz (R2(x , y) ∧ S 2(y , z )→ R1(x , y , z )), ∀x (S 1(x )→ S 2(5, x ))}.
- Σ(P2, P3)= {∀xy (S 2(x , y) → R3(x , y))}.
- Σ(P4, P3)= {∀xyz (R3(x , y) → R4(x , y , 3))}.
In intuitive and procedural terms, if a query is posed to P1, it will send queries
to P2, to check the satisfaction of the DECs in Σ(P1, P2). But, in order for P2 to
answer those queries, it will send queries to peer P3 to check the DECs in Σ(P2,
8 An alternative to this design choice could be, in the case a peer P trusts an inconsistent peer Q
more than itself, that P becomes or declares itself inconsistent as well. This alternative may be
worth exploring, but we do not pursue it here any further.
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Fig. 5. PDES for Example 3.8
turned by a peer who consistently considers the data of- and trust relationships
with its neighbors.
Definition 3.7. Let Q(x¯) ∈ L(P) be a FO query. (a) When Sol(P) 6= ∅, a ground
tuple t¯ is a peer consistent answer (PCA) to Q from P iff D |= Q(t¯) for every
D ∈ Sol(P). If x¯ = ∅ and D |= Q for every D ∈ Sol(P), then yes is the PCA. (b)
Otherwise, when Sol(P) = ∅, incP is the only PCA to Q(x¯). 2
Example 3.8. (extension of example 1.1) The DECs are Σ(P1, P2)= {∀xyz (R2(x, y)
∧ S2(y, z) → R1(x, y, z)), ∀x (S1(x) → S2(5, x))}, Σ(P2, P3) = {∀xy (S2(x, y) →
R3(x, y))}, and Σ(P4, P3)= {∀xyz (R3(x, y)→ R4(x, y, 3))}. Here, N (P1) = {P1, P2}.
The trust relationships are as shown in Figure 5.
In intuitive and procedural terms, if a query is posed to P1, it will send queries to
P2, to check the satisfaction of the DECs in Σ(P1, P2). But, in order for P2 to answer
those queries, it will send queries to peer P3 to check the DECs in Σ(P2, P3). Since
P3 is not connected to any other peer, it will answer P2’s queries using its material
instance D(P3). Thus, the solutions for P1 and its peer consistent answers will be
affected by the peers in AC(P1) = {P1, P2, P3}.
We can make this precise by applying the recursive definition of solution in-
stance. Since P3 has no DECs with other peers, its only neighborhood solution is
its instance D(P3). This is sent back to P2, who needs to repair the extended in-
stance D = {R2(c, 4), R2(d, 5), S2(4, 2), S2(5, 3), R3(5, 7), R3(5, 3)} with respect
to Σ(P2, P3). As P2 trusts P3 the same as itself, it can modify its own data or the
data it got from P3. Assuming -for illustration purposes for the moment- that the
distance between instances is given in terms of the symmetric set-difference, P2 has
two neighborhood solutions: {R2(c, 4), R2(d, 5), S2(5, 3), R3(5, 7), R3(5, 3)} and
{R2(c, 4), R2(d, 5), S2(4, 2), S2(5, 3), R3(5, 7), R3(5, 3), R3(4, 2)}. They minimally
depart from D, and their restrictions to P2’s schema lead to two solutions for P2:
Sol(P2) = {{R2(c, 4), R2(d, 5), S2(5, 3)}, {R2(c, 4), R2(d, 5), S2(4, 2), S2(5, 3)}}.
Peer P2 will send to P1 the intersection of its solutions, namely {R2(c, 4), R2(d, 5),
S2(5, 3)}. Now, P1 has to repair {R1(c, 4, 2), R1(f, 3, 5), S1(3), S1(7), R2(c, 4),
R2(d, 5), S2(5, 3)} with respect to Σ(P1, P2). Since P1 trusts P2 more, it will solve
inconsistencies by modifying its own data, producing only one neighborhood solu-
tion: {R1(c, 4, 2), R1(f, 3, 5), R1(d, 5, 3), S1(3), R2(c, 4), R2(d, 5), S2(5, 3)}. Thus,
Sol(P1) = {{ R1(c, 4, 2), R1(f, 3, 5), R1(d, 5, 3), S1(3)}}.
If P1 had received the query Q(x) : ∃yz(R1(x, y, z)∧S(y)), the only peer consis-
tent answers would be 〈f〉, which is obtained from its only solution. 2
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P3). Since P3 is not connected to any other peer, it will answer P2’s queries using its
initial material instance D(P3). Thus, the solutions for P1 and its peer consistent
answers will be affected by the peers in AC(P1) = {P1, P2, P3}. More precisely, we
can now apply the definitions of solution instance and peer consistent answer.
Since P3 has neither DECs with other peers nor local integrity constraints, its
only neighborhood solution is its instance D(P3) ∈ D, which is sent back to P2.
Now, P2 has to repair the extended instance D = {R2(c, 4), R2(d , 5), S 2(4, 2),
S 2(5, 3), R3(5, 7), R3(5, 3)} with respect to Σ(P2, P3), which is not satisfied due to
the presence of tuple S 2(4, 2). As P2 trusts P3 the same as itself, it can modify its
own data or the data it got from P3.
Assuming -for illustration purposes for the moment- that the preorder relation on
instances is given in terms of the symmetric set-difference, P2 has two neighborhood
solutions: {R2(c, 4), R2(d , 5), S 2(5, 3), R3(5, 7), R3(5, 3)} and {R2(c, 4), R2(d , 5),
S 2(4, 2), S 2(5, 3), R3(5, 7), R3(5, 3), R3(4, 2)}. They minimally depart from D ,
and their restrictions to P2’s schema lead to two solutions for P2: Sol(P2,D) =
{{R2(c, 4),R2(d , 5),S 2(5, 3)}, {R2(c, 4), R2(d , 5), S 2(4, 2),S 2(5, 3)}}.
Peer P2 will send to P1 the intersection of its solutions, namely Core(P2,D) =⋂
Sol(P2,D) = {R2(c, 4), R2(d , 5), S 2(5, 3)}. Now, P1 has to repair the extended
instance {R1(c, 4, 2), R1(f , 3, 5), S 1(3), S 1(7), R2(c, 4), R2(d , 5), S 2(5, 3)} with
respect to Σ(P1, P2), which is not satisfied.
Since P1 trusts P2 more, it will solve inconsistencies by modifying its own data,
in this case inserting tuples into R1 and deleting tuples from S 1. This produces
only one neighborhood solution: {R1(c, 4, 2), R1(f , 3, 5), R1(d , 5, 3), S 1(3), R2(c, 4),
R2(d , 5), S 2(5, 3)}. Thus, Sol(P1,D) = {{R1(c, 4, 2), R1(f , 3, 5), R1(d , 5, 3), S 1(3)}}.
If P1 had received the query Q(x ) : ∃yz (R1(x , y , z ) ∧ S 1(y)), the only peer con-
sistent answer woul have been 〈f 〉, obtained from its only solution. 2
Notice that when a peer Q passes its core, Core(Q, D¯), with D¯ a neighborhood
instance, to a peer P, it is delivering the peers consistent answers to the atomic
queries from P to Q of the form QR(x¯ ) : R(x¯ ), where R ∈ S(Q). However, when P
computes its local PCAs to a query, it does not use its own core,
⋂
Sol(P,D), but
the collection Sol(P,D) as a whole. The reason is that this core is unnecessarily
restrictive for peer consistent query answering. For example, if the query is Q :
∃xP(x ), and P’s solutions are {P(a)} and {P(b)}, the PCA to this Boolean query
would be no if evaluated on the empty core, but yes according to our definition.
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Remark 3.2
Notice that the definitions of solution instance for a peer and of peer consistent
answer are parameterized by:
(a) The class of data exchange constraints. We have considered certain syntactic
classes of FO-sentences, and we will also do so in the rest of this work. However,
our presentation so far has been general enough to accommodate broader classes
of FO sentences in the combined language of any two peers. The restriction on the
classes of DECs has not been required or used yet.
(b) A notion of satisfaction, D |= ϕ, where D is a database instance and ϕ is a FO
sentence in the language of D ’s schema. Most commonly, D is a relational database
considered as a FO structure, and classical logical satisfaction is used. However, if
D contains uncertain information, then we may have to depart from FO logic, as
we will see in Section 4, for a particular PDES semantics.
(c) The preorder relations Σ(P)D between instances for the schema of an instance
D . Different preorder relations can be considered. In the examples above we have
considered, just to fix ideas, the common preorder based on the symmetric set
difference between instances.
(d) The repair semantics, i.e. by a characterization of the instances that minimally
depart from a given one D in order to satisfy local ICs or DECs between two peers.
The repair semantics is based on the preorders D ′′ Σ(P)D D ′, and the associated
minimality conditions (what we did in Definition 3.1). 2
4 Towards a Special PDES Semantics with NULL
Considering the rather abstract nature and flexibility of the semantic framework
introduced in Section 3, in this section, we make specific commitments about the
semantic parameters discussed in Remark 3.2.
In the rest of this section, we consider a classical relational schema Σ = (U ,R,B),
consisting of the data domain, a set of database predicates, and a set of built-in
predicates.9 Now, we will introduce in the schema some extra elements related to
the special constant, null, that we will use in the rest of this work.
Remark 4.1
We assume from now on that every attribute domain, Adom(A), contains the con-
stant null. In particular, null ∈ U . Furthermore, among the built-in predicates in
B, we will also find IsNull(·), and IsNotNull(·). The first one is true only with con-
stant null, and the second one, on any constant c other than null.10 Accordingly,
null and these built-in predicates may appear in DECs as defined in (1) and (2), in
particular, in integrity constraints, and also in queries. They all become sentences
or formulas of the FO language L(Σnull) associated to Σnull = (U ,R,Bnull), with
Bnull= B ∪ {IsNull, IsNotNull}. 2
9 In the coming sections, where we will apply the semantics of this section, R will be the set of
database predicates for a peer or a pair thereof.
10 Each is the negation of the other, but we will keep both in order to avoid using explicit negation.
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The special constant null in the data domain U is intended to behave and be
used as the null value, NULL, in SQL relational databases. The new, unary, built-
in predicates correspond to the SQL predicates IS NULL and IS NOT NULL, used to
check null values. Constant null may appear in database tuples, and will be used
to restore consistency with respect to DECs and ICs.
Using a single null, with its SQL semantics, is clearly different from using multi-
ple labeled null values, as is done in data exchange for enforcing the satisfaction of
existential quantifications (Kolaitis 2005). It is also different from using arbitrary
elements of the underlying data domain for the same purpose (Cali et al. 2003).
However, to a large extent, the semantics of this section could be developed with-
out the specific restrictions imposed on the representation and use of null values,
adopting other forms of handling incomplete and inconsistent data. Cf. Section 7
and electronic Appendix A for additional discussions of these issues.
The semantics of null we introduce next captures the way nulls are handled by
relational DBMSs that follow the SQL standard. More precisely, our semantics
provides a partial logical reconstruction in first-order predicate logic of the way
nulls are handled in SQL databases. It refines and extend previous work presented
in (Bravo and Bertossi 2006) on database repairs with and in the presence of NULL.
The SQL Standard leaves many issues around NULL unspecified, and different
DBMSs depart from the standard in different ways. As a consequence, it is not
possible to provide a full logical reconstruction of SQL databases with NULL. For
this reason, Accordingly, our semantics concentrates on the notion of satisfaction
of DECs and ICs, and query answering for a broad classes of queries. Furthermore,
the proposed semantics extends the “classical” notion of DEC and IC satisfaction,
and query answering in databases without NULL.11
The rest of this section continues as follows. In Section 4.1, we illustrate some
of the elements of and issues around the notion of query answer as used in SQL
databases with NULL. It serves a motivation for Section 4.2, where we formalize
the semantics of query answering. In Section 4.3, we introduce a rewriting-based
semantics for constraint satisfaction in the presence of NULL, leading to a fully
classical semantics. Finally, in Section 4.4, we apply the rewriting methodology to
the semantics of query answering under NULL.
4.1 Query answering under NULL: motivation
A tuple c¯ of elements of U is an answer to query Q(x¯ ), denoted D |=N Q(c¯),
if the formula (that represents) Q is classically true when the quantifiers on its
relevant variables (or attributes) run over (U r {null}); and those on the non-
relevant variables run over U . The free relevant variables, i.e. relevant among those
in x¯ , cannot take the value null either. (Relevance is made precise in Section 4.2.)
11 We reserve the use of constant NULL to illustrate issues in relation its use in SQL databases; and
to emphasize this, also in subsection titles. Otherwise, we keep using only the constant null of
the underlying data domain.
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Example 4.1
Consider the instance D2 and the query below:
R A B C S B
1 1 1 null
2 null null 1
null 3 3 3
Q2(x ) : ∃y∃z (R(x , y , z ) ∧ S(y) ∧y > 2)· (9)
A variable v (quantified or not) in a conjunctive query is relevant if it appears
(non-trivially) twice in the formula after the quantifier prefix. Occurrences of the
form v = null and v 6= null do not count though.
In query (9), the only relevant quantified variable is y , because it participates in
a join and a built-in in the quantifier-free matrix of (9). So, there are two reasons
for y to be relevant. The only free variable is x , which is not relevant. As for
query answers, the only candidate values for x are: null, 2, 1. In this case, null is a
candidate value because x is a non-relevant variable.
First, x = null is an answer to the query, because the formula ∃y∃z (R(x , y , z ) ∧
S (y)∧ y > 2) is true in D2, with a non-null witness value for y and a witness value
for z that combined make the (non-quantified) formula true. Namely, y = 3, z = 3.
So, it holds D2 |=N Q2[null].
Next, x = 2 is not an answer. For this value of x , because the candidate value for
y , namely null that accompanies 2 in P , makes the formula (R(x , y , z )∧S (y)∧y > 2)
false. Even if it were true, this value for y would not be allowed.
Finally, x = 1 is not an answer, because the only candidate value for y , namely
1, makes the formula false. In consequence, null is the only answer. 2
The next example with SQL queries and NULL provides additional intuition and
motivation for the formal semantics of Section 4.2. Notice the use in logical queries
of the new unary predicates IsNull and IsNotNull.
Example 4.2
Consider the schema S = {R(A,B),S (B ,C )} and the instance in the table below.
In it NULL is the SQL null. If this instance is stored in an SQL database, we can
observe the behavior of the following queries when they are directly translated into
SQL and run on an SQL DB:
R A B S B C
a b b h
a c NULL s
d NULL l m
d e
u u
v NULL
v r
NULL NULL
(a) Q1(x , y) : R(x , y) ∧ y = null
SQL: Select * from R where
B = NULL;
Result: No tuple
(b) Q′1(x , y) : R(x , y) ∧ IsNull(y)
SQL: Now uses IS NULL
Result: 〈d, NULL〉, 〈v, NULL〉,
〈NULL, NULL〉
(c) Q2(x , y) : R(x , y) ∧ y 6= null
SQL: Select * from R where
B <> NULL;
Result: No tuple
(d) Q′2(x , y) : R(x , y) ∧ IsNotNull(y)
SQL: Now uses IS NOT NULL
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Answer: The five expected tuples
(e) Q3(x , y) : R(x , y) ∧ x = y
SQL: Select * from R where A = B;
Result: 〈u,u〉
(f) Q4(x , y) : R(x , y) ∧ x 6= y
SQL: Select * from R where A <> B;
Result: 〈a,b〉, 〈a, c〉, 〈d, e〉, 〈v, r〉
(g) Q5(x , y , x , z ) : R(x , y) ∧ R(x , z ) ∧ y 6= z
SQL: Select * from R r1, R r2 where r1.A = r2.A and r1.B <> r2.B;
Result: 〈a,b, a, c〉, 〈a, c, a,b〉
(h) Q6(x , y , z , t) : R(x , y) ∧ S (z , t) ∧ y = z
SQL: Select * from R r1, S s1 where r1.B = s1.B;
Result: 〈a,b,b,h〉
(i) As in (h), but now SQL: Select * from R r1 join S s1 on r1.B = s1.B;
Result:12 〈a,b,b,h〉
(j) Q7(x , y , z , t) : R(x , y) ∧ S (z , t) ∧ y 6= z . In SQL:
Select R1.A, R1.B, S1.B, S1.C from R R1, S S1 where R1.B <> S1.B’;
Result: 〈a, c,b,h〉, 〈d, e,b,h〉, 〈u,u,b,h〉, 〈v, r,b,h〉, 〈a,b, l,m〉, 〈a, c, l,m〉, 〈d, e, l,m〉,
〈u,u, l,m〉, 〈v, r, l,m〉 2
We need to introduce predicates IsNull and IsNotNull in our formal treatment
of nulls, because, as shown in Example 4.2, in the presence of NULL, SQL treats IS
NULL and IS NOT NULL differently from classical = and 6=, resp. For example, the
queries
Q(x ) : ∃y(R(x , y) ∧ IsNull(y)) and Q′(x ) : ∃y(R(x , y) ∧ y = null) (10)
are both conjunctive queries, but in SQL databases, they have different semantics.
4.2 Query answering under NULL: the semantics
Here we introduce the semantics of FO conjunctive query answering in relational
databases with null values. More precisely, in SQL relational databases with a
single null value, null, that is handled like the SQL NULL. We will exclude from the
“SQL-like” conjunctive queries those such as (a) and (c) in Example 4.2. We will
concentrate only on conjunctive queries with built-ins.
Definition 4.1
(a) Conj(Σnull) denotes the class of conjunctive queries in L(Σnull) of the form
Q(x¯ ) : ∃y¯(A1(x¯1) ∧ · · · ∧An(x¯n)), (11)
where y¯ ⊆ ⋃i x¯i , x¯ = (⋃i x¯i) r y¯ , and the Ai are atoms containing any of the
predicates in R∪ Bnull plus terms, i.e. variables or constants in U .
(b) Conjsql(Σnull) denotes the class of conjunctive queries as in (a) whose conjuncts
are never of the form t = null, t 6= null, with t a term (null or not). 2
12 The same result is obtained from DBMSs that do not require an explicitly equality together
with the join.
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For example, for the queries in (10), Q,Q′ ∈ Conj(Σnull), Q ∈ Conjsql(Σnull),
but Q′ /∈ Conjsql(Σnull). Notice that Conjsql(Σnull), Conj(Σ) ⊆ Conj(Σnull). The
idea is to force conjunctive queries a` la SQL that explicitly mention the null value
in (in)equalities, to use the built-ins InNull or IsNotNull.
Definition 4.2
Given a query in Conj(Σnull) of the form Q(x¯ ): ∃y¯ψ(x¯ , y¯), with ψ quantifier-free, a
variable v is relevant for Q if it occurs at least twice in ψ, without considering the
atoms IsNull(v), IsNotNull(v), v θnull, or nullθv , with θ ∈ B. RelV (Q) denotes
the set of relevant variables for Q. 2
For example, for the queryQ(x ) : ∃y(P(x , y , z )∧Q(y)∧IsNull(y)),RelV (Q(x )) =
{y}, because y is used twice in the subformula P(x , y , z ) ∧Q(y).
As usual in FO logic, we consider assignments from the set, V ar, of variables to
the underlying database domain U (that contains constant null), i.e. σ : V ar → U .
Such an assignment can be extended to terms, mapping variables x to σ(x ), and
c ∈ U to c. For an assignment σ, a variable y and a constant c, σ yc denotes the
assignment that coincides with σ everywhere, except possibly on y , that takes the
value c. Given a formula ψ, ψ[σ] denotes the formula obtained from ψ by replacing
its free variables by their values according to σ.
Now, given a formula (query) χ and an assignment σ, we verify if instance D
satisfies χ[σ] by assuming that the quantifiers on relevant variables range over
(U r {null}), and those on non-relevant variables range over U .
Definition 4.3
Let χ ∈ Conj(Σnull), and σ be an assignment. Instance D with σ satisfies χ under
the null-semantics, denoted D |=
N
χ[σ], exactly in the following cases: (below
t , t1, . . . are terms; and x , x1, x2 variables)
1. (a) D |=N IsNull(t)[σ], with σ(t) = null. (b) D |=N IsNotNull(t)[σ], with
σ(t) 6= null.
2. D |=
N
(t1 < t2)[σ], with σ(t1) 6= null 6= σ(t2), and σ(t1) < σ(t2).13
3. (a) D |=
N
(x = c)[σ], with σ(x ) = c ∈ (U r {null}). (or symmetrically)14
(b) D |=
N
(x1 = x2)[σ], with σ(x1) = σ(x2) 6= null.
(c) D |=
N
(c = c)[σ], with c ∈ (U r {null}).
4. (a) D |=
N
(x 6= c)[σ], with null 6= σ(x ) 6= c ∈ (U r {null}). (or symmetrically)
(b) D |=
N
(c1 6= c2)[σ], with c1 6= c2, and c1, c2 ∈ (U r {null}).
5. D |=
N
R(t1, . . . , tn)[σ], with R ∈ R, and R(σ(t1), . . . , σ(tn)) ∈ D .
6. D |=
N
(α∧β)[σ], with α, β quantifier-free, σ(y) 6= null for every y ∈ RelV (α∧β),
and D |=N α[σ] and D |=N β[σ].
7. D |=N (∃y α)[σ] when: (a) if y ∈ RelV (α), there is c in (U r {null}) with
D |=
N
α[σ yc ]; or (b) if y 6∈ RelV (α), there is c in U with D |=N α[σ yc ]. 2
This semantics also applies to Conjsql(Σnull).
13 Of course, when there is an order relation on U . We could introduce “>” similarly.
14 Notice the use of the symbols = and 6= both at the object and the meta levels.
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Definition 4.4
Let Q(x¯ ) : ∃y¯ψ(x¯ , y¯) be in Conj(Σnull), with x¯ = x1, . . . , xn , and ψ quantifier-free.
(a) A tuple 〈c1, . . . , cn〉 ∈ Un is an N -answer from D to Q, denoted D |=N
Q[c1, . . . , cn ], iff there is an assignment σ such that σ(xi) = ci , for i = 1, . . . ,n;
and D |=N (∃y¯ψ)[σ].
(b) If Q is a sentence (a Boolean query), the N -answer is yes iff D |=
N
Q, and no,
otherwise.
(c) QNsem(D) denotes the set of N -answers to Q from instance D . 2
Notice that D |=
N
(∃y¯ψ)[σ] in (a) above requires, according to Definition 4.3, that
the relevant variables in the existential prefix ∃y¯ do not take the value null. The
free variables, i.e. in x¯ , may take the value null only when they are not relevant in
the query. For illustration, in Example 4.1, since the free variable x is not relevant,
QNsem2 (D2) = {〈null〉}.
Example 4.3
Consider the instance D and the conjunctive query below.
R A B
a b
c d
e null
S B C
b f
d g
null j
Q(x , z ) : ∃y(R(x , y) ∧ S (y , z )).
Here, under the classical semantics, Q(D) = {〈a, f 〉, 〈c, g〉, 〈e, j 〉}, treating null
as any other constant. However, QNsem(D) = {〈a, f 〉, 〈c, g〉} ⊆ Q(D). 2
It is easy to prove that, for queries in Conj(Σnull): QNsem(D) ⊆ Q(D). Further-
more, the N -query answering semantics coincides with classical FO query answering
semantics in databases without null. More precisely, if null /∈ U (and then it does
not appear in D or Q either): D |=
N
Q[t¯ ] iff D |= Q[t¯ ].
4.3 Constraint satisfaction under NULL via FO rewriting
The notions of relevant attributes (or variables) and formula satisfaction under the
null-semantics can be both extended to more complex formulas. In particular, they
can be applied to constraint satisfaction under SQL NULL (Bravo and Bertossi 2006;
Bravo 2007). As expected, the satisfaction of a constraint ψ by a database that may
contain null depends upon the presence of null in the relevant attributes of ψ. The
following is a generalization of Definition 4.2 to a larger class of formulas.
Definition 4.5
For ψ ∈ L(Σnull) in prenex normal form,15 a variable v is relevant if it occurs at
least twice in ψ, without considering occurrences in quantifiers or atoms of the
forms IsNull(v), IsNotNull(v), v θnull, or nullθv , where θ a built-in comparison
predicate. RelV (ψ) denotes the set of relevant variables of ψ. 2
15 That is, of the form Q¯χ, where Q¯ is a prefix of quantifiers, and χ is a quantifier-free formula.
Actually, in this work all the formulas have a quantifier prefix of the form ∀¯∃¯.
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The constraints we are considering in this work, particularly those of the form (2),
may not be in prenex normal form, but can be easily transformed while keeping the
same variables and their occurrences, so that relevant variables can be determined.
Example 4.4
Consider the referential integrity constraint (RIC) on schema R = {P(A,B ,C ),
R(A,B ,E )}: ψ : ∀x∀y∀z (P(x , y , z )→ ∃vR(x , y , v)); and the instance D :
P A B C R A B E
a 5 d a 5 3
b null a a 3 7
DBMSs implement the so-called “simple semantics” of the SQL Standard for
satisfaction of ICs. According to it, the database D above satisfies the RIC. This is
because, for every tuple t in P , if t [A] and t [B ] are different from null, there is a
tuple t ′ in R with t [A,B ] = t ′[A,B ].
In this case, and informally, the attributes that are relevant for checking the satis-
faction of the RIC (i.e. those we attempt to capture through the relevant variables)
are A and B , in both P and R. If we try to insert tuple P(c, d , null) into P , the
DBMS will reject the insertion, because none of the attributes that are relevant for
checking the constraint are null, and there is no tuple R(c, d).
More precisely, the set of relevant variables for ψ is RelV (ψ) = {x , y}, because
x and y appear twice in ψ. Accordingly, the values for attributes C and E are not
relevant when checking the satisfaction of ψ, which makes sense. 2
We will now formalize constraint satisfaction under the null-semantics. In this
direction, we consider a single class of constraints that includes those in (1) and
(2), and can be handled in a uniform manner. It also includes all the common
constraints used in data management. More precisely, we consider constraints that
are sentences in L(Σnull) of the form:
∀x¯ (
n∧
i=1
Ri(x¯i) −→
m∨
j=1
Cj ), (12)
where m,n 6= 0, Ri is a predicate in R, Cj is a conjunctive formula of the form
∃y¯j
∧l
k=1 Qjk (x¯
′
jk , y¯jk ), where each Qjk is a predicate in R or a built-in,16 x¯ =⋃n
i=1 x¯i , x¯
′
jk ⊆ x¯ , and y¯j =
⋃l
k=1 y¯jk .
Without loss of generality, we assume that the existentially quantified variables
(the y¯j ) do not appear in x¯ and are different for each conjunctive literal Cj . Notice
that (12) allows formulas with only built-in atoms in the consequent. We also assume
that they do not have any explicit occurrence of the constant null.17 Those formulas
may contain the IsNull or IsNotNull, but as built-in predicates.
16 Occurrences of variables in built-ins have to be safe, i.e. they also appear in x¯ or in database
predicate in the same conjunction.
17 This is not an essential requirement, but will simplify the presentation. Furthermore, all rea-
sonable DECs and local ICs do not require the explicit use of null as a constant. If we need to
express a relational NOT-NULL-constraint, we can say, e.g. ∀x∀y(R(x , y)→ IsNotNull(x)).
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In order to define N -satisfaction of a constraint ψ ∈ L(Σnull) of the form (12),
we first rewrite it into a new FO formula ψN , which makes explicit the role played
by the relevant attributes in ψ (as in Definition 4.5) and the way nulls are handled
in them. Next, satisfaction is defined in terms of the rewriting.
Definition 4.6
Let ψ ∈ L(Σnull) be a constraint of the form (12), i.e. ∀x¯ (∧ni=1 Ri(x¯i) −→ ∨mj=1 Cj ).
(a) The N -rewriting of ψ is the L(Σnull)-sentence:
ψN : ∀x¯ (
n∧
i=1
Ri(x¯i) → (
∨
v∈RelV (ψ)∩x¯
IsNull(v) ∨
m∨
j=1
CNj )), (13)
with x¯ = ∪ni=1x¯i and
CNj = ∃y¯j (
l∧
k=1
Qjk (x¯
′
jk , y¯jk ) ∧
∧
w∈((RelV (ψ)rx¯)∩y¯j )
IsNotNull(w)) · (14)
(b) For an instance D , possibly containing null, ψ is N -satisfied by D , denoted
D |=N ψ, iff D |= ψN . Here, D |= ψN refers to classical first-order satisfaction,
with null treated as any other constant of the domain. 2
We can see from Definition 4.6 that there are basically two cases when a ground
instantiation of ψ (obtained by assigning constants to the variables in x¯ ) is imme-
diately satisfied due to the presence of null: (a) When null appears in any of the
relevant attributes in the antecedent. (b) At least one of the conjunctive formulas
Cj is true, considering that when they are checked according to equation (14), null
is treated as any other constant, but the variables in existential joins do not take
the value null (hence the condition based on w ∈ (RelV (ψ) r x¯ ) ∩ y¯j in (14)).
The rewriting can be applied in particular to our UDECs and RDECs, as follows.
For a UDEC ψ of the form (1), ψN is:
∀x¯ (
n∧
i=1
Ri(x¯i) → (
∨
v∈RelV (ψ)
IsNull(v) ∨
l∧
k=1
(
m∨
j=1
Qkj (y¯j )))) · (15)
For an RDEC ψ of the form (2), ψN is:
∀x¯ (
n∧
i=1
Ri(x¯i) → (
∨
v∈(RelV (ψ)∩x¯)
IsNull(v) ∨ ∃y¯(
l∧
k=1
(Qk (x¯k , y¯k ) ∧ ϕk (x¯ ′k , y¯ ′k )) ∧∧
w∈(RelV (ψ)rx¯)
IsNotNull(w)) ) )· (16)
Example 4.5
(example 4.4 cont.) The rewriting ψN of the RIC ψ is, according to (16):
ψN : ∀x∀y∀z (P(x , y , z ) → IsNull(x ) ∨ IsNull(y) ∨ ∃wR(x , y ,w))·
D classically satisfies ψN , treating null as any other constant. Then, D |=N ψ. 2
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Example 4.6
For ψ : ∀x (R(x )→ ∃y(T (x , y) ∧ S (y)), RelV (ψ) = {x , y}. From (16):
ψN : ∀x (R(x ) → IsNull(x ) ∨ ∃y(T (x , y) ∧ S (y) ∧ IsNotNull(y))·
(a) For D = {R(a)}, D 6|= ψN ; and then, D 6|=N ψ.
(b) For D = {R(a),T (a, null),S (null)}, D 6|= ψN ; and then, D 6|=N ψ.
(c) For D = {R(a),T (a, b),S (b)}, D |= ψN ; and then, D |=N ψ.
(d) For D = {R(null)}, D |= ψN ; and then, D |=N ψ.
(e) For D = ∅, D |= ψN ; and then, D |=N ψ. 2
Example 4.7
Consider the schema S = {R(A,B ,E )} with the primary key constraint (KC)
R : AB → E , expressing that attributes A,B , together, functionally determine
attribute E .18 An SQL database with the instance D = {R(a, 5, 3),R(a, 3, 7)},
which contains no nulls, would satisfy the KC.
The insertion of R(null, 4, 5) into D would be rejected since the KC would be
violated: null is not allowed in a key attribute.The insertion of R(a, 5, null) would
also be rejected, but now due to the potential occurrence of two R-tuples t1, t2 with
t1[A] = t2[A] = a and t1[B ] = t2[B ] = 5, but being unknown whether t1[E ] = t2[E ].
In order to fully capture this KC in predicate logic and the intended semantics
we just described, we need the following sentences to represent the KC:
ψ1 : ∀x∀y∀z1∀z2(R(x , y , z1) ∧ R(x , y , z2)→ z1 = z2), (17)
ψ2 : ∀x∀y∀z1∀z2(R(x , y , z1) ∧ R(x , y , z2) ∧ IsNull(z1)→ IsNull(z2)), (18)
ψ3 : ∀x∀y∀z (R(x , y , z ) ∧ IsNull(x )→ false), (19)
ψ4 : ∀x∀y∀z (R(x , y , z ) ∧ IsNull(y)→ false)· (20)
The first two constraints ensure that, if two tuples coincide in attributes A and B ,
then they have the same value in z or they are both null. The last two constraints
ensure that the values in attributes A or B in relation R cannot be null.
Actually, (18) can be written as
∀x∀y∀z1∀z2(R(x , y , z1) ∧ R(x , y , z2)→ ¬IsNull(z1) ∨ IsNull(z2)),
or equivalently, as a UDEC of the form (1):
ψ′2 : ∀x∀y∀z1∀z2(R(x , y , z1) ∧ R(x , y , z2)→ IsNotNull(z1) ∨ IsNull(z2)),
Similarly, (19) and (20) can be written as UDECs of the form (1):
ψ′3 : ∀x∀y∀z (R(x , y , z ) → IsNotNull(x )),
ψ′4 : ∀x∀y∀z (R(x , y , z ) → IsNotNull(y))·
So, finally, the KC is represented by the UDECs ψ1, ψ
′
2, ψ
′
3, ψ
′
4.
18 A key constraint is a particular kind of functional dependency, where a set of attributes of a
relational predicate functionally determines all the attributes of the predicate. Declaring a key
constraint as primary in an SQL-based relational DBMS has in particular the effect that NULL
is not accepted in key attributes.
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For illustration, considering that RelV (ψ1) = {x , y , z1, z2}, and RelV (ψ′3) = ∅,
we obtain from (15):
ψN1 : ∀x∀y∀z1∀z2(R(x , y , z1) ∧ R(x , y , z2) → IsNull(x ) ∨ IsNull(y) ∨
IsNull(z1) ∨ IsNull(z2) ∨ z1 = z2), (21)
(ψ′3)
N : ∀x∀y∀z (R(x , y , z ) → IsNotNull(x ))· (22)
Finally, observe that when the atom z1 = z2 in ψ
N
1 is evaluated on the domain,
the constant null is treated as any other constant, i.e. null = c is true only when
constant c is null. 2
We have managed to reduce constraint satisfaction under NULL as handled by
SQL databases to formula satisfaction in FO predicate logic, without assigning any
special status to null, which is treated as an ordinary constant. We considered only
constraints of the form (12), which include all our DECs and ICs for peers, in which
case, the generic set of database predicates R will contain those for a single peer
or a pair thereof. However, the semantics can be extended to more general FO
formulas (Bravo 2007).
4.4 Query answering under NULL via FO rewriting
The notion of query answer under NULL, that of N -answer given in Section 4.2, being
interesting per se, allowed us to motivate the treatment of constraints via relevant
variables. However, query answering in presence of null can also be treated via the
rewriting in Definition 4.6. This is achieved by considering conjunctive queries as
a special case of (12), without the ∀x¯ and empty antecedents; and obtaining their
relevant variables through Definition 4.5.
More precisely, a conjunctive query Q(x¯ ) ∈ Conj(Σnull), i.e. of the form (11), is
rewritten into a new conjunctive query as follows:
QN (x¯ ) : ∃y¯(A1(x¯1) ∧ · · · ∧An(x¯n) ∧
∧
v∈RelV (Q)
v 6= null) · (23)
It holds: D |=
N
Q[c¯] iff D |= QN [c¯], where the latter is classic FO satisfaction,
with null treated as an ordinary constant in the domain.
This transformation ensures that relevant variables range over (U r {null}).
QN (x¯ ) ∈ Conj(Σnull), and may contain atoms of the form IsNull(t) or IsNotNull(t).
However, they can be replaced by t = null or t 6= null, resp., leading to a query in
Conj(Σ), but with the same answers as (23).
Example 4.8
Consider the instance D below, and the query Q(x ) : ∃y(P(x , y)∧y > 5), for which
RelV (Q) = {y}. In this case, the bound variable is the only relevant variable, and
then ranges over non-null values when checking query satisfaction.
28 L. Bertossi, L. Bravo
Accordingly, D |=N Q[f ] holds, be-
cause ∃y(P(f , y) ∧ y > 5) is true in D ,
with 7 as a non-null value for y that
makes the formula true. This result is
confirmed by the rewriting of Q(x ).
P A B
f 7
f 5
null 8
b null
For QN (x ) : ∃y(P(x , y) ∧ y > 5 ∧ IsNotNull(y)), D |= QN [f ] holds, under
classical satisfaction, with null treated as any other constant. Similarly, D |=N
Q[null]. 2
Example 4.9
(example 4.1 continued) The query in (9) can be rewritten as
QN2 (x ) : ∃y∃z (R(x , y , z ) ∧ S (y) ∧ y > 2 ∧ y 6= null)·
We had D 6|=
N
Q2[1]. Now, D 6|= ∃y∃z (R(1, y , z ) ∧ S (y) ∧ y > 2 ∧ y 6= null),
classically, with null treated as an ordinary constant. As expected, D 6|= QN2 [2]
due to the new conjunct y 6= null.
Finally, D |= QN2 [null] because D |= (R(null, 3, 3) ∧ S (3) ∧ 3 > 2 ∧ 3 6= null).
Since null is treated as any other constant, we can compare it with 3. By the unique
names assumption, 3 6= null holds. 2
Our query answering N -semantics for Conj(Σnull) can be applied in particular
any SQL-like conjunctive query, but first expressing it as a queryQ in Conjsql(Σnull),
and then computing and classically evaluating QN .
The notions of constraint satisfaction and query answer in the presence of NULL a`
la SQL we introduced in this section coincide with the classic notions in databases
without null.
In the rest of this work, the notion of formula satisfaction that we have denoted
with |=N will be simply denoted with |=. When constraints are not satisfied in this
sense, we will apply a particular repair semantics that captures the special role of
null. It is introduced in the next section.
5 Solution Semantics with NULL
In the preceding section, we introduced a notion of formula satisfaction with database
instances that may contain null. We now use it for defining the semantics of a peer
system where the data movement process relies on consistency restoration of peer
instances with respect to DECs. The value null will be used to replace existentially
quantified variables in consequents of referential DECs and local referential ICs as
a possibility to consider for DEC and IC enforcement. Another possibility for the
same task is tuple deletion.
The repair semantics that supports consistency restoration will have to capture
and be sensitive to the (possibly multiple) presence of null in the database and its
use for consistency enforcement. In particular, it has to give an account of the facts
that:
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1. When atoms are inserted into the database, an existential variable that ap-
pears in a join or in a built-in atom in an RDEC’s consequent (a so-called
problematic existential variable) is never replaced by (or takes the value) null.
2. Arbitrary non-null constants from the domain are not used for these prob-
lematic variables either. Actually, rather than introducing arbitrary values for
existential variables of this kind, tuple deletions from antecedents in DECs
will be privileged.
5.1 A restricted chase
In order to achieve the just stated goals, we first introduce a restricted, ad hoc form
of the chase (Abiteboul et al. 1995), as an auxiliary construct. It is applied only
with the DECs and ICs at hand that do not have problematic existential variables
in their consequents. The enforcement of this subset of the constraints introduces
tuples with null for existential variables (that do not appear in joins though).
In the end, this chase will return a finite set of atoms that will be used as a possibly
generous upper-bound for the admissible tuple insertions that create repairs and
solutions on the basis of the whole sets of DECs at hand.
As any other form of chase, our restricted chase enforces the satisfaction of con-
straints, but in our case the notion of satisfaction corresponds to that introduced
in Section 4.3.
In the rest of this subsection, we consider a database instance D and a set of
DECs Σ = Σ1∪Σ2, with Σ1 a set of UDECs of the form (1) and Σ2 a set of RDECs
of the form (2). We consider the subset, Σ−2 of Σ2 that contains all the RDECs
except for those involving existentially quantified variables in joins or built-in atoms.
Accordingly, we consider Σ− := Σ1 ∪ Σ−2 .
Definition 5.1
The restricted chase, r -Chasenull(D ,Σ−), with an instance D and Σ− = Σ1 ∪Σ−2 ,
is the instance D ′ obtained as a fix-point of the following iterative procedure:
1. D ′0 := D .
2. Given instance D ′s , if D
′
s |= Σ− (relative to |=N ), then D ′s+1 := D ′s .
3. Given instance D ′s , if a ground instantiation, ϕ↓, of a constraint ϕ ∈ Σ1 (with
constants or null) is not satisfied by D ′s (relative to |=N ), but its antecedent is,
then D ′s+1 is obtained from D
′
s by adding the ground database atoms appearing
in every disjunct of every conjunct in the consequent of ϕ↓ (but only when the
built-ins in the conjunct are satisfied).
Notice that this excludes the generation of atoms with any kind of built-ins,
including the atom false.
4. Given instance D ′s , if a ground instantiation (obtained by replacing universal
variables with constants or null, but keeping the existential quantifiers) of a
constraint in Σ−2 is not satisfied by D
′
s , but its antecedent is, then replace the
existentially quantified variables by null, and build D ′s+1 by adding to D
′
s the
corresponding ground atoms in the conjunct in the consequent (but only when
the built-ins in it are satisfied). 2
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This procedure finitely terminates as we show below, but first some intuitions,
explanations and examples. The chase procedure propagates and invents values
due to the enforcement of RECs with non-problematic existential quantifiers and
UDECs. As a result, the constants in the chase instance will be those already
appearing in the initial instance D , those that appear explicitly in consequents of
DECs, or null as a value invented for (non-problematic) existentially quantified
variables.
Example 5.1
Consider the following set of constraints, classified according to Definition 5.1:
Σ1 = {∀x∀y(T (x , y)→ R(x , y)), (24)
∀x∀y∀z (R(x , y) ∧ S (y , z )→ Q(x , y , z ) ∨ T (x , z )), (25)
∀x∀y∀z (Q(x , y , z )→ S (x , y) ∧ R(y , z )), (26)
∀x∀y∀z (T (x , y) ∧ T (x , z )→ y = z ), (27)
∀x∀y(T (x , y) ∧ S (x , y)→ false), (28)
Σ−2 = {∀x∀y(R(x , y)→ ∃z (Q(x , y , z ) ∧ x 6= y), (29)
∀x∀y∀z (Q(x , y , z )→ ∃w(R(x , z ) ∧ S (x ,w))}· (30)
Independently from the instance at hand (initial or not) at a chase step, constraints
(27) and (28), will never be applied (or enforced).
If D contains T (a, null), then the ground instantiation T (a, null)→ R(a, null)
of (24) is satisfied under |=N , even if D does not contain R(a, null). This is because
both variables x , y in (24) are relevant (cf. Definition 4.5). So, R(a, null) is not
generated. However, if T (a, b) ∈ D and R(a, b) /∈ D , the latter atom is generated.
Now, the ground instantiation R(a, a) → ∃z (Q(a, a, z ) ∧ a 6= a) of (29) will
not create new tuples because of the inequality a 6= a. However, if R(a, b) ∈ D ,
and the instantiation R(a, b) → ∃z (Q(a, b, z ) ∧ a 6= b) is not satisfied, the tuple
Q(a, b, null) will be created.
The ground instantiation R(a, b) ∧ S (b, c) → Q(a, b, c) ∨ T (a, c) of (25), with
R(a, b), S (b, c) ∈ D , will generate both Q(a, b, c) and T (a, c) (if it was not already
satisfied).
Notice that creation of Q(a, b, null) above, due to (29), feeds the antecedent of
(26). However, its instantiation Q(a, b, null) → S (a, b) ∧ R(b, null)) is satisfied,
because null appear for variable z that is relevant. So, R(b, null) is not generated.
2
Remark 5.1
(a) Notice that in the DEC (26) all variables, x , y , z , are relevant. As a consequence,
any ground atom with predicate Q with null in it will not trigger the rule. We can
see that, every time the chase introduces null in a predicate position that turns out
to be relevant in another DEC, this latter DEC will not be triggered (because it will
be automatically satisfied). This possibly very common situation will contribute to
a fast termination of the chase.
(b) We can assume that the chase applies in parallel all possible instantiations of
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DECs in Σ−. It is clear that this restricted null-based chase always terminates, be-
cause only the elements of the initial active domain plus possibly null are used to fill
arguments in database predicates, which leads to a saturation point in polynomial-
time in the size of instance D and the schema. In particular, the resulting instance
is of polynomial size in the size of D .
(c) Instead of using the chase procedure (in case we wanted a more model-theoretic
or declarative approach to the chase instance), we could replace each sentence in
Σ1 by a collection of Datalog rules, one for each disjunct in the consequent; and
each sentence in Σ−2 by a Datalog rule obtained replacing existential variables by
null. The chase instance would coincide with the minimal model of the resulting
Datalog program (Abiteboul et al. 1995). 2
Notice that r -Chasenull(D ,Σ−) may not satisfy Σ, for the trivial reason that not
all DECs in Σ are considered in the chase. Actually, r -Chasenull(D ,Σ−) may not
even satisfy Σ−, because it ignores DECs with only built-ins in consequents. For
illustration, in Example 5.1, the chase of D = {T (a, b),T (a, c)} will not satisfy
(27), and the chase of D = {T (a, b),S (a, b)} will not satisfy (28).
The next step will be imposing r -Chasenull(D ,Σ−) as an upper bound on the
extensions of possible repairs. With this we will discard candidate repairs that
introduce arbitrary, non-mandatory, non-null constants. In other words, we will use
the result of this chase to test candidate repairs (or solutions), demanding their
inserted atoms to be contained in the chase applied with the subset Σ− of the set
Σ of DECs at hand.
5.2 Repair semantics with NULL and solutions
A repair semantics for single relational databases and sets of ICs that may include
referential ICs is proposed in (Bravo and Bertossi 2006; Bravo 2007). It introduces
null values of the kind described in Section 4.3. We will adopt and adapt this repair
semantics in the context of PDESs, by taking into account the restrictions imposed
by the chase we just introduced, and also the trust relationships.
So as repairs of an inconsistent instance with respect to a set of ICs, solutions for
a peer in a PDES are expected to stay “close” to the original peer’s instance, while
satisfying its DECs. In order to capture “closeness” in our null-based semantics, we
need to compare instances and their tuples, which may contain constant null.
Definition 5.2
(Levene and Loizou 1997) For constants c, d ∈ U , c provides less or equal informa-
tion than d , denoted c v d , iff c = null or c = d . For sequences s¯1 = 〈c1, . . . , cn〉
and s¯2 = 〈d1, . . . , dn〉, with ci , di ∈ U , s¯1 provides less or equal information than
s¯2, denoted s¯1 v s¯2, iff ci v di for every i = 1, . . . ,n. Finally, s¯1 @ s¯2 means s¯1 v s¯2
and s¯1 6= s¯2. 2
Definition 5.3
Consider D ,D ′,D ′′ be database instances for the same schema, and a set Σ of DECs
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of the form (1) or (2) in the language of the schema. Let Σ− be the subset of Σ
that excludes the DECs with problematic existential variables (cf. Section 5.1).
(a) D ′ is at least as close to D as D ′′ (is to D), denoted D ′ ≤ΣD D ′′, iff one of
the following holds:
1. D ′′ 6⊆ r -Chasenull(D ,Σ−).
2. For every P(a¯) ∈ ∆(D ,D ′), there exists P(a¯ ′) ∈ ∆(D ,D ′′), such that:
i. a¯ v a¯ ′, and ii. if a¯ @ a¯ ′, then P(a¯ ′) 6∈ ∆(D ,D ′).
(b) D ′ is closer to D than D ′′ (is to D), denoted D ′ <ΣD D
′′, iff D ′ ≤ΣD D ′′, but
not D ′′ ≤ΣD D ′. 2
Definition 5.4
Given an instance D and a set Σ of DECs of the forms (1) or (2), a null-based
repair of D with respect to Σ is an instance D ′ such that D ′ |=N Σ, and there is
no D ′′, such that D ′′ |=N Σ and D ′′ <ΣD D ′. 2
This definition ensures, in particular, that a database that, due to the enforcement
of an RDEC with a non-problematic existential variable, inserts a tuple with null for
that variable, is closer to D than another that adds some other, arbitrary constant.
At the same time, the definition makes us prefer repairs obtained via tuple deletions
instead of tuple insertions (with values null or not), when enforcing RDECs with
problematic existential variables.
The null-based repair semantics, in particular Definition 5.4, is also of indepen-
dent interest in the context of single inconsistent databases with respect to a set
of ICs that are like the DECs we are considering in the PDES setting. Actually,
this is the official and detailed formalization of the repair semantics first sketched
and used in (Bravo and Bertossi 2006) for databases with referential ICs. The idea
in that case is that inconsistencies are preferably repaired through the insertion of
tuples with the special constant null, that is used as the null in SQL. When this
is not possible, tuple deletions are preferred. This happens either because a con-
straint cannot be solved via tuple insertions at all (e.g. functional dependencies)
or an inclusion dependency would have to be satisfied through the use of null for
variables in a join. The next two examples show how this repair semantics would
be used for repairing a single database.
Example 5.2
(example 4.6 cont.) Consider Σ = {∀x (R(x ) → ∃y(T (x , y) ∧ S (y))}, and the in-
stance D = {R(a)}.
Here, Σ− = ∅, and r -Chasenull(D ,Σ−) = {R(a)}. Furthermore, D 6|= Σ (this
is case (a) in Example 4.6).
i. D ′1 = {R(a),T (a, null),S (null)} 6|= Σ (this is case (b) in Example 4.6). So,
D ′1 is not a repair.
ii. D ′2 = ∅ |= Σ (this is case (e) in Example 4.6). D ′2 is a repair.
Indeed, for any instance D ′′ that is not contained in r -Chasenull(D ,Σ−),
D ′2 ≤ΣD D ′′ holds. So, the only possible improvement on D ′2 could be {R(a)},
which does not satisfy Σ.
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iii. D ′3 = {R(a),T (a, a),S (a)} |= Σ (as case (c) in Example 4.6), but it is not a
repair.
Indeed, first notice that D ′2 ≤ΣD D ′3, because D ′3 6⊆ r -Chasenull(D ,Σ−).
Now, D ′3 6≤ΣD D ′2, because condition 2. of Definition 5.3 does not hold for S (a)
(or T (a, a)). We have obtained that D ′2 <
Σ
D D
′
3, i.e. the former, which is a
repair, is strictly closer to D than the latter. The same holds for any instance
of the form D ′4 = {R(a),T (a, b),S (b)} (and its supersets). 2
Example 5.3
Consider Σ = {∀x∀y∀z (T (x , y) ∧ T (x , z ) → y = z ), ∀x∀y(T (x , y) ∧ S (x , y) →
false)}, containing a functional dependency and a denial constraint. The instance
D = {T (a, b),T (a, c),S (a, c)} is inconsistent with respect to Σ.
Here, Σ− = Σ. However, the restricted chase does not apply any of the ICs,
because they contain only built-ins in the consequent. So, r -Chasenull(D ,Σ−) = D .
As a consequence, only repairs based on tuple deletions are acceptable. In this case,
D ′ = {T (a, b),S (a, c)} is the only repair. 2
Since the ≤ΣD relations can take the place of the generic relation Σ(P)D used in
Section 3, ≤D determines, through the instantiation of Definition 3.1, a concrete
repair semantics that determines null-based neighborhood solutions for a peer P, in
which case the definition has to be applied with Σ(P). However, Definition 5.4 does
not take into account the trust relationships in a neighborhood that are imposed in
Definition 3.1. As a consequence, to have a null-based notion of neighborhood solu-
tion, we have to impose the additional requirement that certain database relations
in a neighborhood instance have to stay untouched (they belong to a peer that is
most trusted).
Having a specific notion of neighborhood solution, it is possible to obtain, fol-
lowing the developments in Section 3, also specific definitions of solution and core
for a peer, and the notion of peer-consistent answer. In the rest of this section we
provide some additional examples that show aspects of this specific semantics, and
in the following subsections we investigate computational problems related to this
semantics.
Example 5.4
(example 5.2 continued) Consider a PDES instance D for the schema P with peers
P1 and P2, with S(P1) = {R}, S(P2) = {T ,S}, and Trust = {(P1, same, P2)}.
Assume the only DECs are those in Σ(P1, P2) = {∀x (R(x )→ ∃y(T (x , y) ∧ S (y))}.
So, Σ−(P1, P2) = ∅.
Assume that the instance of the neighborhood of P1 is D = {R(a)}. Here, D 6|=
Σ(P1, P2). So, in order to obtain a neighborhood solution, we have to repair D with
respect to Σ(P1, P2).
Since P1 trusts P2 the same as itself, in principle we could insert tuples into P2’s
relations or delete tuples from P1’s relation. However, in this case (cf. Example 5.2),
since r -Chasenull(D ,Σ−(P1, P2)) = {R(a)}, the only neighborhood solution is the
empty instance: ∅ |=N Σ(P1, P2), and ∅ <Σ(P1)D D ′, for any S(P1, P2)-instance D ′
that inserts tuples. 2
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Similarly, the generic Definition 3.2 of solution and core for peers, can be instan-
tiated with the null-based solution semantics, i.e. on the basis of the ≤ΣD relations,
obtaining specific versions of those definitions. Accordingly, we recall that, given an
instance D = {D(Q) | Q ∈ P} for the schema P, the core of peer P is the intersection
of its solutions: Core(P,D) :=
⋂
Sol(P,D).
Example 5.5
(example 2.1 continued) Consider the following peers’ instances: D(P1)={R1(a, 2)},
D(P2) = {R2(c, 4),R2(d , 5)}, D(P3) = {R3(c, 4)}, and D(P4) = {R4(d , 5, 1)}. So,
the PDES instance is D = {D(P1),D(P2),D(P3),D(P4)}.
If we want the solutions for P4, we first need the solutions for P3 and P2, who
also needs the solution for P3. Since P3 has no DECs with other peers, its only
neighborhood solution is its local instance D(P3), which is sent back to P2 or P4 if
request.
Peer P2 needs to find the neighborhood solutions for {R2(c, 4),R2(d , 5),R3(c, 4)}
with respect to Σ(P2, P3). Since P2 trusts P3 the same as itself, it can modify its
own data or the data it got from P3. There are two neighborhood solutions for P2:
{R2(c, 4),R2(d , 5)} and {R2(d , 5),R3(c, 4)}, that restricted to P2’s schema lead to
two solutions for P2: Sol(P2,D)={{R2(c, 4),R2(d , 5)}, {R2(d , 5)}}. Peer P2 sends
to P4 the intersection of its solutions: Core(P2,D) = {R2(d , 5)}.
Neighborhood solutions for P4 are obtained by repairing {R4(d , 5, 1), R2(d , 5),
R3(c, 4)} with respect to Σ(P4, P2), and Σ(P4, P3). The DECs in Σ(P4, P2) are
already satisfied, but not those in Σ(P4, P3). Since P4 trusts the data in P3 more
than its own, the only neighborhood solution for P4 is obtained by inserting a tuple
with null into P4’s: {R4(d , 5, 1),R2(d , 5),R3(c, 4), R4(c, 4, null)}. Consequently,
Sol(P4,D) = {{R4(d , 5, 1), R4(c, 4, null)}}. 2
Due to a particular combination of DECs, trust relationships, and local instances,
it is possible that a peer has not solution, which may happen with or without the
null-based repair semantics. For illustration, Example 3.2, now with the null-based
solution semantics, still does not have solutions.
5.3 Complexity of neighborhood solutions
We now investigate the complexity of decision problems related to the general case
of DECs of the form (12) (cf. Section 4), in combination with the null-based repair
semantics we introduced in this section.
We concentrate mostly on the case that is directly relevant to our forthcoming
answer-set programming (ASP) approach to specifying solutions for individual peers
when they have already gathered their neighbors solutions. That is, we consider
specifications and reasoning at the neighborhood level (cf. Section 6). Accordingly,
we start by analyzing the complexity of deciding if an instance is a neighborhood
solution (cf. Definition 3.1).
Definition 5.5
Consider a PDES schema P = 〈P,S,Σ, T rust〉 and a peer P ∈ P. Given an
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instance D¯ for the neighborhood schema S(N (P)) around P, and an instance J for
the schema S(N (P)), the NeighborhoodSol decision problem is about determining
if J is a neighborhood solution for P and D¯ , i.e. about membership of the set:
NeighborhoodSol(P, P) = {(J , D¯) | J ∈ NS(P, D¯)}. 2
This decision problem is parameterized by peer schemas and selected peers. The
inputs are database instances. Then, we are considering data complexity.
Proposition 5.1
NeighborhoodSol is coNP -complete in the size of J ∪ D¯ . 2
Notice that Proposition 5.1 has to be interpreted as follows (and similarly those
that follow in this section): For every peer schema P, NeighborhoodSol(P, P) is in
coNP; and there is a peer schema P0 and a peer P0 in it, such that the associated
problem NeighborhoodSol(P0, P0) is coNP-hard.
Proposition 5.1 holds already for PDES with a single peer with local integrity
constraints; actually with (cyclic) sets of RDECs of the simple form ∀x¯ (R(x¯ ) −→
∃y¯ Q(x¯ ′, y¯)). The proof in this case is a bit more involved since tuple deletions
and insertions are in principle possible, but the latter were blocked with the trust
relationships. A proof can be found in (Bravo 2007).19 The proposition also holds
in the case where D¯ =
⋃
Q∈N (P) JQ, but every JQ with Q ∈ N ◦(P) is fixed, i.e. only
J and JP vary.
5.4 Complexity of the core and peer-consistent answers
Definition 5.6
Consider a PDES schema P = 〈P,S,Σ, T rust〉 and a peer P in it. Given a neigh-
borhood instance D¯ =
⋃
Q∈N (P) JQ for S(N (P)), the local core of P is the intersec-
tion of the neighborhood solutions for P and D¯ , but restricted to P’s schema S(P):
localCore(P, D¯) := (
⋂
NS(P, D¯))S(P). 2
In this definition, JQ denotes an arbitrary instance for peer Q, which may be
different from what we have called the initial instance D(Q) for Q (cf. Definition
3.2). Actually, JQ could be D(Q), but also a neighborhood solution for Q restricted
to its schema, or the intersection of the latter, etc. In this regard, we recall that
a neighborhood solution for P is defined in terms of its neighborhood schema, its
local instance D(P) in D, and instances JQ for other peers Q in its neighborhood (cf.
Definition 3.1). Each JQ for a neighboring peer Q is typically the restriction to S(Q)
of the intersection of Q’s local neighborhood solutions, which may not necessarily
be the same as the initial instance D(Q) ∈ D.
We can see that the problems of defining and computing neighborhood solutions
for a peer can be formulated with arbitrary instances for the neighbors, and do not
require taking into consideration the recursive relations between peers. However,
19 It is also possible to modify the proof just given by introducing auxiliary, dummy joins in the
consequent of the RDEC in Σ(P1, P1), to make attributes relevant and avoid so the insertion of
tuples with null, which has the effect of enforcing deletions.
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the computation of the solutions of a peer is a global problem that does include
recursion. In this case, we fix all the instances to be the initial ones for each peer.
Notice from Definition 3.2, that when D¯ = D(P) ∪⋃Q∈N◦(P) Core(Q,D) in Defi-
nition 5.6, it holds localCore(P, D¯) = Core(P,D). In particular, Proposition 5.1
remains true if JQ = Core(Q,D), for Q ∈ N ◦(P), and JP = D(P).
Definition 5.7
Consider a PDES schema P = 〈P,S,Σ, T rust〉 and a peer P ∈ P, the InLocalCore
decision problem is about membership of the set:
InLocalCore(P, P) = {(R(t¯), D¯) |R(t¯) ∈ localCore(P, D¯) and D¯ is an instance
for S(N (P))}. 2
Proposition 5.2
For a PDES schema P = 〈P,S,Σ, T rust〉 and a peer P ∈ P, InLocalCore(P, P) is
ΠP2 -complete in the size of D¯ , the input neighborhood instance. 2
Despite the assumption that the peer graphs G(P) are acyclic (cf. Remark 2.1),
sets Σ of DECs may contain cycles through inclusion dependencies, in particular
with existential quantifiers, i.e. RDECs.
More precisely, assume Σ is (or contains) a set of sentences ϕ of the form
∀x¯ (ψ(x¯ ) → ∃y¯χ(x¯ , y¯)), of the form (12). When y¯ is not empty, ϕ is called ex-
istential. A directed graph can be associated to Σ. The nodes are the database
predicates, and there is an edge from predicate P to predicate Q when P appears
in the antecedent, and Q in the consequent of a ϕ ∈ Σ. The edge is marked if ϕ is
existential. Σ is ref-acyclic if there no cycles with marked edges in the graph.20
For example, IC1 = {∀x (S (x ) → Q(x )), ∀x (Q(x ) → ∃y T (x , y))} and IC2 =
{∀x (S (x ) → Q(x )), ∀x (Q(x ) → S (x ))} are ref-acyclic sets, whereas IC3 = IC1 ∪
{∀xy (T (x , y) → Q(y))} is not. This notion can be applied without changes to the
sets Σ(P) in PDESs.
Example 5.6
Given a PDES P = 〈P,S,Σ, T rust〉 with P = {P1, P2}, S = {S(P1),S(P1)},
S(P1) = {R1(·, ·)}, S(P2) = {R2(·, ·)}, Σ(P1, P2) = {∀x∀z (R1(x , z )→ ∃yR2(x , y)),
∀x∀z (R2(x , z )→ ∃yR1(x , y)}, Σ(P2, P1) = ∅; and Trust = {(P1, less, P2)}. In this
case, the peer graph G(P) is acyclic. However, schema P is not ref-acyclic, because
Σ(P1) = Σ(P1, P2) has a cycle through RDECs. 2
In some cases we will make the assumption that the sets of DECs at hand are
ref-acyclic. For this reason, we make notice that the proof of Proposition 5.2 uses a
ref-acyclic set of DECs. So, the proposition still holds for this class of DECs, which
will become relevant in Section 6. (Cf. electronic Appendix A.1 for an additional
discussion.)
20 The condition of ref-acyclicity was already used in (Bravo and Bertossi 2006), as RIC-acyclicity,
for sets of ICs on a single database schema.
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Corollary 5.1
For a PDES schema P = 〈P,S,Σ, T rust〉 and a peer P ∈ P, with ref-acyclic sets
of DECs, the InLocalCore(P, P) decision problem is ΠP2 -complete in the size of D¯ ,
the input neighborhood instance. 2
We can also apply the null-based solution semantics to Definition 3.3, obtaining
a specific definition of peer consistent answer. More precisely, given a PDES schema
P, an instance D for it, a peer P and a query Q(x¯ ) ∈ L(P), the set of peer consistent
answers to Q from P is
PCADP,P(Q) = {t | D |=N Q[t ], for all D ∈ Sol(P,D) }, (31)
with Sol(P,D) as defined in this section, on the basis of the ≤Σ(P)D relations.
Proposition 5.2 and its Corollary 5.1 still hold when, for each Q ∈ N ◦(P), JQ =
Core(Q,D), and JP = D(P). Therefore, the local computation of peer consistent
answers to a conjunctive query -for which the cores of the neighboring peers are
used- is also ΠP2 -complete.
Corollary 5.2
For a PDES schema P = 〈P,S,Σ, T rust〉, an instance D for P, and a peer P ∈ P,
deciding answers to a conjunctive query posed to P that are true in
⋂
NS(P, D¯),
where D¯ = D(P) ∪⋃Q∈N◦(P) Core(Q,D), is ΠP2 -complete in the size of D¯ . This is
also true for P with ref-acyclic sets of DECs. 2
The complexity of the decision and computational problems at the neighborhood
level we have obtained so far are the most interesting, due to the modular and local
manner solutions and peer-consistent answers are computed. These results will be
useful in Section 6, where specification and computation of neighborhood solutions
and PCAs are addressed.
We make only some final remarks in relation to global solutions and PCAs on their
basis. Corollary 5.2 already tells us that deciding peer-consistent answers (which
involves global solutions as opposed to neighborhood solutions) will be at least ΠP2 -
hard. Actually, using Proposition 5.2 it is possible to provide a non-deterministic
polynomial time algorithm (in data) with a ΠP2 -oracle to decide if an instance for
a peer is a (global) solution for the peer. On this basis, one can obtain that PCA,
as a decision problem, belongs to ΠP3 , in data (that includes those of all peers in
the system).
5.5 The import case
In this section we consider a common situation, namely the import case, where we
find Trust relationships are only of the form (P, less, Q) when P 6= Q; and the DECs
are used for importing data from other peers.
Definition 5.8
Consider a PDES schema P = 〈P,S,Σ, T rust〉, and two different peers P and Q:
38 L. Bertossi, L. Bravo
(a) An import UDEC (IUDEC) to P from Q is a UDEC in L(P, Q) of the form:
∀x¯ (
n∧
i=1
Ri(x¯i) −→ (Q(x¯ ′) ∨ ϕ(x¯ ′′)), (32)
where the Ri are predicates in S(Q), Q is a predicate in S(P), x¯ ′, x¯ ′′ ⊆ ∪x¯i = x¯ ,
and ϕ(x¯ ′′) is a disjunction of built-ins (representing a conjunction of built-ins on
the variables in the antecedent).
(b) An import RDEC (IRDEC) to P from Q is an RDEC in L(P, Q) of the form:
∀x¯ (
n∧
i=1
Ri(x¯i) −→ ∃z¯ (Q(y¯ , z¯ ) ∧ ϕ1(x¯ ′, z¯ ′)) ∨ ϕ2(x¯ ′′)), (33)
where the Ri are predicates in S(Q), Q is a predicate in S(P), x¯ ′, x¯ ′′, y¯ ⊆ ∪i x¯i = x¯ ,
z¯ ′ ⊆ z¯ , and ϕ1 (ϕ2) is a conjunction (disjunction) of built-ins. Notice that ϕ1
basically imposes conditions with built-ins on the values for z¯ that, under the null-
based semantics, will be all null. (ϕ2(x¯
′′) plays the same role on ϕ in (32).)
(c) A PDES is of the import kind if, for every peer P, the DECs in Σ(P, Q) with
any peer Q different from P, are import DECs to P from Q. Furthermore, if this set
of DECs is non-empty, (P, less, Q) ∈ Trust. 2
Notice that this definition does not make any assumptions on the possible sets
of local constraints, Σ(P, P).
Example 5.7
Consider a PDES with P = {P1, P2, P3, P4}, S(P1) = {R1(·, ·)},S(P2) = {R2(·, ·),
S 2(·, ·)}, S(P3) = {R3(·, ·)},S(P4) = {R4(·, ·, ·)}, and the following sets of DECs:
Σ(P1, P2) = {∀x∀y(R2(x , y)→ (R1(x , y) ∨ x ≤ y))},
Σ(P4, P2) = {∀x∀y∀z (R2(x , y) ∧ S 2(y , z ) → R4(x , y , z ))},
Σ(P4, P3) = {∀x∀y(R3(x , y)→ ∃zR4(x , y , z ))} ·
Σ(P3, P2) = {∀x∀y(R3(x , y)→ R2(x , y))}·
The first three sets of DECs are formed by import DECs, but not the last one. 2
5.5.1 The unrestricted case
The unrestricted import case of PDES P as in Definition 5.8 occurs when, for every
peer P ∈ P, Σ(P, P) = ∅. That is, in this case, a peer may have DECs of the forms
(32) and (33) to neighboring peers, in whom it has more trust than in itself, but
no local ICs.
As a consequence of an unrestricted local repair process, a peer will get data from
its neighbors and will integrate them, at least virtually, into its own neighborhood
instance. The data from a neighboring peer will be obtained by just posing it a
conjunctive query, the one corresponding to the antecedent of the DEC.
For illustration, in Example 5.7, if P4 uses its import DEC from P2 (that in
Σ(P4, P2)) to retrieve data from P2, then P4 sends to P2 the query: Q(x , y) :
R2(x , y) ∧ S 2(y , z ).
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In the import case we can define a Datalog program for which its minimal model
is the neighborhood solution of the peer.
Definition 5.9
Given an unrestricted import PDES schema P = 〈P,S,Σ, T rust〉, a peer P ∈ P
and an instance D¯ for the neighborhood schema S(N (P)) around P, the import
program I(P, D¯) is a Datalog program containing:
1. The facts: R(a¯), for every atom R(a¯) ∈ D¯ .
2. For every IUDEC in Σ(P) of the form (32), the rule:
Q(y¯)← R1(x¯1), . . .Rn(x¯n),¬ϕ(x¯ ′′)·
3. For every import RDEC in Σ(P) of the form (33), the rule:
Q(y¯ , null)← R1(x¯1), . . .Rn(x¯n), ¬ϕ2(x¯ ′′)·
Here, ¬ϕ(x¯ ′′) and ¬ϕ2(x¯ ′′) become conjunctions of built-in literals, i.e. atomic for-
mulas with a built-in or negations thereof; and null is a sequence of nulls for vari-
ables z¯ . According to the discussion of (33), conditions associated to ϕ1 become
conditions on x¯ ′, which can all be made part of x¯ ′′. 2
Proposition 5.3
Given an unrestricted import PDES schema P = 〈P,S,Σ, T rust〉 and an instance
D over it, every peer P ∈ P has a unique solution instance. Furthermore, there is
an algorithm, that uses the import program I(P,D ′), and computes the solution
for a peer P in polynomial time in the size of DS(AC(P)). 2
This uniqueness result relies on the fact that we are repairing IRDECs through
the insertion of null values, as sanctioned by the official repair semantics. Otherwise,
uniqueness would hold in general only for IUDECs.
5.5.2 The restricted case
This case appears when, under all the import assumptions above, peers are allowed
to have local constraints, that is, it may be that Σ(P, P) 6= ∅. In this case, a peer
will import data without restrictions from its neighbors, but when building neigh-
borhood solutions, also the local ICs will be taken into account. In this case, P may
have none or several solutions.
Example 5.8
Consider the PDES schema P = 〈P,S,Σ, T rust〉 corresponding to Figure 7. Here,
P = {P1, P2, P3},S = {S(P1), S(P2),S(P3)}, S(P1) = {R1(·, ·)}, S(P2) = {R2(·, ·)},
S(P3) = {R3(·, ·)}.
The local instances are: D(P1) = {}, D(P2) = {R2(a, b)}, D(P3) = {R3(a, c)}.
The DECs are:
1. Σ(P1, P2)= {∀x∀y(R2(x , y)→ R1(x , y))},
2. Σ(P1, P3) = {∀x∀y(R3(x , y)→ R1(x , y))}, and
3. Σ(P1, P1) = {∀x∀y∀z (R1(x , y) ∧ R1(x , z )→ y = z )}.
Σ(P1, P2) and Σ(P1, P3) contain import DECs. However, due to the local constraints
in Σ(P1, P1), there are no solutions for P1. 2
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Fig. 7. Accessibility graph for Example 5.8
Example 5.9
Consider D(P) = {P(a, b),P(a, c)},D(Q) = {Q(a, d)}, and Trust = {(P, less, Q)}.
Σ(P, Q) = {∀x∀y(Q(x , y)→ P(x , y)}, and Σ(P, P) = {∀x∀y∀z∀v(P(x , y)∧P(x , z )∧
P(x , v) → y = z ∨ z = v ∨ v = y)}. The local constraints in Σ(P, P) ensures that
there are at most two tuples in P with the same first attribute. In this case, Σ(P, Q)
is of the import kind and therefore P(a, d) will belong to all solutions. The local
constraint in Σ(P, P) will force the removal of either P(a, b) or P(a, c), and therefore
P has two solutions: {P(a, d),P(a, b)} and {P(a, d),P(a, c)}. 2
6 Answer Set Programs and the Solutions for a Peer
Continuing with the special PDES semantics based on the use of null introduced
in Section 4, in this section we show how to specify neighborhood solutions for a
peer (which is the central notion in this paper, upon which the recursive notion of
global solution is defined) by means of disjunctive logic programs with stable model
semantics (Gelfond and Lifschitz 1991; Eiter et al. 1997). As above, we assume that
DECs and ICs have the forms (1) or (2).
Our aim in this section is to show the gist of the approach, by considering in
precise terms a particular but still interesting case, one where the RDECs have a
limited syntactic form, without joins in the consequents. The general case, i.e. with
arbitrary UDECs and RDECs as considered in this work so far, is possible and not
difficult from the conceptual or technical point of view, but more difficult or lengthy
to present.
Remark 6.1
In this section we make the additional assumption that given a schema P =
〈P,S,Σ, T rust〉, for each P ∈ P, its set of DECs Σ(P) is ref-acyclic. In this case, we
say that P is ref-acyclic. The formulation of the programs is independent from this
assumption, but -as we will see later in this section- it ensures desirable properties
of the program. 2
Now we show how to specify the neighborhood solutions for a peer P as the
stable models of a disjunctive logic program Π(P). The program can be used for this
purpose under the assumption that P has already gathered, for each of its neighbors
Q, the intersection of its solutions, i.e. Core(Q,D) (cf. Definition 5.6). However, the
program works with arbitrary instances for the neighbors. Accordingly, the facts of
the program come from the union D of the given instances for the peers in N (P),
the neighborhood centered around peer P. As a consequence, Π(P) can be used to
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compute the restrictions to P’schema of P’s neighborhood solutions, on the basis of
a neighborhood instance D.
In Π(P), we find each predicate R ∈ S(N (P)) and also its copy R that has an
extra argument (an augmented nickname). This argument is the last one and is
used to place an annotation constant. Thus, if R has arity n, then R has arity
n + 1. The possible annotation constants are: t, f , t?, f?, t??. Their occurrences in
database tuples have the following intended semantics:
Annotation The tuple R(a¯) ...
R (a¯, t) is made true in (inserted into) the database
R (a¯, f) is made false in (deleted from) the database
R (a¯, t?) was true or is made true
R (a¯, f?) was false or is made false
R (a¯, t??) was true or made true, and is not deleted
This intended semantics is formally captured in the program by means of appro-
priate rules. The (possibly virtual) insertions and deletions are made in order to
satisfy P’s DECs. Actually, for each DEC ψ, a rule captures through its disjunctive
head the alternative virtual updates that can be performed to satisfy ψ (cf. rules
2. and 3. in Definition 6.1 for UDECs, and 4. and 5. for RDECs). That is why we
use annotations t or f in rule heads.
The annotations t?, f? are used to execute sequences of virtual updates, which
may be necessary when there are interacting DECs. Finally, atoms annotated with
t?? are those that become true in a solution. They are the relevant atoms, and are
used to read off the database atoms in the solutions (rules 8. below).
Before presenting the logic program, let us recall that RelV (ψ) denotes the set of
relevant variables of a constraint ψ, those where the occurrence of null is relevant
for its satisfaction (see Definition 4.5). Those attributes/variables receive a special
treatment in the program.
In the following, for a DEC ψ, A(ψ) and C (ψ) denote the set of database atoms
(without built-ins) in the antecedent of, resp. the consequent, of ψ.
A consequence of repairing using null, is that any RDEC with joins between
existential quantifiers can only be repaired by deleting tuples and not by inserting
tuples with null. Thus, the most relevant RDECs in this setting are of the form:
∀x¯ (R(x¯ ) −→ ∃y¯ Q(x¯ ′, y¯)), (34)
For this reason, and to simplify the presentation, the logic program that follows
considers RDECs of this form only.
Definition 6.1
Consider a PDES schemaP = 〈P,S,Σ, T rust〉 and a peer P ∈ P with local instance
D(P) (for the schema S(P)). Let D¯ be an instance for the schema S(N (P)), i.e. for
P’s neighborhood N (P), with D¯S(P) = D(P). The solution program Π(P; D¯) for P
contains:
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1. The following facts: dom(a), for every a ∈ Adom(D¯); dom(null), and R(a¯), for
every atom R(a¯) ∈ D¯ .21
2. For every UDEC ψ ∈ Σ(P, Q) of the form (1), with Q ∈ N (P) and (P, less, Q) ∈
Trust, the rule:∨{R (x¯i , f) | R(x¯i) ∈ A(ψ),R ∈ S(P)} ∨∨{Q (y¯j , t) | Q(y¯j ) ∈ C (ψ),Q ∈ S(P)}
← ∧ni=1 Ri (x¯i , t?), ∧mj=1Qj (y¯j , f?), ∧xl∈RelV (ψ) xl 6= null·
Here, when Qj ∈ B (i.e. a built-in), Qj (y¯j , f?) simply denotes the negated atom
Qj (y¯j ), e.g. = becomes 6=, IsNull becomes, IsNotNull, etc., without annotations.
Notice that the condition Q ∈ S(P) in the head of the rule discards built-in atoms
(cf. Example 6.1 below).
3. For every UDEC ψ ∈ Σ(P, Q) of the form (1), with Q ∈ N (P) and (P, same, Q)
∈ Trust, the rule:∨{R (x¯i , f) | R(x¯i) ∈ A(ψ)} ∨∨{Q (y¯j , t) | Q(y¯j ) ∈ C (ψ)} ← ∧ni=1 Ri (x¯i , t?),∧m
j=1Qj (y¯j , f
?),
∧
xl∈RelV (ψ) xl 6= null.
We apply the same convention as in 2. about the rule body. This case also covers
UDECs in Σ(P, P), i.e. local universal ICs for P.
4. For every RDEC ψ ∈ Σ(P, Q) of the form (34), with Q ∈ N (P) and (P, same, Q)
∈ Trust, the rule:
R (x¯ , f) ∨Q (x¯ ′, null, t)← R (x¯ , t?), not auxψ(x¯ ′), x¯ ′ 6= null·
Here, auxψ is an auxiliary predicate used to obtain a safe rule (i.e. its variables in
negated atoms also appear in a positive atom), whose body captures the violations
of (34). In FO logic this would be done through: R(x¯ )∧¬∃y¯Q(x¯ ′, y¯), which basically
leads to the following rules that define the auxiliary predicate (taking into account
the special semantics of null):
For every yi ∈ y¯ :
auxψ(x¯
′)← Q (x¯ ′, y¯ , t?), notQ (x¯ ′, y¯ , f), x¯ ′ 6= null, yi 6= null · (35)
auxψ(x¯
′)← Q(x¯ ′, null), notQ (x¯ ′, null, f), x¯ ′ 6= null · (36)
This case covers the RDECs in Σ(P, P), i.e. local referential ICs for P. (Cf. Example
6.1 below.) Here, and in the rest of this work, atoms of the form Q (x¯ ′, null, . . .)
associated to an atom in a DEC, have all the existential variables appearing in the
latter and predicate Q replaced by null. Furthermore, for x¯ = x1, . . . , xn , x¯ 6= null
abbreviates x1 6= null, . . . , xn 6= null.
5. For every RDEC ψ ∈ Σ(P, Q) of the form (34), with Q ∈ N (P) and (P, less, Q) ∈
Trust, the rules:
(a) If R ∈ S(P): R (x¯ , f)← R (x¯ , t?), not auxψ(x¯ ′), x¯ ′ 6= null·
(b) If Q ∈ S(P): Q (x¯ ′, null, t)← R (x¯ , t?), not auxψ(x¯ ′), x¯ ′ 6= null·
Plus rules (36), (35).
6. For each predicate R ∈ S(N (P)), the annotation rules:
21 We can also add IsNull(null), and IsNotNull(c), for every non-null constant in the active
domain, but this is not necessary if these two predicates do not appear in the program.
Consistency and Trust in Peer Data Exchange Systems 43
R (x¯ , f?)← dom(x¯ ), notR(x¯ )· R (x¯ , f?)← R (x¯ , f)·
R (x¯ , t?)← R(x¯ )· R (x¯ , t?)← R (x¯ , t)·
7. For each predicate R ∈ S(N (P)), the program constraint:
← R (x¯ , t), R (x¯ , f)·
8. For each predicate R ∈ S(P), the interpretation rule:
R (x¯ , t??) ← R (x¯ , t?), notR (x¯ , f)· 2
Example 6.1
If the UDEC ψ is ∀x∀y(R(x ) → S (x , y)∨ IsNull(y)), then the corresponding rule
according to (2) above is: R(x , f)← R(x , t?),S (x , y , f?), IsNotNull(y), x 6= null.
Notice that RelV (ψ) = {x}. Since the program interprets null as any other con-
stant in the domain, this rule can be replaced by R(x , f)← R(x , t?),S (x , y , f?), y 6=
null, x 6= null.
If the RDEC ψ is ∀x (R(x )→ ∃yS (x , y)), then the corresponding rules according
to 4. above are:
R (x , f) ∨ S (x , null, t) ← R(x , t?), not aux(x ), x 6= null ·
aux(x ) ← S (x , null), notS (x , null, f), x 6= null ·
aux(x ) ← S (x , y , t?), notS (x , y , f), x 6= null, y 6= null·
In this case, the RDEC is “repaired”, as usual with referential ICs in databases,
by either deleting the tuple from table R or inserting a tuple with a null value in
table S , both cases equally acceptable. The two cases for item 5. in the program
correspond each to only one of these possible choices. 2
Since instance D¯ and its active domain are finite, the program has a finite number
of facts in item (1) The most relevant part of the program corresponds to the rules
(2)-(5). They capture through their bodies the violations of DECs; and through
their heads, the (possibly alternative) virtual updates that are necessary on the
peers’ instances to restore the satisfaction of DECs and local ICs. In the bodies of
these rules associated to DECs or ICs ψ, the conditions of the form x 6= null, with
x a variable appearing in a relevant attribute of ψ, are used to capture the special
semantics of null values introduced in Section 4.
The fixed semantics of annotations is captured by the rules (6)-(8). They appear
in every solution program. The program constraints in (7) discard models where an
atom is both inserted and deleted.
The instances D¯S(Q)) used in the program for P’s neighbors may not coincide
with the initial, physical instances D(Q) in an instance D for the PDES P (except
when Q is P). However, the idea is that P, given a global instance D, uses its
program with D(P) and D¯  S(Q)) = Core(Q,D) for each Q ∈ N ◦(P). In this way,
the program computes through its stable models the neighborhood solutions for
P, whose restrictions to P’s schema will be the solutions for P. Notice that atoms
annotated with t?? in a stable model of P’s program have predicates in S(P) only;
and they define a database instance for P.
The adoption of the stable model semantics for the solution programs (Gelfond
and Lifschitz 1991), plus the appropriate use of conditions with null in rules’ bodies,
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guarantee the minimal discrepancy between the generated and the original instances
according to Definitions 3.1 and 5.3.
Example 6.2
Consider P = {P1, P2}, with D(P1) = {R1(a, 2)}, D(P2) = {R2(d , 5)}, and neigh-
borhood instance D¯ = D(P1)∪D(P2). Assume (P1, less, P2) ∈ Trust, and the only
set of DECs in the system is Σ(P1, P2) = {∀xy(R2(x , y)→ R1(x , y))}.
The solution program Π(P1; D¯) contains: (we itemize in correspondence to Defi-
nition 6.1)
1. The facts dom(a), dom(d), dom(2), dom(5), dom(null),R1(a, 2),R2(d , 5)·
2. R1 (x , y , t)← R2 (x , y , t?), R1 (x , y , f?), x 6= null, y 6= null·
6. R1 (x , y , f?)← R1 (x , y , f)· R1 (x , y , f?)← dom(x ), dom(y), notR1(x , y)·
R1 (x , y , t?)← R1 (x , y , t)· R1 (x , y , t?)← R1(x , y)·
7. ← R1 (x , y , t),R1 (x , y , f)·
8. R1 (x , y , t??)← R1 (x , y , t?), notR1 (x , y , f)·
The rule in 2. makes sure that a null-free R2-tuple that is not in R1, is also virtually
inserted into R1 (if it had null, the DEC would be satisfied since all attributes are
relevant). Since P1 trusts P2 more than itself, virtual changes affect only peer P1.
According to Definition 6.1, we should also include rules similar to those in 6. and
7. for R2. However, they are not necessary because R2 does not change. If we decide
to omit them, we have to replace the atom R2 (x , y , t?) in the body of rule in 2. by
R2(x , y).
Notice that since P2, which is a sink peer, does not have local ICs, its instance
D(P2) is also its only solution, and the one passed over to P1, who uses it to build
the facts of its program. 2
Example 6.3
Consider P = {P1, P2}, with D(P1) = {R1(s, t), R1(a, null)}, D(P2) = {R2(c, d),
R2(a, e)}, and Trust = {(P1, same, P2)}.
Assume the only set of DECs are Σ(P1, P1) = {∀xyz (R1(x , y) ∧R1(x , z )→ y =
z )}, and Σ(P1, P2) = {∀xy(R2(x , y) → ∃zR1(x , z ))}. The neighborhood instance is
D¯ = D(P1) ∪D(P2) (the second disjunct is also P2’s only solution).
The solution program Π(P1; D¯) for P1 is as follows: (omitting rules 6. and 7.):
1. dom(a), . . . , dom(null),R1(a, null),R1(s, t),R2(c, d), R2(a, e)·
3. R1(x , y , f) ∨ R1(x , z , f)← R1(x , y , t?),R1(x , z , t?), x 6= null, y 6= null,
z 6= null, y 6= z ·
4. R2 (x , y , f) ∨ R1 (x , null, t)← R2 (x , y , t?), not aux(x ), x 6= null·
aux(x )← R1(x , null), notR1 (x , null, f)·
aux(x )← R1(x , y , t?), notR1 (x , y , f), x 6= null, y 6= null·
8. R1 (x , y , t??)← R1 (x , y , t?), notR1 (x , y , f)·
Rule 3. takes care of P1’s the local functional dependency. In case of a violation,
one of the two tuples in conflict has to be deleted. Rule 4. has the role of satisfying
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the RDEC. Since P1 trusts P2 the same as itself, consistency is restored by either
deleting the tuple from R2 or introducing a null into R1.
Here, only R1 -atoms become annotated with t??. These annotations are used
to build solutions for P. In this example, we have two stable models, whose restric-
tions to t??-annotated atoms are: {R1 (a, null, t??),R1 (s, t , t??),R1 (c, null, t??)},
corresponding to the insertion of tuple R1(c, null); and {R1 (a, null, t??), R1 (s, t ,
t??)}, corresponding to the deletion of tuple R2(c, d). They correspond to the two
solutions for P: {R1(a, null),R1(s, t),R1(c, null)} and {R1(a, null),R1(s, t)}. 2
Notice that each peer P in a PDES has a solution program that, except for the
facts in it, is fixed. It depends only on its DECS in Σ(P) and the trust relationships
to its neighbors. The same program can be used with different initial neighborhood
instances D¯ . On their basis, the program will compute stable models, whose double-
starred atoms will determine a local instance.
Definition 6.2
Consider a PDES P = 〈P,S,Σ, T rust〉, a peer P ∈ P, and a neighborhood instance
D¯ for S(N (P)). Let M be a stable model of Π(P; D¯). The database instance for peer
P (and schema S(P)) associated to M is DM = {R(a¯) | R ∈ S(P) and R (a¯, t??) ∈
M }. 2
The following result tells us that the instances for a peer obtained via the sta-
ble models of its program are all and only the solutions for the peer, under the
assumption that its neighbors contribute with their own cores.
Proposition 6.1
Consider a PDES P = 〈P,S,Σ, T rust〉, with an instance D for P, and P ∈ P
whose set of DECs Σ(P) is ref-acyclic. Given the neighborhood instance for S(N (P)):
D¯ := D(P) ∪ ⋃Q∈N◦(P) Core(Q,D), it holds:
Sol(P,D) = {DM | M is a stable model of program Π(P, D¯)}. 2
This result generalizes one about the correctness of similar programs for null-
based repairs of the kind considered in this work, for single databases with respect
to denial constraints and referential constraints and null values (Bravo and Bertossi
2006). The hypothesis of ref-acyclicity is necessary for the soundness of the program
(every instance DM is a solution). Otherwise, only the completeness of the program
can be guaranteed (every solution is a DM ) (Bravo and Bertossi 2006).
Under the assumption that we have already computed the (intersection of the)
solution instances for P’s neighbors, the program for P allows us to compute its
solution instances. This generates a recursive process that can be applied because
G(P) is acyclic. Terminal peers P’ in G(P), i.e. without outgoing edges, become the
base cases for the recursion. If their local instances D(P’) are (locally) consistent,
they pass those instances to their neighbors. Otherwise, they first, using program
Π(P’; D(P’)) compute local repairs for D(P’), and pass the intersection of them to
their neighbors.
Several optimizations can be applied to solution programs (Caniupan and Bertossi
2010). An important one has to do with the materialization of the closed-world-
assumption, which results through the rule R1 (x , y , f?) ← dom(x ), dom(y),
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not R1(x , y) in 6. in Example 6.2. This is clearly undesirable and can be avoided.
We do not provide optimized versions here, because they are more difficult to read.
Proposition 6.1 still holds if P, instead of collecting the intersection of the solu-
tions of a neighbor Q, uses the intersection of the solutions for Q restricted to the
subschema of Q that contains Q’s relations that appear in Σ(P, Q), which are those
P needs to run its program.
As we expressed at the beginning of this section, our solution programs can be
much more general. In particular, they can be modified to include rules for REDCs
with existential quantifiers and joins in the consequents. For example, if the DEC
is, say ∀xy(R(x , y)∧ S (y , z )→ ∃w(P(x ,w)∧Q(w , z ))), and the antecedent is true
with null-free tuples,22 but not the consequent, one of the (satisfying) tuples in
the antecedent has to be deleted. All we need to handle this DEC is a disjunctive,
“deleting” rule. Built-in comparisons (with null) are used by the rule as well.
Remark 6.2
For simplicity, the programs we introduced above do not consider inconsistent peers,
i.e. a peer P whose instance is DP = {incP}. As the following example shows, it is
easy to modify the rules to capture this situation. This change is compatible with
the corresponding general DECs (cf. Remark 3.1). 2
Example 6.4
(example 6.2 continued) The system is exactly as before, except that now DP2 =⋂
Sol(P2,D) = {incP2}, reflecting the fact that P2 has no solutions (due to its
mappings and trust relationships to other peers, which we are not showing here).
The general program that allows for inconsistent peers would now have, instead of
1. and 2.:
1′ · dom(a), dom(2),R1(a, 2), incP2·
2’. R1 (x , y , t)← R2 (x , y , t?), R1 (x , y , f?), not incP2, x 6= null, y 6= null·
In this case, and as expected, the rule has no effect on P1. 2
6.1 ASPs and PCAs
With a solution program for P, PCAs to a query Q posed to P can be obtained by
running a query program in combination with the solution program. First a query
program Π(Q) has to be produced, which is rather standard, and next, Π(P)∪Π(Q)
is run under the cautious stable model semantics, the one that declares as true what
is simultaneously true in all the stable models. Of course, the same program Π(P)
can be used with different queries.
Example 6.5
(example 6.2 continued) In order to obtain P1’s PCAs to the query Q1(x , y) :
R1(x , y), the rule Ans1(x , y) ← R1(x , y , t??) has to be added to Π(P; D(P1) ∪
D(P2)). The PCAs are the ground Ans1-atoms in the intersection of all stable
22 If it is true via tuples with nulls, then due to the relevance of attributes, the DEC is immediately
satisfied.
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models of the combined program. For the query Q2(x ) : ∃yR1(x , y), the query rule
is: Ans2(x )← R1(x , y , t??). 2
In general, given a conjunctive query Q (for which we want PCAs), first its
rewriting QN is produced (as in Definition 4.6). Next, QN is rewritten in its turn
as a query program with annotation t??. The query program is added to the peer’s
solution program, and the combination is run under the skeptical semantics.
Deciding the truth of ground atomic queries by means of the solution program
for a peer under the skeptical semantics amounts to deciding membership of the
local core, which, by Corollary 5.1, is ΠP2 -complete in data. This is exactly the data
complexity of deciding skeptical entailment for atomic queries for disjunctive logic
programs under the stable model semantics (Dantsin et al. 2001). So, the solution
programs have the right expressive power for the problem at hand.
Using solution programs, our semantics could be naively implemented as follows.
When P is posed a query, P has to run its program, for which it needs as facts those
in the intersections of the solutions of its neighbors. So, P sends to each neighbor Q
queries of the form Q : R(x¯ ), where R ∈ S(Q) and appears in Σ(P, Q). Peer P expects
to receive from Q the PCAs to Q, because they corresponds to the extension of R
in the intersection of solutions for Q.
In order to return to P the PCAs to its queries, each of its neighbors Q has to
run its own program Π(Q). As before, they need PCAs from their own neighbors,
etc. This recursion eventually reaches peers that have no DECs, and assuming its
local ICs are satisfied, they return query answers to its neighbors directly from their
original instances. This is the start of the backward propagation of PCAs process,
which goes on until reaching P. Eventually, P gets all the facts to run its program
and obtain the PCAs to the original query. If the local instance of a terminal peer
is not consistent with respect to its local ICs, the local solution program can still
be used to restore consistency with respect to the local ICs, as in consistent query
answering. The data to be sent back to the neighbors comes from the intersection
of the repairs, in the form of consistent query answers (Arenas et al. 1999).
Example 6.6
(example 2.1 continued) Consider an instance D = {D(P1),D(P2),D(P3)} with
D(P1) = {R1(a, 2)}, D(P2) = { R2(c, 4),R2(d , 5)}, and D(P3) = {R3(c, 4)}. A user
poses the query Q0 : R1(x , y) to P1, expecting its PCAs.
To run its program, P1 needs the intersection of the solutions of peer P2. So, P1
sends to P2 the queries Q11 : R2(x , y) and Q12 : S 2(x , y) (actually, P1 does not need
the latter, S 2 is not relevant to P1).
In order to peer-consistently answer these queries, P2 needs from P3 the PCAs
to Q23 : R3(x , y). Since P3 has no neighbors, it returns to P2 the entire exten-
sion in its local database, i.e. D(P3) = {R3(c, 4)}. Now, P2 runs its program
Π(P2; D(P2)∪D(3)). It contains, among others, the facts R2(c, 4),R2(d , 5),R3(c, 4);
and (assuming Σ(P2, P2) = ∅) the main rule:
R2 (x , y , f) ∨ R3 (x , y , f)← R2 (x , y , t?),R3 (x , y , t?), x 6= null, y 6= null·
P2 has two solutions, {R2(d , 5)} and {R2(c, 4),R2(d , 5)}, whose intersection,
Core(P2,D) = {R2(d , 5)}, is given to P1.
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Finally, the program Π(P1; D(P1) ∪ Core(P2,D) (cf. Example 6.2) is run. It has
only one solution, namely {R1(a, 2), R1(d , 5)}}; and the PCAs to Q0 are 〈a, 2〉 and
〈d , 5〉. 2
6.2 The import case revisited
We first consider the unrestricted case introduced in Section 5.5.1. Here, each peer
P has a solution program Π−(P) as in Definition 6.1, with rules of the form:
2. S (y¯j , t) ←
∧n
i=1 Ri (x¯i , t
?), S (y¯j , f
?),
∧
xl∈RelV (ψ) xl 6= null, ϕ¯·
Here, S ∈ S(P) and the Ri ∈ S(Q), for Q ∈ N ◦(P).
5.(b) Q (x¯ ′, null, t)← R (x¯ , t?), not auxψ(x¯ ′), x¯ ′ 6= null·
Here, Q ∈ S(P) and R ∈ S(Q), for Q ∈ N ◦(P).
We also need the auxiliary rules (36), (35), and only for predicates in S(P) that
appear in consequents of RDECs.
Now, for a predicate Q ∈ S(P), a solution program like this never generates a
tuple of the form Q(a¯, t). In consequence, the negative literals can be eliminated
from the bodies of both (36) and (35). The resulting program still contains nega-
tion, in rules 6. and 8. However, the solution program becomes a (non-disjunctive)
stratified normal program (Abiteboul et al. 1995). In consequence, for every set of
facts, it has only one stable model that can be computed in polynomial time in
data. It corresponds to the only solution for peer P mentioned in Section 6.1.
If the query Q (or, better, its rewriting QN ) posed to P can also be represented
as a stratified normal program Π(Q) (which is the case when Q is first-order, for
example), then the combined program Π(P)∪Π(Q) is also normal and stratified. In
consequence, computing PCAs can also be done in polynomial time. This is under
the assumption that the peer has collected, for each of its neighbors, the intersection
of its (local) solutions. We have obtained the following result.
Proposition 6.2
For an unrestricted import PDES schema P = 〈P,S,Σ, T rust〉, an instance D for
P, and a peer P ∈ P, deciding answers to a conjunctive query posed to P that
are true in
⋂
NS(P, D¯), where D¯ = D(P) ∪ ⋃Q∈N◦(P) Core(Q,D), can be done in
polynomial time in the size of D¯ . 2
In the restricted import case of Section 5.5.2, we allowed peers to have local ICs.
In this case, as illustrated in Examples 5.8 and 5.9 the situation may change: Due
to the local ICs, the solution program may be disjunctive, and have none or several
stable models, which is also reflected in the peers’ solutions.
Example 6.7
(example 5.8 continued) In this case we have no solution. This is captured by the
corresponding program through the program constraint ← R1 (x , y , t),R1 (x , y , f).
In each of the two models of the program without the constraint, there will be the
atoms R1(a, b, t),R1(a, c, t),R1(a, b, f) or the atoms R1(a, b, t),R1(a, c, t),R1(a, c,
f). Both models will be discarded for violating the constraint. 2
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Example 6.8
(example 5.9 continued) The solution program for P has as main rules, the following:
P (x , y , t) ← Q (x , y , t?),P (x , y , f?), x 6= null, y 6= null·
P (x ,w1, f)∨P (x ,w2, f) ∨ P (x ,w3, f) ← P (x ,w1, t?),P (x ,w2, t?),P (x ,w3, t?),∧
i 6=j
wi 6= wj , x 6= null,w1 6= null,w2 6= null,w3 6= null·
We have a disjunctive solution program; actually one with two stable models, as
expected according to Example 5.9. 2
In (Barcelo et al. 2003; Bravo and Bertossi 2006), in the context of consistent query
answering, several classes of ICs have been identified for which the logic program
becomes head-cycle free, in which case, it can be replaced by and equivalent non-
disjunctive, i.e. normal, program (Dantsin et al. 2001). Cautious reasoning from
normal logic programs is coNP-complete (Dantsin et al. 2001). In consequence, for
those classes of ICs, peer consistent query answering is in coNP in data complex-
ity.23 Among those constraints we find denial constraints, such as constraint (5) in
Example 2.1. Even in the restricted import case with denial constraints as local con-
straints, peer consistent query answering is coNP-complete. (This can be obtained
from CQA under denial constraints (Barcelo et al. 2003). Cf. (Bertossi 2011) for a
survey of complexity results and references.)
7 Related Work
Our work can be placed among those on semantic peer data management systems, a
research direction that was started, to the best of our knowledge, with (Halevy et al.
2003) (cf. also (Halevy et al. 2004)). Mappings relate two conjunctive queries that
are expressed in terms of the schemas of two disjoint sets of peers. Already in those
papers problematic cases of cyclic dependencies, which implicitly involve a cyclic
accessibility graph, were identified. For example, we may have P = {P1, P2, P3},
with relations R1(·),R2(·),R3(·), resp., and DECs Σ(P1) = {∀x (R2(x )→ R1(x ))},
Σ(P2) = {∀x (R3(x ) → R2(x ))}, Σ(P3) = {∀x (R1(x ) → R3(x ))}, each of them
satisfied only by importing data into the peer who owns the DEC, i.e. there is the
implicit trust relation {(P1, less, P2), (P2, less, P3), (P3, less, P1)}. This is an unre-
stricted and cyclic import case. In the presence of cycles like this, peer consistent
query answering becomes undecidable.
In (Halevy et al. 2003), mappings are represented and given a semantics using
classical first-order logic (FOL). This choice requires consistency of peers (i.e. their
data, local ICs and local mappings) with respect to the system as a whole. More
precisely, certain answers from a peer are defined as those true in every global
instance that is consistent with the local data and metadata, which is rigid. Some
23 Again, under the assumption that the peer has collected, for each of its neighbors, the intersec-
tion of its (local) solutions.
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Fig. 7. Integration systems as peers
In this case: ∀xy(R2(x, y, z) → ∃wR1(x, y, w)), ∀xy(R3(x, y, y) → ∃uvR3(u, x, v)).
These DECS are used to pass data from the peer mentioned in the antecedent to
the one mentioned in the consequent. This activity is based on a theory written in
epistemic logic which is generated from the local and inter-peer mappings. More
specifically, the following epistemic theory is used for query answering:
K1(∀xyz(S1s (x, y, z)→ S1(x, y, z)))
∀xy(K2(R2(x, y, z))→ K1(∃wR1(x, y, w)))
}
Specification of P1
K2(∀xyz(R2s(x, y) ∧R2s(y, z)→ R2(x, y, z)))
∀xy(K3(R3(x, y, y))→ K2(∃uvR3(u, x, v)))}
}
Specification of P2
K3(∀xyz(R3s(x, y, z)→ R3(x, y, z))) } Specification of P3
Kiϕ is interpreted as ϕ is known by peer Pi. The idea behind using the epistemic
theory is that data that is known (or certain) is passed from local sources to medi-
ated schemas and from peers to other peers. A tuple t¯ is a peer consistent answer
to a query Q posed to peer Pi if KiQ(t¯) is a logical consequence of the epistemic
theory.
An advantage of this approach is that the semantics can be applied in the presence
of cycles. However, possibly the whole epistemic theory has to be used by a peer
Pi to do query answering, which requires not only data, but also the mappings and
DECs; and this not only of its neighbors, but of all accessible peers.
Our approach can be easily and uniformly adapted in order to make each peer a
local data integration system. For this, the answer set programs that specify the
legal instances of a virtual data integration introduced in [Bravo and Bertossi 2003;
2005; Bertossi and Bravo 2004a] can be used in combination with those presented
here.
The treatment of local ICs differs from ours in two ways : (a) A peer that is
inconsistent with respect to its local ICs is not considered for data exchange, while
in our case such a peer may apply a repair semantics, as in CQA. (b) Atoms are
imported into a peer by interaction with other peers only if this does not produce a
local IC violation. In our case, under the same trust conditions, the data is accepted
and the peer applies again a local repair semantics.
In order to answer a query [Calvanese et al. 2005], a peer traverses the network
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Fig. 8. Integration systems as peers
criticisms for the use of first-order logic as a basis for the semantics of PDESs were
raised in (Calva ese et al. 2004), motivating a new research direction (cf. below).
For comparison, our approach is inconsistency tolerant, and does not provide a
first-order semantics to the global system. Instead, we appeal to a non-monotonic
semantics for only neighborhoods of peers. Our mappings are between two peers
only, but in that case, more expressive than those considered in (Halevy et al.
2003).
It is worth noticing that all approaches adopting a FOL interpretation for PDESs,
e.g. (Halevy et al. 2004; Halevy et al. 2003), do not consider peer mappings as
constraints, but as logical implications from a peer to another. This in fact coincides
with having trust relationships of he form (P, less, Q) for any mapping specified
from P to Q.
Among the approaches to PDESs that are the closest to ours, we should mention
(Calvanese et al. 2004; Calvanese et al. 2005; Calvanese et al. 2008; Franconi et al.
2004). The DECs are of the “import kind”, and there are no explicit trust relation-
ships. For example, in (Calvan se et al. 2008), DECs are of the form CQi → CQj ,
where CQi , CQj are conjunctive queries over Pi and Pj’s schemas, resp. This kind
of DECs keep the schemas separate, on different sides of the implication. The latter
has to be int rpreted appropriately. Actually, the semantics of the system, in par-
ticular of the DECs, is given by an epistemic logic. Local ICs violations are avoided
by ignoring a peer that is inconsistent with respect to its local ICs. New atoms
are added into a peer by interaction with other eers only if this d es not produce
a local IC violation. In consequence, a peer trust other peers more than itself, as
long as no local inconsistencies a e produc d. There is not consi tency restoration
process involved.
As shown in Figure 8, in (Calvanese et al. 2008) each peer is considered as a local
virtual data integration system that follows the global-as-view approach (Lenz-
erini 2002). In this example, the three peers are locally defined by the GAV map-
pings ∀x∀y∀z (S 1s (x , y , z )→ S 1(x , y , z )), ∀x∀y∀z (R2s (x , y)∧S 2s (y , z )→ R2(x , y , z )),
and ∀x∀y∀z (R3s (x , y , z ) → R3(x , y , z )), resp. The predicates of the form Ps cor-
respond to local sources, and those of the form P i correspond to the mediated
schema provided by peer Pi. In addition, the DECs establish mappings between
the peers. In this case: ∀x∀y(R2(x , y , z ) → ∃wS 1(x , y ,w)), ∀x∀y(R3(x , y , y) →
∃u∃vR2(u, x , v)). These DECs are used to pass data from the peer mentioned in
the antecedent to the one mentioned in the consequent. This activity is based on
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a theory written in epistemic logic which is generated from the local and inter-
peer mappings. More specifically, the following epistemic theory is used for query
answering:
K1(∀x∀y∀z (S 1s (x , y , z )→ S 1(x , y , z )))
∀x∀y(K2(R2(x , y , z ))→ K1(∃wS 1(x , y ,w)))
}
Specification of P1
K2(∀x∀y∀z (R2s (x , y) ∧ S 2s (y , z )→ R2(x , y , z )))
∀x∀y(K3(R3(x , y , y))→ K2(∃u∃vR2(u, x , v)))}
}
Specification of P2
K3(∀x∀y∀z (R3s (x , y , z )→ R3(x , y , z ))) } Specification of P3
Kiϕ is interpreted as ϕ is known by peer Pi. The idea behind using the epistemic
theory is that data that is known (or certain) is passed from local sources to medi-
ated schemas and from peers to other peers. A tuple t¯ is a peer consistent answer
to a query Q posed to peer Pi if KiQ(t¯) is a logical consequence of the epistemic
theory.
An advantage of this approach is that the semantics can be applied in the presence
of cycles. However, possibly the whole epistemic theory has to be used by a peer
Pi to do query answering, which requires not only data, but also the mappings and
DECs; and this not only of its neighbors, but of all accessible peers. (This semantics
is similar in spirit to the one called “send all” in Section A.4.)
Our approach can be easily and uniformly adapted in order to make each peer
a local data integration system. For this, the answer set programs that specify the
legal instances of a virtual data integration introduced in (Bravo and Bertossi 2003;
Bravo and Bertossi 2005; Bertossi and Bravo 2004a) can be used in combination
with those presented here.
The epistemic theory has also been extended in (Calvanese et al. 2008) in order
to make the PDES “inconsistency tolerant”. This is done by using additional modal
operators and extending the epistemic theory, achieving that: (a) A peer whose local
data is inconsistent with respect to its ICs, is not considered for data exchange, that
is, the PDES behaves as if that peer didn’t exist. In our case, however, to such a
peer, whenever possible, a repair semantics is applied. (b) Inconsistencies due to
data imported from other peers, referred as P2P inconsistencies, are solved by
removing a minimal amount of data imported from other peers in order to preserve
consistency. In other words, atoms are imported into a peer by interaction with
other peers only if this does not produce a violation of an integrity constraint of a
peer. In our case, under the same or less trust conditions, the data is accepted and
the peer applies again a local repair semantics.
In order to answer a query (Calvanese et al. 2005), a peer traverses the network
eventually collecting at its site all DECs, ICs and data of other logically related
peers. With these elements, the peer can construct its epistemic theory, that is
used for query answering. An accessibility cycle can be detected by using request
identifiers. The use of epistemic logic makes sure that certain data, the one a peer
really knows, is passed to another peer. In our case, a peer collects only data from its
neighbors; and certainty is achieved by using the PCAs of a peer, or more generally,
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the intersection of its solutions. A more detailed comparison can be found in (Bravo
2007).
The semantics in (Franconi et al. 2004; Franconi et al. 2004) coincides with the
epistemic semantics in (Calvanese et al. 2004). The former also provide a distributed
algorithm, where peers’ data is updated by instruction of a super peer. When a
query is posed to a peer, it can answer the query right away with its data, because
the PDES is already updated.
The data exchange problem among distributed independent sources has been
investigated in (Caroprese et al. 2006; Caroprese and Zumpano 2008; Caroprese
and Zumpano 2011). In (Caroprese et al. 2006) the authors define a declarative
semantics for P2P systems that allows one to import, into each peer, maximal
subsets of atoms that do not violate the local integrity constraints. The framework
has been extended in (Caroprese and Zumpano 2008) with a mechanism to set
different degrees of reliability for neighbor peers, and in (Caroprese and Zumpano
2011), where “dynamic” preferences can be used to import data in the case of
conflicting sets of atoms, depending on the properties of the peers’ data. This
extended framework allows one to model preferences like “in the case of conflicting
information, it is preferable to import data from the neighbor peer that can provide
the maximum number of tuples” or “in the case of conflicting information, it is
preferable to import data from the neighbor peer such that the sum of the values
of an attribute is minimum”, without having to select preferred peers a-priori. To
enforce this preference mechanisms the P2P framework has been enriched with
aggregate functions.
In (Fuxman et al. 2006), the case of two peers that belong to a PDES is analyzed.
From a source peer, P, to a target peer, Q, there may be both source-to-target depen-
dencies, as in data exchange (Kolaitis 2005), and also target-to-source dependencies.
The former are used to transport data from P to Q, and the second, to filter the re-
ceived data in Q. In addition, the target may have an instance and local constraints.
The existence of solutions for the target peer is investigated. The semantics we have
introduced, but using labeled nulls instead of null, could be adapted to a situation
like this (cf. Section A.3). It is also possible to use the solution programs in the case
of (Fuxman et al. 2006). In this scenario, the source-to-target dependencies would
give rise to program rules that do the data exchange, and both target-to-source
dependencies and target dependencies would become hard program constraints.
More material and references on peer data exchange systems can be found in
(Aberer 2011). Consistency issues that appear in our PDES scenario may also
appear in the context of ontologies, when they have to be aligned in the presence
of bridges between them. When ontologies are merged, it becomes necessary to
solve inconsistencies between them (Serafini et al. 2005). However, in relation to
mappings, we go beyond the cases considered in that area. The mappings, or bridges,
between ontologies are in general much simpler than the general case considered in
our work.
In this work we have concentrated on null values that are handled as in SQL re-
lational databases. Actually, in that case, there is a single null, namely the constant
NULL. It can be interpreted in different ways in a database, e.g. as a representative
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for an existing but unknown value, as a missing or non-existent value, as a withheld
or hidden value, etc. In our case, we do not make any ontological assumption about
this constant. Our purpose consists in logically capturing the way it is handled in
data management operations by an SQL database. More specifically, with respect
to query answering, integrity checking and interaction with other data elements.
Most of the work in database theory bypasses the issue of SQL null, mainly
because it is considered to be an undesirable oddity that could be replaced by a
logically cleaner solution. However, SQL NULL exists, is used, and will most like
stay with us. It would be better to accept it, but trying to clarify its logical and
operational status. This is our approach in this work. From this point of view, we
accept that SQL NULL appears, not only in databases, but could also appear explic-
itly in data exchange constraints and integrity constraints, and in their semantics.
For example, a referential constraint or data exchange constraint could be of the
form ∀xy(S (x , y) → T (x , NULL)), i.e. requiring that T ’s second attribute should
be filled with NULL.24
A similar approach is adopted in (Franconi and Tessaris 2012), where an alter-
native reconstruction of SQL NULL is attempted. They propose a corresponding
relational algebra that takes care of the special status of NULL, but in the end, after
the reconstruction, this constant disappears from the data domain. We keep it, but
rewrite queries and constraints in such a way that it can be treated as any other
constant.
There is a large literature on nulls in relational databases (see, e.g. (Levene and
Loizou 1999)). However, to the best of our knowledge those nulls are “ideal” nulls,
and not the real SQL NULL. There are also some logical approaches, starting with
Reiter’s treatment of nulls (Reiter 1984), which can be multiple, existential values
not subject to the unique names assumption. They are also different from the SQL
NULL. More recent work extending Reiter’s approach can be found in (Traylor and
Gelfond 1994; Lifschitz et al. 2012). See also (Libkin 2014; Libkin 2016) for a recent
work on incomplete information in relational databases.
8 Conclusions
We have introduced a general framework for peer data exchange with trust rela-
tionships. The methodology is flexible and inconsistency tolerant in that each peer
solves its data and semantic conflicts at query time, when querying its own and
other peers’ data.
The general semantic framework can be specialized in several ways, and we pre-
sented some possibilities. In particular, we developed a specific semantics based on
universal and referential data exchange constraints, and on the use on SQL null
values to deal with incomplete information. In this scenario, logic programs can
24 In our case, given our repair semantics of Section 5, even a constraint of the form ∀xy(S(x , y)→
∃zT (x , z )) will be enforced by giving to z the value NULL (unless some other constraint prevents
this).
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be used to specify the solution instances for a peer and to obtain peer consistent
answers.
Techniques for optimizing the logic programs and their execution could be applied
for query answering. Among them we find the partial evaluation of programs and
the solution instances they specify, since we are not interested in the solution per se,
but in the PCAs. More specifically, techniques used in CQA, such as magic sets for
stable model semantics (Faber et al. 2007), and identification of predicates that are
relevant to queries and constraints, could also be used in this setting. In this way,
the number of rules and the amount of data that are needed to run the program
are reduced (Caniupan and Bertossi 2010; Eiter et al. 2008).
The problem of query evaluation from disjunctive programs is ΠP2 -complete in
data (Dantsin et al. 2001), which matches the complexity of PCA, as we estab-
lished here. In spite of this, we have also identified syntactic classes of PDESs for
which peer consistent query answering has a lower complexity. For them, specifically
tailored mechanisms to solve this problem could be developed, as for CQA.
We should emphasize that the DECs we can handle are more general that those
found in related work on peer data exchange.
Our semantics allows for inconsistent peers and inconsistencies between peers,
without unraveling logical reasoning or having to exclude peers whose data par-
ticipate in inconsistencies. Actually, our semantics for peer data exchange systems
smoothly extend the repair semantics for consistent query answering from incon-
sistent databases.
Along the way, and interesting on its own merits, we developed a semantics of
conjunctive query answering and constraint satisfaction in terms of classical FO
predicate logic. It puts on a solid ground the mechanisms implemented in SQL
databases and specifications in the SQL Standard for handling null values.
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ELECTRONIC APPENDIX
Appendix A Discussion
A.1 On cycles and their assumptions
In this section, unless stated otherwise, we refer to the special semantics introduced
in Section 4.
We have assumed that G(P) is acyclic. However, the peers, not being aware of
being in a cycle in G(P), could attempt to do data exchange as described above.
In order to detect an infinite loop, for a query Q posed by a peer P, a unique
identifier id(P,Q) can be created and kept in all the queries that have origin in Q.
If an identifier comes back to a peer, it will realize that it is in a cycle and act
accordingly.
The assumption of acyclicity of the accessibility graph is quite cautious, in the
sense that it excludes cases where a reasonable semantics could still be given and
the logic programs would work correctly. This is because the cycles in G(P) are not
necessarily relevant.
Example 1
Consider S(P1) = {R1(·),S 1(·)}, S(P2) = {R2(·), S 2(·)}, Σ(P1, P2) = {∀x (R2(x )
→ R1(x ))}, Σ(P2, P1) = {∀x (S 1(x )→ S 2(x ))}, Trust = {(P1, less, P2), (P2, less,
P1)}. If a query is posed to P1, it will request from P2 the PCAs to query R2(x ),
but not those to query S 2(x ). Peer P2 can realize it does not need data from P1
and will simply return D(P2) {R2} to P1, who will run its solution program and
answer the original query. Even though there is a cycle in G(P), there is no infinite
loop in the query answering process. 2
As we mentioned before, if there are ref-cycles in Σ(P), the stable models of the
solution program for P may correspond to a strict superset of the solutions. This
is shown in the next example. In such a case, post-processing that deletes models
corresponding to non-minimal “solutions” is necessary.
Example 2
Consider D(P1) = {R1(a, b)}, D(P2) = {R2(a, c)}, Σ(P1, P2) = {∀x∀z (R1(x , z ) →
∃y R2(x , y)), ∀x∀z (R2(x , z )→∃y R1(x , y)}, which is ref-cyclic; Σ(P2) = Σ(P1, P1) =
∅; and (P1, same, P2) ∈ Trust. Here, P1 has only one solution, namely {R1(a, b)}.
However, Π(P1) has two models. The most relevant part of the program consists
of the facts R1(a, b), R2(a, c), and the following rules:
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R1 (x , y , f) ∨ R2 (x , null, t) ← R1 (x , y , t?), not aux1(x ), x 6= null
aux1(x ) ← R2(x , null), notR2 (x , null, f)
aux1(x ) ← R2(x , y , t?), notR2 (x , y , f), x 6= null, y 6= null
R2 (x , y , f) ∨ R1 (x , null, t) ← R2 (x , y , t?), not aux2(x ), x 6= null
aux2(x ) ← R1(x , null), notR1 (x , null, f)
aux2(x ) ← R1(x , y , t?), notR1 (x , y , f), x 6= null, y 6= null
The two models correspond to the neighborhood “solutions” {R1(a, b),R2(a, c)}
and ∅, producing in their turn, the instances {R1(a, b)} and ∅, resp., for P1. Only
the former is a solution instance. The second model is the result of cycles through
weak negation (not). The cycle creates the self justification of facts as follows: (i) If
we choose R2 (a, c, f) to be true, then by the second and third rules above, aux1(a)
is false. (ii) Then, the first rule can be satisfied, by making R1 (a, b, f) true. (iii) By
the fifth and sixth rules, aux2(a) is false. (iv) This justifies making R
2 (a, b, f) true,
thus, closing the cycle. Notice, that in the whole justification the changes where
not determined by inconsistencies. 2
There are also cases with an acyclic G(P), but with ref-cycles in the DECs, where
the logic programming counterpart of the semantics is correct due to the role of the
trust relationships.
Example 3
(example 2 continued) If we replace (P1, same, P2) ∈ Trust by (P1, less, P2) ∈
Trust, the relevant part of Π(P1) now is: R1(a, b), R2(a, c), plus
R1 (x , y , f) ← R1 (x , y , t?), not aux1(x ), x 6= null ·
aux1(x ) ← R2(x , null), notR2 (x , null, f) ·
aux1(x ) ← R2(x , y , t?), notR2 (x , y , f), x 6= null, y 6= null ·
R1 (x , null, t) ← R2 (x , y , t?), not aux2(x ), x 6= null ·
aux2(x ) ← R1(x , null), notR1 (x , null, f) ·
aux2(x ) ← R1(x , y , t?), notR1 (x , y , f), x 6= null, y 6= null·
Since P1 trusts more peer P2 than itself, it will modify only its own data. This
program computes exactly the solutions for peer P1, i.e. {R1(a, b)}, even though
the DECs exhibit ref-cycles. 2
It becomes clear that it is possible to find more relaxed conditions, both on the
accessibility graph and ref-cycles, under which a sensible semantics for solutions
and semantically corresponding logic programs can be given. Also, for cyclic ac-
cessibility graphs, super peers (Yang and Garcia-Molina 2003) could be used, to
detect cycles and prune certain DECs, making the graph acyclic if necessary; and
then our semantics could be applied.
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A.2 Query sensitive query answering
Our definition of the solution semantics and the peer consistent answers might
suggest that, in order to answer a particular query Q, a peer P has to import the
full intersection of the solutions of each of its neighbors, which in their turn have
to do the same, etc. If we do this, most likely most of the data imported by P will
be irrelevant for the query at hand, and is not needed.
It is possible to design query answering methodologies that are more sensitive to
the query at hand, in the sense that only the relevant data is transitively imported
into P before answering Q. A full treatment of this subject is beyond the scope of
this paper. However, we can give some indications as to how to proceed.
In (Caniupan and Bertossi 2010), the dependency graph of database predicates
with respect to a set of ICs was introduced and used to capture the notion of
possibly transitive relevance of a predicate for another, which is useful in consistent
query answering. Here we can use similar graphs for each peer in relationship with
its neighbors through a set of DECs, also taking into account the local ICs. These
graphs would give us a better upper bound on what to import from other peers (as
opposed to bringing the full intersection of solutions).
More precisely, if a query Q to P contains S(P)-predicates P1, . . . ,Pn , with rele-
vant S(Q)-predicates Q11 , . . . ,Q1m1 , . . . ,Qn1 , . . . ,Qnmn , resp., at a neighbor Q, then P
will request from Q the PCAs to each of the constant-free, atomic queries Q ij (x¯ ).
The corresponding sets of answers will form the (most likely smaller) instance pro-
vided by Q to P, who will prune its repair program by keeping only the relevant
rules, i.e. those that are related to Q, the Pi and the Q ij . This idea can be illustrated
by means of an example.
Example 4
Consider a schema P = 〈P,S,Σ, T rust〉 with P = {P1, P2, P3}, S = {S(P1),S(P2),
S(P3)}, S(P1) = {R1(·, ·), S 1(·, ·), T 1(·, ·)}, S(P2) = {R2(·, ·), S 2(·, ·),T 2(·, ·)},
S(P3) = {R3(·, ·),S 3(·, ·)}, Trust = {(P1, less, P2), (P2, same, P3)}. Let D be an
arbitrary instance for the PDES.
The sets of DECs are: Σ(P1, P1) = {∀x∀y(R1(x , y) ∧ S 1(x , y) → false)},
Σ(P1, P2) = {∀x∀y(R2(x , y) → R1(x , y)), ∀x∀y(S 2(x , y) → S 1(x , y))}, and Σ(P2,
P3) = {∀x∀y(R2(x , y) ∧ R3(x , y)→ false)}.
If P1 is posed the query Q1(x ) : ∃yR1(x , y), then the relevant predicates in
S(P1) are R1,S 1 (due to the DEC in Σ(P1)). Then, through the DECs also, it
follows that the predicates that are relevant to P1 are R2,S 2 at P2. So, P1 poses
to P2 the queries R2(x , y),S 2(x , y). The only relevant predicate at P3 is S 3. So, P2
will pose to P3 the query S 3(x , y).
In this case, P3 will return D(P3)  {R3} to P2, which, due to the UDEC in
Σ(P2, P3), will subtract it from D(P2)  {R2}, because (⋂Sol(P2,D))  {R2} =
(D(P2) {R2} r D(P3) {R3}). Peer P2 will send this difference to P1 as it is the
answer to query R2(x , y). Peer P2 will also return to P1 the entire D(P2){S 2} as
its answer to the query S 2(x , y).
Finally, P1 will answer the original query with a solution program containing as
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facts the tuples in D(P1){R1},D(P1){S 1},D(P2){S 2}, ((D(P2){R2})r(D(P3)
{R3})). The last set, as an extension for R2 in the program. 2
The methodology sketched in this example will be certainly more efficient than
computing and shipping the full intersection of a peer’s solutions. It is natural to
expect that additional optimizations can be developed.
A particularly appealing, but provably less general, approach to peer-consistent
query answering is first-order query rewriting, which we illustrate by means of an
example.
Example 5
Consider an instance D = {D(P1),D(P2),D(P3)} for the schema P = 〈P,S,Σ,
T rust〉 with P = {P1, P2, P3}, S = {S(P1),S(P2), S(P3)}, S(Pi) = {Ri(·, ·)},
Trust = {(P1, less, P2), (P1, same, P3)}, D(P1) = {R1(a, b), R1(s, t)}, D(P2) =
{R2(c, d), R2(a, e)}, D(P3) = {R3(a, f ), R3(s, u)} and the DECs:
Σ(P1, P2) = {∀x∀y(R2(x , y)→ R1(x , y))};
Σ(P1, P3) = {∀x∀y∀z (R1(x , y) ∧ R3(x , z ) → y = z )}·
We are interested in P1’s solutions. Since P2, P3 are sink peers in the graph G(P),
we have the extended instance D = {R1(a, b),R1(s, t),R2(c, d), R2(a, e), R3(a, f ),
R3(s, u)}, from which we have to obtain the solutions for P1.
The solutions for P1 are obtained by first repairing D with respect to Σ(P1, P2),
obtaining D1 = {R1(a, b),R1(s, t), R1(c, d),R1(a, e), R2(c, d),R2(a, e), R3(a, f ),
R3(s, u)}. We have only one repair at this stage, which now has to be repaired in
its turn with respect to Σ(P1, P3) (but keeping the relationship between P1 and P2
satisfied). There are two sets of tuples violating Σ(P1, P3) in D1: {R1(s, t),R3(s, u)}
and {R1(a, b),R1(a, e), R3(a, f )}. The first violation can be repaired by deleting
any, but only one, of the two tuples. The second one, by deleting tuple R3(a, f )
only (otherwise we would violate the relationship between P1 and P2).
As a consequence, we obtain two neighborhood solutions: D ′ = {R1(a, b),R1(s, t),
R1(c, d), R1(a, e),R2(c, d),R2(a, e)}, and D ′′ = {R1(a, b),R1(c, d),R1(a, e),
R2(c, d),R2(a, e), R3(s, u)}. The solutions for P1 are: D(P1)′ = {R1(a, b),R1(s, t),
R1(c, d), R1(a, e)} and D(P1)′′ = {R1(a, b), R1(c, d), R1(a, e)}.
If the query Q : R1(x , y) is posed to P1, the PCAs are 〈a, b〉, 〈c, d〉, 〈a, e〉, because
those are R1-tuples found in in the intersection of P1’s solutions.
Now, let us try an alternative method for peer consistently answering the same
query. We first rewrite the query using the DEC in Σ(P1, P2), obtaining Q′ :
R1(x , y)∨R2(x , y), with the effect of bringing P2’s data into P1. Next, considering
Σ(P1, P3), this query is rewritten as
Q′′ : [R1(x , y) ∧ ∀z1((R3(x , z1) ∧ ¬∃z2R2(x , z2)) → z1 = y)] ∨ R2(x , y) · (A1)
To answer this query, P1 first issues a query to P2 to retrieve the tuples in R2, since
they will be essentially in R1 in all the solutions, due to Σ(P1, P2). Next, a query is
issued to P3 to leave aside from the answers those tuples of R1 that have the same
first but not the same second argument in R3. This filtering is performed as long
as there is no tuple in R2 that “protects” the tuple in R1. For example, the tuple
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R1(a, b) is protected by R2(a, e) because, as R1(a, e) belongs to all the solutions,
the only way to repair a violation with respect to Σ(P1, P3) is by deleting the tuple
from R3. In this case, the R1-tuple will be in the answer.
We can see that answering query (A1) amounts to issuing from P1 queries to P2,
P3 about the contents of their relations, R2 and R3, resp., which are answered by
the latter by classical query evaluation over their local instances. After those data
have been gathered by P1, it proceeds to evaluate (A1), which contains an implicit
repair process.
Now, the answers to (A1) are 〈a, b〉, 〈c, d〉, 〈a, e〉, precisely the PCAs we obtained
above, considering all the explicit solutions for P1. 2
The FO rewriting methodology we just illustrated is bound to have limited appli-
cability. If this was a general mechanism, PCAs to conjunctive queries could be
obtained in polynomial time in data, i.e. in the size of the union of the instances
of a peer and those of its neighbors (or the local intersections of their solutions).
However, Corollary 5.2 tells us that the complexity is higher than this (if P 6= NP ).
A.3 A semantics based on arbitrary data elements
The purpose of this section is twofold. First, we will present an alternative special
semantics that fits into the general semantic framework of Section 3. Second, we will
show that this general semantics (and also the one in Section 4) can handle data
mappings that are more complex that those usually considered in the related work
on peer data exchange. All this will be done on the basis of an extended example.
Consider a PDES P = 〈P,S,Σ, T rust〉 with P = {P1, P2}, S = {S(P1),S(P2)},
S(P1) = {R1(·, ·), T 1(·, ·)}, S(P2) = {T 2(·, ·), S 2(·, ·)}, Trust = {(P1, less, P2)},
and Σ(P1, P2) consists of the following DEC:
∀x∀y∀z (R1(x , y) ∧ T 2(z , y) → ∃w(T 1(x ,w) ∧ S 2(z ,w))) · (A2)
This DEC, which falls within our general syntactic class of DECs, mixes tables of
the two peers on each side of the implication. This kind of mapping is more general
than those typically considered in virtual data integration (Lenzerini 2002) or data
exchange (Kolaitis 2005).25
If (A2) is not satisfied by the data in P1 and P2, which happens when the join in
the antecedent is satisfied, but not the one in the consequent, then solutions for P1
have to be found, keeping P2’s data fixed in the process, due to the trust relation-
ship. Now, in this section we will depart from the solution semantics introduced in
Section 4, by restoring consistency with respect to (A2) through the introduction
of arbitrary elements of the data domain U .26 Those elements become witnesses
for the existentially quantified variables in the DECs. That is, these values come
25 Cf. (Bertossi and Bravo 2004b) for some connections between PDESs and virtual data integra-
tion under the local-as-view approach. Also (De Giacomo et al. 2007), for relationships between
PDESs, virtual data integration, and data exchange.
26 This U could be a finite superset of the union of the active domains involved or infinite. The
latter case is also covered by our semantics. The logic programming semantics is also perfectly
defined in this case.
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from the data domain, and are not replaced by null or by labeled nulls as in data
exchange (Kolaitis 2005). Since we have alternative choices for them, we may obtain
different solutions for a peer. However, by definition of solution, they have to stay
as close as possible to the original instance. In this case, the general comparison
relation D between neighborhood instances of Section 3 is given by: D1 ∆D D2
iff ∆(D ,D1) ⊆ ∆(D ,D2).
We will specify the solutions for this example directly in (or using) logic programs.
We will also show the most relevant part of the program Π−(P1). Since we have to
restore consistency with respect to (A2), the main rules are (A3)-(A6) below.
R1 (x , y , f) ← R1 (x , y , t?),T 2(z , y), not aux1(x , z ), not aux2(z ) · (A3)
aux1(x , z ) ← T 1 (x ,w , t?),S 2(z ,w) · (A4)
aux2(z ) ← S 2(z ,w)· (A5)
That is, R1(x , y) is deleted if it participates in a violation of (A2) (what is captured
by the first three literals in the body of (A3) plus rule (A4)), and there is no way
to restore consistency by inserting a tuple into T 1, because there is no possible
matching tuple in S 2 for the possibly new tuple in T 1 (what is captured by the last
literal in the body of (A3) plus rule (A5)). In case there is such a tuple in S 2, we
can either delete a tuple from R1 or insert a tuple into T 1:
R1 (x , y , f) ∨ T 1 (x ,w , t) ← R1 (x , y , t?), T 2(z , y), not aux1(x , z ),
S 2(z ,w), choice((x , z ),w)· (A6)
That is, in case of a violation of (A2), when there is tuple of the form S 2(a, t)
in S 2 for the combination of values 〈d , a〉, then the choice operator (Giannotti
et al. 1991) non-deterministically chooses a unique value for t , so that the tuple
T 1(d , t) is inserted into T 1 as an alternative to deleting R1(d ,m) from R1. The
choice predicate can be eliminated and replaced by another predicate that can be
specified by means of extra but standard rules (Giannotti et al. 1991).
If, instead, we had Trust = {(P1, same, P2)}, P2’s relations would also be flexible
when searching for solution instances. In this case, the program becomes more
involved in terms of presentation (but not conceptually), in the sense that more
relations can be updated, and corresponding repair rules have to be added.
Notice that in this example, the values that are chosen as witnesses for the
existential quantifier in the DEC are taken from the active domain of the database,
namely from the set of values for the second attribute of relation S 2. In other cases,
for example with a DEC of the form ∀x∀y(T 2(x , y) → ∃zR1(x , z )), we have to
consider arbitrary values from an underlying domain dom when inserting tuples into
R1. In this case, dom requires a specification as a finite predicate in the program.
Some of the ideas presented above (such as the insertion of elements from the
active domain and the use of the choice operator) have been fully developed and
applied by the authors (Bertossi and Bravo 2004a; Bravo and Bertossi 2003; Bravo
and Bertossi 2005) to inconsistency management in virtual data integration systems
under the local-as-view approach (Lenzerini 2002).
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A.4 Data transport and semantics
The data distributed across different peers has to be appropriately gathered to build
solution instances for a peer, and different semantics may emerge as candidates,
depending on the granularity of the data sent between peers. In the context of
the general semantic framework introduced in Section 3, we developed a particular
semantics in Section 4, according to which a peer Q passes back to a neighbor P,
who is building its solutions, this is (part of) its certain data. This is the one that
holds in all of Q’s solutions.
In (Bravo 2007, chapter 7) also two other alternative semantics are fully developed
and compared, in particular establishing some conditions under which they coincide
or differ. Those other semantics assume that more detailed information, such as
mappings and trust relationships, can be sent between peers. We briefly describe
them.
1. Send all. The first one assumes that data, DECs and trust relations can be
sent between peers. So, we can think that we have a possibly large database in-
stance that has to be virtually repaired in order to satisfy all the relevant DECs
(obtained from the accessibility graph) and at the same time accommodating the
trust relationships. In this case, the DECs are treated as traditional ICs on the
integrated instance. This semantics is similar to the repair semantics for consis-
tent query answering. Preferences imposed on repairs can be used to capture the
trust relationships. In this case, it is not necessary to require the acyclicity of the
accessibility graph.
2. Send solutions. The second one assumes that only solutions can be send between
neighboring peers. In this case, a peer P requests the solutions of the neighbors in
order to calculate its own solutions. Here, the database consists of the data at P
plus all the solutions of P’s neighbors; and the constraints are the DECs between
P and its neighbors. As in Section 3, this is a recursive definition, and assumes an
acyclic accessibility graph.
We think that the semantics we developed in Section 3, which could be called
“send cores”, is more natural (a peer passes over what it is certain about), and also
simplifies reasoning at the local level, i.e. at each peer’s site, because at most one
instance peer neighbor has to be considered.
Now, under our official semantics, if we want to use local solution programs, each
neighbor of a peer P has to run its program, and then send the (relevant part of
the) intersection of the stable models to P, who runs its local solution program.
This means that different programs have to be fed externally.
At least under the “send solutions” and “send cores” semantics (which assumes
an acyclic peer graph), we could imagine having a single program that does all
this output/input concatenation, internally. Actually, it is possible to build a single
program for a peer, say Πman(P), that acts as a combination of solution programs as
given in Section 6. For each peer Q that is accessible from P, the program locally runs
a solution program, produces Q’s solutions (its stable models), or the intersection
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thereof; and, without leaving Πman(P), passes them to its preceding neighbors Q’,
who uses them to locally compute its own solutions by means of its own, local
solution program, etc., until reaching P. Such a program Πman(P) can be a manifold
program (Faber and Woltran 2011).
Actually, within a manifold program (MP), a program can pass certain or possible
query answers as an input to another program. Conceptually, MPs offer a nice
logical solution, by means of a single program, to this form of program combination
that, otherwise, would require external intervention (the efficient implementation
of MPs is still an open problem).
A.5 On trust
We introduced trust relationships in the process of peer data exchange already in
(Bertossi and Bravo 2004b); and here we have further developed this idea, in a
general semantic framework. However, the notion of trust we have in this work is
still rather simple. Actually, it can be represented as an annotated binary relation
between peers. It would be interesting to impose a more sophisticated and rich
model of trust on top of the DECs-bases network of peers. Our concern is not
about computing or updating trust in a P2P overlay network (Xiong and Liu 2004;
Jøsang et al. 2006), but about logical specifications of trust. We envision a logic-
based model of trust that can be integrated with/into the DECs. Such a model
could express some higher level properties, e.g. symmetry or transitivity of trust
relationships. A logic-based representation of trust could allow us to infer non-
explicit trust relationships whenever necessary.
Trust modeling is an active and important area of research nowadays, most no-
tably in the context of the semantic web. See (Sabater and Sierra 2005; Artz and
Gil 2007) for surveys. The integration of trust models, including related notions,
like reputation, provenance, etc., into peer data exchange is still an open area of re-
search. This is specially the case for logic-based models of trust (Herzig et al. 2008).
See (Hien Nguyen et al. 2008) and references therein for probabilistic approaches.
In Definition 6.1, the trust relationships between peers were implicitly and rigidly
captured in the specifications of solutions by means of the disjunctive heads of
the repair rules. Although this is a simpler way of presenting things, it has some
drawbacks: (a) The approach is not modular in the sense that trust is built-in into
the rules; (b) Changes in trust relationships requires changing heads of repair rules;
and (c) In case no solution exists due to the rigid and conflicting trust relationships,
no alternative, but possibly less desirable solution can be obtained as a stable model
of the solution program.
One way of addressing these issues is through the use of preference programs,
which are answer set programs that express different forms of preference, which
essentially amounts to preferring and keeping only certain stable models of the
program. For example, in a disjunctive rule of the form A ∨ B ← Body, one could
prefer to make A true instead of B . If this is possible, only that stable model would
be chosen. However, if that is not possible (due to the other rules and facts in
the program), making B true is still good enough. More complex preferences could
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also be captured. Preferences can be explicitly and declaratively expressed, and the
resulting programs can be compiled into usual answer set programs with their usual
stable model semantics (cf. (Brewka 2004) and references therein).
Here we briefly outline how weak program constraints (Buccafurri et al. 2000;
Leone et al. 2006) declaratively capture the kind of preferences that address our
needs. (Cf. (Brewka 2004) for connections between preferences in logic programs
and weak constraints.).
Example 6
Consider Example 6.2, where (P1, less, P2) ∈ Trust is captured by the non-disjunctive
repair rule
R1 (x , y , t)← R2 (x , y , t?),R1 (x , y , f?), x 6= null, y 6= null·
The same effect, and more, could be obtained by uniformly using disjunctive rules
followed by appropriate weak constraints. In this case,
R1 (x , y , t) ∨ R2 (x , y , f) ← R2 (x , y , t?),R1 (x , y , f?), x 6= null, y 6= null ·
⇐ R2 (x , y , f)· (A7)
Here, the weak constraint (A7) expresses a preference for the stable models of the
program that minimize the number of violations of the condition expressed its body,
in this case, that, when restoring the satisfaction of the DEC ∀x∀y(R2(x , y) →
R1(x , y)), the tuple R2(x , y) is not deleted. These weak constraints are used by a
peer P to ensure that, if possible, the tuples in the peers that it trusts more than
itself are not modified. 2
If the original solution program has solutions, then the new program would have
the same solutions. However, the latter could have solutions when the former does
not. This would make the semantics of the system more flexible with respect to
unsatisfiable trust requirements. It is also clear that the weak constraints could be
easily derived from the trust relationships and the DECs. The solution program
with weak constraints can be run in the DLV system (Leone et al. 2006) to obtain
the solutions and peer consistent answers of a peer.
Notice that the new repair programs, except for the weak program constraints,
are now of the same kind as those for specifying repairs of single databases with
respect to local ICs (Bravo and Bertossi 2006). Actually, if in the new program the
weak program constraints are replaced by (hard) program constraints, e.g. (A7) by
← R2 (x , y , f), the solutions coincide with those of the programs in Definition 6.1.
We should mention that in (Arenas et al. 2003), weak constraints were used, as
a part of a repair program, to specify the preference for cardinality repairs, i.e.
repairs that minimize the number of tuples that are inserted or deleted to restore
consistency, as opposed to minimality (with respect to subset-inclusion) of sets of
inserted/deleted tuples.
Appendix B Proofs of Results
Proof of Proposition 3.1:
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Let D0 be an empty instance for the schema S(N (P)). By being empty, D0 satis-
fies
⋃
Q∈N (P) Σ(P, Q) (condition (i) for a neighborhood solution). Also, since all the
trust relationships are of the “same” kind, condition (ii) on neighborhood solutions
is satisfied by D0. Then, either D0 is a neighborhood solution, or there exists a
neighborhood solution D ′′ such that D ′′ D¯ D0. 2
Proof of Corollary 3.1:
All we need is notice that the possibly inconsistent sink peers in the accessibility
graph always have local repairs under the kind of DECS considered (ICs in that
case). A solution for a peer P can then be obtained by recursively propagating back
neighborhood solutions (that always exist by Proposition 3.1) for peers along the
paths that contain P. 2
Proof of Proposition 5.1:
Membership of coNP is established by directly appealing to Definition 3.1 of neigh-
borhood solution. In fact, given neighborhood instance J , after having checked (in
polynomial time) if J ⊆ r -Chasenull(D¯ ,Σ−(P)), a non-deterministic algorithm to
test that J is not a neighborhood solution for P and the neighborhood instance D¯
checks if one of the following holds:
1. J 6|= Σ(P).
2. J  {R} 6= D¯  {R}, for some Q ∈ N (P) and predicate R ∈ S(Q) with
(P, less, Q) ∈ Trust.
3. There is an instance J ′ for S(N (P)) (the non-deterministic choice) that sat-
isfies conditions (i) and (ii) of Definition 3.1, but J ′ <Σ(P)
D¯
J .
These conditions are the basis for a non-deterministic algorithm: First conditions
1. and 2. can be checked deterministically in polynomial time. If they are passed by
J (i.e. the answer is negative), then an instance J ′ with size polynomially bounded
by the size of J is guessed. Next, conditions 1.-2. are checked for J ′, and 3., for the
pair (J , J ′). The three tests can be performed in polynomial time in |J | + |D¯ |. If
the answer to any of the tests is yes, J is not a neighborhood solution.
Hardness can be proved by reduction of satisfiability of propositional formulas
in CNF, which is coNP -complete. The reduction is a modification of that used in
Theorem 4.4 of (Chomicki and Marcinkowski 2005) to prove that repairs obtained
through deletions are coNP -complete. In our case we have to deal with trust rela-
tionships and the possible insertion of tuples with null. Actually, in our proof the
former will be used to exclude the latter.
We now show that the satisfiability of a propositional formula ϕ : ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 ∧
. . . ϕm in CNF (i.e. the ϕi are clauses) can be reduced to checking if a particular
neighborhood instance is a neighborhood solution for a given peer.
Consider the fixed PDES schema (it does not depend on ϕ): P = 〈P,S,Σ, T rust〉,
with P = {P1, P2},S = {S (P1),S (P2)}, S (P1) = {R1(·, ·, ·, ·)}, S (P2) = {R2(·, ·, ·, ·)},
Trust = {(P1, same, P1), (P1, less, P2)}, and Σ = {Σ(P1, P1),Σ(P1, P2)}, with:
Σ(P1, P1) = {∀x1y1y2z1z2w1w2(R1(x1, y1, z1,w1) ∧ R1(x1, y2, z2,w2)→ y1 = y2),
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∀x1y1z1w1(R1(x1, y1, z1,w1)→ ∃x2y2z2R1(x2, y2, z2, z1))}.
Σ(P1, P2) = {∀xyzw(R1(x , y , z ,w)→ R2(x , y , z ,w))}.
Now, consider a propositional formula ϕ as above, on which the instances for the
peer system will depend. Let Dϕ = {D(P1),D(P2)} be the instance for P, with:
D(P1) = {R1(pj , 0, ϕi , ϕi+1) | pj occurs negatively in ϕi} ∪
{R1(pj , 1, ϕi , ϕi+1) | pj occurs positively in ϕi} ·
D(P2) = {R2(a, b, c, d) | R1(a, b, c, d) ∈ D(P1)}·
(The addition i +1 is meant to be modulo the number m of clauses in φ.) Notice that
tables R1 and R2 for peers P1 and P2, respectively, have the same rows. Intuitively,
the UDEC in Σ(P1, P1) ensures that, for every proposition in the first attribute of
R1, the truth assignment, if any, is unique; whereas the RDEC in it, ensures that
there are assignments that make all clauses in the formula true.
We now show that the neighborhood instance D¯ , with the empty relation for R1
plus the original contents of D(P2), is the neighborhood solution for P1 with initial
neighborhood instance D(P1)∪D(P2) if and only if ϕ is not satisfiable. In this case,
D¯ would be obtained through the deletion of all tuples from R1 in D(P1). Notice
that due to the trust relations and the DEC in Σ(P1, P2), only tuple deletions from
peer P1’s instance are admissible updates.
To prove that D¯ being a neighborhood solution for P1 implies that ϕ is not sat-
isfiable, assume by contradiction that ϕ is satisfiable. Then, there is an assignment
σ that makes ϕ true.
The instance D¯ ′ := {R1(p, 0, ϕi , ϕi+1) ∈ D(P1) | σ(p) = 0} ∪ {R1(p, 1, ϕi , ϕi+1) ∈
D(P1) | σ(p) = 1} ∪ D(P2) is a subinstance of D(P1) ∪ D(P2), D¯ ′ S(P1) 6= ∅,
satisfies the DECs, and does not modify the more trusted relations, i.e. D¯ ′S(P2) =
D(P2). Thus, D¯ cannot be a neighborhood solution since D¯ ′ <Σ(P1)
D(P1)∪D(P2) D¯ .
Now we show that if ϕ is not satisfiable, then D¯ is a neighborhood solution for
P1 when starting with neighborhood instance D(P1) ∪ D(P2). Assume by contra-
diction that D¯ is not a neighborhood solution. Since D¯ satisfies all the DECs and
respects the trust relationships, D¯ cannot be a neighborhood solution only if there
is a neighborhood instance D¯ ′, such that: D¯ ′ |= Σ(P1); D¯ ′ S (P2) = D(P2), and
D¯ ′ <Σ(P1)
D(P1)∪D(P2) D¯ . Since D¯
′ can be obtained only through tuple deletions, it holds:
D¯ $ D ′ ⊆ D(P1) ∪ D(P2). Thus, there is at least one tuple R1(t¯) ∈ (D¯ ′ ∩ D(P1)).
Due to the UDEC in Σ(P1, P2), we conclude that, for every i ∈ [1,m], there exists
a p and v with R1(p, v , ϕi , ϕi+1) ∈ (D ′ ∩D(P1)). Using these tuples we can define
the following assignment σ′:
σ′(p) =
{
1 if R1(p, 1, ϕi , ϕi+1) ∈ D ′ with i ∈ [1,m]
0 if R1(p, 0, ϕi , ϕi+1) ∈ D ′ with i ∈ [1,m]
The assignment is well defined, because the functional dependency in Σ(P1, P1)
ensures that only one value exists for each proposition. By construction, σ′ is an
assignment that satisfies ϕ. We have reached a contradiction, which completes the
proof. 2
Consistency and Trust in Peer Data Exchange Systems 69
Proof of Proposition 5.2:
First we prove membership of ΠP2 . An atom R(t¯) ∈ localCore(P, D¯) if for every
D ′ ∈ NS(P, D¯), D ′ |= R(t¯). Thus, a non-deterministic algorithm that checks if
R(t¯) 6∈ localCore(P, D¯) guesses an instance J of S(N (P)), next checks if it is a
neighborhood solution for P and D¯ , and finally, if R(t¯) 6∈ J . By Proposition 5.1,
the first of these two tests is in coNP ; and the second one is in polynomial time.
Thus, the problem is in ΠP2 .
Hardness holds by a reduction from satisfiability of a quantified propositional
formulas (QBF) β of the form ∀p1 · · · ∀pk∃q1 · · · ∃qlψ, where ψ is a quantifier-free
propositional formula in CNF, i.e. of the form ψ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ψm , where the ψi are
clauses. This problem is ΠP2 -complete (Schaefer and Umans 2008; Papadimitriou
1994). (The reduction is adapted from that for Theorem 4.7 in (Chomicki and
Marcinkowski 2005).)
We construct a PDES schema (independent from β) P0 = 〈P0,S0,Σ0, T rust0〉,
with P0 = {P1, P2}, S0 = {S(P1),S(P1)}, S(P1) = {R(·, ·, ·),T (·)}, S(P2) =
{Clause(·), V ar(·)}, Trust0 = {(P1, less, P2)}, and the DECs Σ0 = {Σ(P1, P2),
Σ(P1, P1)} with:
Σ(P1, P2) = {∀x (Clause(x )→ ∃yzR(y , z , x )),
∀x (V ar(x )→ R(x , 1, a) ∨ R(x , 0, a))},
Σ(P1, P1) = {∀xy1y2z1z2(R(x , y1, z1) ∧ R(x , y2, z2))→ y1 = y2,
∀xyzw(R(x , y , z ) ∧ T (w)→ w 6= sat ∨ IsNotNull(x ) ∨ IsNotNull(y))} ·
Now, given a QBF β, we construct an instance D¯β for the neighborhood schema
S(N (P1)) around P1, such that: T (sat) ∈ localCore(P1, D¯β) iff β is true.
Now, for β = ∀p1 · · · ∀pk∃q1 · · · ∃ql(ψ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ψm), D¯β := Dβ(P1) ∪Dβ(P2), with:
Dβ(P1) := {R(varj , 1, ψi) | varj occurs positively in ψi} ∪
{R(varj , 0, ψi) | varj occurs negatively in ψi} ∪
{V ar(pi) | pi is universally quantified in ψ} ∪ {T (sat)} ·
Dβ(P2) := {Clause(ψ1), . . . , Clause(ψm)}·
Intuitively, relation R(x , y , z ) is used to provide a truth value y to variable x in
conjunct z . This truth value will be unique across ψ due to the integrity constraints
on R contained in Σ(P1, P1). The first DEC in Σ(P1, P2) ensures that, for every
clause ψi , there is, if possible, a literal which is true in it. If it is not possible
(the formula is not true), it inserts a tuple of the form R(null, null, ψi). The second
DEC ensures that all possible assignments for the universally quantifies variables are
tested in different solutions. It uses a constant, a, which is different from all ψi . The
first IC in Σ(P1, P1) enforces that, in each solution, each propositional variable takes
a unique value. Finally, the second IC in Σ(P1, P1) ensures that if R(null, null, ψi)
is true, then predicate T (sat) should not be part of the neighborhood solution. In
this way, formula β is true if and only of T (sat) ∈ localCore(P1, D¯β). To conclude
the proof, we illustrate the reduction with the following example.
Example 7
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Fig. B 1. Instances for a peer system
Consider the QBF ∀p1∃q1∃q2(ψ1 ∧ ψ2 ∧ ψ3), with ψ1 : (p1 ∨ q1), ψ2 : (p1 ∨ ¬q2),
and ψ3 : q2. Instance D¯β is the union of the instances in Figure B 1.
On this basis, the neighborhood solutions for P1 and D¯β are:
D1 ={R(p1, 1, a),R(p1, 1, ψ1),R(q1, 1, ψ1),R(p1, 1, ψ2),R(q2, 1, ψ3),T (sat)}∪D(P2),
D2 ={R(p1, 0, a),R(q1, 1, ψ1),R(q2, 1, ψ3),R(null, null, ψ2)} ∪D(P2), and
D3 ={R(p1, 0, a),R(q1, 1, ψ1),R(q2, 0, ψ2),R(null, null, ψ3)} ∪D(P2).
Since T (sat) 6∈ localCore(P1, D¯β) := (D1 ∩D2 ∩D3)S(P1), the QBF formula is
false.
2
Proof of Corollary 5.2:
Membership is established with a test similar to that in the proof of Proposition
5.2. Hardness follows from Proposition 5.2, because it is about a particular kind of
conjunctive queries, namely atomic of the form Q(x¯ ) : R(x¯ ), where R is a predicate
for a peer P. The peer consistent answers to this query are exactly the c¯s, such that
R(c¯) is in the local core of P. 2
1 Algorithm: ImportSolution
2 Input: An instance D for a PDES schema P = 〈P,S,Σ, T rust〉 and a peer P ∈ P
3 Output: The unique solution of P
4 if P has no outgoing edges then return D(P) else
5 foreach Q ∈ N ◦(P) do
6 Sol(Q,D)← ImportSolution(P, Q);
7 D ′ ← D(P) ∪⋃Q∈N◦(P) Sol(Q,D);
8 NS ← minimal model of Datalog import program I(P,D ′) ;
9 return NSS(P);
Fig. B 2. Computing the solution for a peer in the import case
Proof of Proposition 5.3:
The existence and uniqueness is straightforward since there are no local restrictions
(existence), and there is no non-determinism involved (uniqueness). The unique so-
lution for a peer P can be computed by means of Algorithm ImportSolution shown in
Figure B 2. It recursively computes the solutions for all the peers that are accessible
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from P. The base case occurs when a peer Q has no DECs (line 4). In that case,
its unique solution is its own database D(Q). Otherwise (lines 5-10), the algorithm
recursively requests the solutions of its neighbors (lines 6-7) and uses them to con-
struct instance D ′ (line 8). Then, the unique neighborhood solution for the peer
consists of the minimal model of I(P,D ′) (line 9). By restricting P’s neighborhood
solution to P’s schema we get P’s solution (line 10). 2
Proof of Proposition 6.1:
We will prove this result for the case where the central peer trusts its neighbors
as much as itself, which is more general in some sense than that where it trusts
neighbors’ data more, because more alternatives for repairs come up, using the full
power of disjunctive programs. Below D is P’s neighborhood instance for which
neighborhood solutions are specified by means of the program in Definition 6.1. C
is the set of constraints, i.e. UDECs and RDECs, for the neighborhood.
Given the trust assumptions, the program takes a special form, as follows. For
exchange constraints in C of the forms:
(a) Universal constraint (UDEC):
∀x¯ (
m∧
i=1
Pi(x¯i) −→
n∨
j=1
Qj (y¯j ) ∨ ϕ) · (B1)
(b) Referential constraint: (RDEC)
∀x¯ (P(x¯ ) −→ ∃y¯ Q(x¯ ′, y¯)) · 27 (B2)
the neighborhood solution program Π(P,D) becomes:
1. dom(c) for every c ∈ Adom(D)r {null}.
2. The fact P(a¯) for every atom P(a¯) ∈ D.
3. For every UDEC ψ of the form (B1), the rule:∨n
i=1 Pi (x¯i , f) ∨
∨m
j=1 Qj (y¯j , t) ←−
∧n
i=1 Pi (x¯i , t
?),
∧m
j=1 Qj (y¯j , f
?),∧
xl∈RelV (ψ) dom(xl), ϕ¯·
where RelV (ψ) is the set of relevant attributes for ψ, x¯ =
⋃n
i=1 xi , and ϕ¯ is a
conjunction of built-ins that is equivalent to the negation of ϕ.
4. For every RDEC ψ of the form (B2), the rules:28
P (x¯ , f) ∨Q (x¯ ′, null, t)← P (x¯ , t?), not auxψ(x¯ ′), dom(x¯ ′)·
And for every yi ∈ y¯ :
auxψ(x¯
′)← Q (x¯ ′, y¯ , t?), not Q (x¯ ′, y¯ , f), dom(x¯ ′), dom(yi).
auxψ(x¯
′)← Q(x¯ ′, null), not Q (x¯ ′, null, f), dom(x¯ ′).
5. For every predicate P ∈ S(N (P)), the rules:
P (x¯ , t?)← P(x¯ ) · P (x¯ , t?)← P (x¯ , t)·
P (x¯ , f?)← P(x¯ , f) · P (x¯ , f?)← dom(x¯ ), not P(x¯ )·
6. For every predicate P ∈ S(N (P)), the interpretation rules:
P (x¯ , t??) ← P (x¯ , t) · P (x¯ , t??) ← P(x¯ ), not P (x¯ , f)·
7. For every predicate P ∈ S(N (P)), the coherence constraints:
← P (x¯ , t), P (x¯ , f)·
The claim is: IfM is a stable model of Π(P,D), then DM is a neighborhood solution
28 Literal dom(x¯) denotes the conjunction of the atoms dom(xj ) for xj ∈ x¯ .
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repair of D. Furthermore, the neighborhood solutions obtained in this way are all
the neighborhood solutions of D. We recall that for a stable model of Π(P,D),
DM = {P(a¯) | P ∈ S(N (P)) and P (a¯, t??) ∈ M } · (B3)
The proof follows directly from Propositions 1 and 2 below, which require in their
turn some lemmas and intermediate definitions. 2
In the following, for a disjunctive program Π and a set of ground atoms M , ΠM
is the positive ground program obtained by the Gelfond-Lifschitz transformation
(Gelfond and Lifschitz 1991):
ΠM = {H ← B | H ← B , notA1, . . . , notAm ∈ ground(Π), and A1, . . .Am /∈ M }·
Lemma 1
Given an instance D and a RDEC-acyclic set of UDECs and RDECs, if M is a
stable model of Π(P,D), then exactly one of the following cases holds:
1. P(a¯), P (a¯, t?) and P (a¯, t??) belong to M , and no other P (a¯, v), for v an
annotation, belongs to M .
2. P(a¯), P (a¯, t?) and P (a¯, f) belong to M , and no other P (a¯, v), for v an
annotation, belongs to M .
3. P(a¯) 6∈ M , and P (a¯, t), P (a¯, t?), P (a¯, t??) belong to M , and no other
P (a¯, v), for v an annotation, belongs to M .
4. P(a¯) 6∈ M , and no P (a¯, v), for v an annotation, belongs to M .
Proof: For an atom P(a¯), there are two possibilities:
(a) P(a¯) ∈ M . Then, from rule 5., P (a¯, t?) ∈ M . Two cases are possible now:
P (a¯, f) 6∈ M or P (a¯, f) ∈ M . In the first case, since M is minimal, P (a¯, t) 6∈
M and P (a¯, t??) ∈ M . In the second case, due to rule 7., P (a¯, t) 6∈ M . These
cases cover the first two in the statement of the lemma.
(b) P(a¯) 6∈ M . Two cases are possible now: P (a¯, t) ∈ M or P (a¯, t) 6∈ M . In
the first one, it also holds P (a¯, t??), P (a¯, t?) ∈ M , by rules 5. and 6.; and
P (a¯, f) 6∈ M by rule 7. In the second case, P (a¯, t?) 6∈ M (because M is
minimal), P (a¯, f) 6∈ M (because P (a¯, t?) 6∈ M , and M is minimal). These
cases cover the last two in the statement of the lemma.
2
From two database instances we can define a structure.
Definition 1
For two database instances D1 and D2 over the same schema and domain and a
set of constraints C, M ?C (D1, D2) is the Herbrand structure 〈U , IP , IB〉, where U
is the underlying domain,29 and IP , IB are the interpretations for the database
predicates (extended with annotation arguments), and the built-ins, respectively.
IP is inductively defined as follows:
29 In this case it can be restricted to the active domain of the neighborhood instance D (or the
union of the active domains of D1,D2) plus the constant null.
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1. If P(a¯) ∈ D1 and P(a¯) ∈ D2, then P(a¯), P (a¯, t?) and P (a¯, t??) ∈ IP .
2. If P(a¯) ∈ D1 and P(a¯) 6∈ D2, then P(a¯), P (a¯, t?) and P (a¯, f) ∈ IP .
3. If P(a¯) 6∈ D1 and P(a¯) 6∈ D2, then P (a¯, v) 6∈ IP for every annotation v .
4. If P(a¯) 6∈ D1 and P(a¯) ∈ D2, then P (a¯, t), P (a¯, t?) and P (a¯, t??) ∈ IP .
5. For every RDEC ψ ∈ C of the form ∀x¯ (P(x¯ )→ ∃y¯Q(x¯ ′, y¯)): If P (a¯, t??) ∈ IP
and Q (a¯ ′, b¯, t??) ∈ IP , with a¯ 6= null and at least one b ∈ b¯, b 6= null, then
auxψ(a¯
′) ∈ IP .
The interpretation IB is defined as expected: if Q is a built-in, then Q(a¯) ∈ IB iff
Q(a¯) is true in classical logic, and Q(a¯) 6∈ IB iff Q(a¯) is false. 2
Notice that the database instance associated to M ?C (D1,D2) through (B3) corre-
sponds exactly to D2, i.e. DM?C (D1,D2) = D2.
Lemma 2
Given an instance D and a set C of UDECs and RDECs, if D ′ |=
N
C, then there is
a model M of the program Π(P,D)M with DM = D
′. Actually, M ?C (D ,D
′) is such
a model.
Proof: Since DM?C (D,D′) = D
′, we only need to show that M ?C (D ,D
′) satisfies all
the rules of Π(P,D)M
?
C (D,D
′). First, by construction, it is clear that rules 2., 5. and
6. are satisfied by M ?C (D ,D
′).
For every UDEC in C, the program has the rule in 3. If its body is satisfied,
then the atoms Pi (a¯i , t
?) ∈ M ?C (D ,D ′) and Qi (b¯i , f) ∈ M ?C (D ,D ′) or Qi(b¯i) 6∈
M ?C (D ,D
′). Also, since the constraint is satisfied, at least one of the Pi(a¯i) is not
in D ′ or one of the Qi(b¯i) is in D ′. By construction of M ?C (D ,D
′), at least one
of Pi (a¯i , f) or Qi (b¯i , t) is in M
?
C (D ,D
′). Therefore, the head of the rule is also
satisfied.
For every RDEC in C, there are the rules 4. By construction of M ?C (D ,D ′), for
every ψ ∈ C, those that define auxψ(x¯ ) are satisfied.
If the body of the first rule in 4 is true in M ?C (D ,D
′), it means that the con-
straint is not satisfied in the initial instance or at some point along the repair pro-
cess. Since the constraint is satisfied by D ′, the satisfaction is restored by adding
Q (x¯ , null) or by deleting P(x¯ ). This implies that Q (x¯ , null, t) ∈ M ?C (D ,D ′) or
P (x¯ , f) ∈ M ?C (D ,D ′). As a consequence, the first (or second) rule is satisfied. Then,
by construction of M ?C (D ,D
′), P (a¯, f) ∈ M ?C (D ,D ′), and the head of the rule is
satisfied. 2
The next lemma shows that if M is a minimal model of the program Π(P,D)M ,
then DM satisfies the constraints.
Lemma 3
Given a database D and a set of constraints C, if M is a stable model of the program
Π(P,D), then DM |=N C.
Proof: We want to show that DM |=N ψ, for every constraint ψ ∈ C. There are
two cases to consider:
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A. IC ψ is a UDEC. Since M is a model of Π(P,D)M , M satisfies rules 3. of
Π(P,D). Then, at least one of the following cases holds:
(a) Pi (a¯, f) ∈ M . Then, Pi(a¯, t??) /∈ M and P(a¯) 6∈ DM (by Lemma 1).
Hence, Pi(a¯) /∈ DM . Since the analysis was done for an arbitrary value
a¯, DM |=N
∧n
i=1 Pi(x¯i)→
∨m
j=1 Qj (y¯j ) ∨ ϕ holds.
(b) Qj (a¯, t) ∈ M . It is symmetric to the previous one.
(c) It is not true that M |=
N
ϕ¯. Then M |=
N
ϕ. Hence, ϕ is true, and
DM |=N
∧n
i=1 Pi(x¯i)→
∨m
j=1 Qj (y¯j ) ∨ ϕ holds.
(d) Pi (a¯, t
?) /∈ M . Given that M is minimal, just the last item in Lemma 1
holds. This means Pi(a¯, t
??) /∈ M , Pi(a¯) 6∈ DM and Pi(a¯) /∈ DM . Since
the analysis was done for an arbitrary value a¯, DM |=N
∧n
i=1 Pi(x¯i) →∨m
j=1 Qj (y¯j ) ∨ ϕ holds.
(e) Qj (a¯, f) /∈ M or Qj (a¯) ∈ M . Given that M is minimal, just the first
item in Lemma 1 holds. Then, Qj (a¯, t
??) ∈ M , Qj (a¯) ∈ DM and
DM |=N Qj (a¯). Since the analysis was done for an arbitrary value a¯,
DM |=N
∧n
i=1 Pi(x¯i)→
∨m
j=1 Qj (y¯j ) ∨ ϕ holds.
B. Formula ψ is a RDEC. Since M is a model of Π(P,D)M , M satisfies rules 4.
of Π(P,D). Then, at least one of the following cases holds:
(a) P (a¯, f) ∈ M . Then, Pi (a¯, t??) /∈ M and P(a¯) 6∈ DM (by Lemma 1).
Hence, Pi (a¯) /∈ DM . Since the analysis was done for an arbitrary value
a¯, DM |=N (P(x¯ )→ Q(x¯ ′, y)) holds.
(b) Q (a¯ ′, null, t) ∈ M . It is symmetric to the previous one.
(c) P (a¯, t?) /∈ M . Given that M is minimal, just the last item in Lemma
1 holds. This means P (a¯, t??) /∈ M , P(a¯) 6∈ DM and P(a¯) /∈ DM .
Since the analysis was done for an arbitrary value a¯, DM |=N (P(x¯ ) →
Q(x¯ ′, y)) holds.
(d) auxψ(a¯
′) ∈ M . This means that P (a¯, t?) ∈ M and there exists b¯ 6= null
with Q (a¯ ′, b¯, t?) ∈ M , Q (a¯, f) 6∈ M , and then, that P(a¯) ∈ DM and
Q(a¯, b¯) ∈ DM . Then, the constraint is satisfied.
2
Lemma 4
Let D and D ′ be instances over the same schema and domain. If M is a minimal
model of Π(P,D)M
?
C (D,D
′) with M $ M ?C (D ,D ′), then there exists M ′ that is a
minimal model of Π(P,D)M
′
with DM ′ <D D
′.
Proof: Since M is a minimal model of Π(P,D)M
?
C (D,D
′), P(a¯) ∈ M iff P(a¯) ∈ D .
By definition of M ?C (D ,D
′) and M $ M ?C (D ,D ′), the only two ways that both
models can differ is that, for some P(a¯) ∈ D , P (a¯, f) ∈ M ?C (D ,D ′) and nei-
ther P(a¯) nor P (a¯, f) belong to M , or for some P(a¯) 6∈ D , {P (a¯, t), P(a¯, t?),
P (a¯, t??)} ⊆ M ?C (D ,D ′) and none of P(a¯), P (a¯, t), P(a¯, t?), P (a¯, t??) belong to
M . Now, we can use the interpretation rules over M to construct M ′ that is a
minimal model of Π(P,D)M
′
, as follows:
1. If P(a¯) ∈ M and P (a¯, f) 6∈ M , then P(a¯),P (a¯, t?) and P (a¯, t??) ∈ M ′.
2. If P(a¯) ∈ M and P (a¯, f) ∈ M , then P(a¯),P (a¯, t?) and P (a¯, f) ∈ M ′.
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3. If P(a¯) 6∈ M and P (a¯, t) 6∈ M , then nothing is added to M ′.
4. If P(a¯) 6∈ M and P (a¯, t) ∈ M , then P (a¯, t), P (a¯, t?) and P (a¯, t??) ∈ M ′.
It is clear that M ′ satisfies the coherence constraints, and is a minimal model of
Π(P,D)M
′
.
It just rests to prove that DM ′ <D D
′. First, we prove that DM ′ ≤D D ′. Let us
suppose P(a¯) ∈ ∆(D ,DM ′). Then, either P(a¯) ∈ D and P(a¯) 6∈ DM ′ or P(a¯) 6∈ D
and P(a¯) ∈ DM ′ . In the first case, P(a¯), P (a¯, t?) and P (a¯, f) belong to M ′. These
atoms are also in M and, given the only two ways in which M and M ?C (D ,D
′) can
differ, they are also in M ?C (D ,D
′). Hence, P(a¯) ∈ ∆(D ,D ′). In the second case,
P (a¯, t) and P (a¯, t?) belong to M ′. These atoms are also in M and, given the only
two ways in which M and M ?C (D ,D
′) can differ, they are also in M ?C (D ,D
′). Hence,
P(a¯) ∈ ∆(D ,D ′).
We now prove that DM ′ <D D
′. We know that, for some fact P(a¯), P (a¯, t) ∈
M ?C (D ,D
′) and P (a¯, t) 6∈ M , or P (a¯, f) ∈ M ?C (D ,D ′) and P (a¯, f) 6∈ M . If P (a¯, f)
is in M ?C (D ,D
′) and not in M , then, P(a¯) ∈ ∆(D ,D ′), but P(a¯) 6∈ ∆(D ,DM ′).
Alternatively, if P (a¯, t) and P (a¯, t?) belong to M ?C (D ,D
′) but not to M , then
P(a¯) ∈ ∆(D ,D ′), but P(a¯) 6∈ ∆(D ,DM ′). Therefore, DM ′ <D D ′. 2
Proposition 1
Given a neighborhood instance D and a set C of UDECs and RDECs, if D ′ is a
neighborhood solution for D with respect to C, then there is a stable model M of
the program Π(P,D)M with DM = D
′. Furthermore, the model M corresponds to
M ?C (D ,D
′).
Proof: By Lemma 2, M ?C (D ,D
′) is a model of Π(P,D)M
?
C (D,D
′). We now show
that it is minimal. Assume, by contradiction, that there exists a model M of
Π(P,D)M
?
C (D,D
′) with M $ M ?C (D ,D ′). We can assume, without loss of gener-
ality, that M is a minimal model. Since M $ M ?C (D ,D ′), the model M contains
the atom P(a¯) iff P(a¯) ∈ D .
By Lemma 4, there exists model M ′ such that DM ′ <D D′ and M ′ is a mini-
mal model of Π(P,D)M
′
. By Lemma 3, DM ′ |=N C. This contradicts that D ′ is a
neighborhood solution. 2
Proposition 2
If M is a stable model of Π(P,D), then DM is a neighborhood solution for D with
respect to C.
Proof: From Lemma 3, it holds DM |=N C. We have to prove that it is ≤D -
minimal. Let us suppose there is a neighborhood solution D ′ (that satisfies C)
with D ′ <D DM . From Proposition 1, M ?C (D ,D
′) is a stable model of Π(P,D) and
DM?C (D,D′) = D
′ (we denote it simple with M ? in the rest of the proof).
If D ′ <D DM , there is an atom P(a¯) ∈ ∆(D ,DM ), with P(a¯) /∈ ∆(D ,D ′), or
there is an atom P(a¯, b¯) ∈ ∆(D ,DM ), with a¯ ′, b¯ 6= null, and an atom P(a¯, null) ∈
∆(D ,D ′). We analyze both cases:
1. P(a¯) ∈ ∆(D ,DM ) and P(a¯) 6∈ ∆(D ,D ′):
Since P(a¯) ∈ ∆(D ,DM ), P (a¯, t) or P (a¯, f) belong to M . By Lemma 1, there
are two cases:
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(a) P(a¯), P (a¯, t?) and P (a¯, f) belong to M , and no other P (a¯, v), for v
an annotation, belongs to M . P(a¯), P (a¯, t?) and P (a¯, t??) belong to
M ?, and, for any other annotation v , P (a¯, v) /∈ M ?.
(b) P (a¯, t), P (a¯, t?) and P (a¯, t??) belong to M , and no other P (a¯, v),
for v an annotation, belongs to M . No P (a¯, v), for v an annotation,
belongs to M ?.
If an atom belongs to a model M1, e.g. P (a¯, f), and there is another model M2
in which it is not present, then there must be in M2 an atom annotated with
t or f in order to satisfy the rule that was satisfied in M1 by P (a¯, f). This
implies that M ? has an atom annotated with t or f that does not belong to
M . This implies that there is an atom that belongs to ∆(D ,D ′) and that does
not belong to ∆(D ,DM ). We have reached a contradiction, because ∆(D ,D
′)
is a proper subset of ∆(D ,DM ).
2. P(a¯, b¯) ∈ ∆(D ,DM ) and P(a¯, null) ∈ ∆(D ,D ′):
If P(a¯, b¯) /∈ M , then P (a¯, b¯, t) ∈ M , P(a¯, null) /∈ M , P (a¯, null, t) /∈ M .
Since P(a¯, null) ∈ ∆(D ,D ′) and P(a¯, null) /∈ M , P (a¯, null, t) ∈ M ?.
Since P (a¯, null, t) ∈ M ?, there must be a rule representing a RDEC in
Π(D, C) such that P (a¯, null, t) is the only true atom in the head. For that rule
to be also satisfied by M , there must be another atom in the head of that rule
that is true in M but not in M ?. This means that there is a P(b¯) ∈ ∆(D ,DM )
and P(b¯) 6∈ ∆(D ,D ′), which brings us back to case 1. above. Again we obtain
a contradiction.
Therefore, it is not possible to have D ′ <D DM ; and DM is a neighborhood solution
for D . 2
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